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Abstract
Even though globalization is a core strategy of most major Japanese
engineering and construction (E&C) firms, they have made a weak appearance
in the international construction market. Few firms have seriously attempted to
globalize, largely due to their lack of a strong incentive to advance in the
international market. Today, however, circumstances are changing. Japan has
become the largest construction market in the world and has received
considerable attention from foreign countries. Foreign governments, especially
the United 3tates, have begun to press the Japanese government to open its
construction market to foreign firms. As a result, the Japanese construction
market has become exposed for the first time to internal internationalization.
The purpose of this study is to assess overseas strategies which have
been taken by Japanese E&C firms. However, the Japanese unique
contractual system and public construction policy make the assessment difficult.
The study found that while competition determines the strategies of international
E&C firms, Japanese firms are determined by designation in the area of public
works. It is competition that determines the strategies of international E&C firms.
The nature of this competition is controlled by the contractual system of a
market, while the contractual system is influenced by the construction policy of a
country. Therefore, in order to study Japanese E&C firms' overseas strategies,
this thesis will also examine the Japanese domestic contractual system, its
construction policy and the resulting strategies of Japanese firms.
Thesis Supervisor: Fred Moavenzadeh
Title: Director, Henry L. Pierce Laboratory
George Macomber Professor of Construction Management
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chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Major international engineering and construction (E&C) contractors
are always looking for opportunities to increase their business in the
international market, as there are often unpredictable opportunities there.
Today, a relatively large percentage of construction work in industrial
countries is in the maintenance of old structures; newly industrialized
countries (NICS) and developing countries are spending considerable
amounts of money to establish the infrastructures they need to proceed with
industrialization. One of the goals of civil engineering is to contribute to the
peace and prosperity of the world through participating in these
international engineering and construction projects.
Construction is as old as history. Originally, it was not a means of
making money, but the staff of life. However, engineering has changed its
nature so that it is more efficient, productive, challenging and powerful.
Great business opportunities have been born as civil engineering has
evolved. On the other hand, the international construction grew out of
domestic construction services, in response to customer dissatisfaction
13
when their demands could not be met due to domestic limitations.
U.S. E&C firms have led and still dominate the international
construction market. Their strengths are demonstrated in petrochemical
engineering, procurement, and construction fields, which account for about
half of the international market today. The success of the U.S. E&C firms in
petrochemical engineering is attributed to their technological competitive
advantages. Since petrochemical engineering was born and grew up in
the United States, its E&C firms have been able to get technological
advantages through collaborating with the U.S. petrochemical industry.
European E&C firms have a long history of exporting engineering
and construction to their former colonies. They have also expanded their
businesses to include new markets in the U.S., Asia and South America,
using merger and acquisition (M&A) as their main strategy. This practice
has been common in European industries as in other countries, including
the United States, so that today a considerable number of U.S. firms are
operated by large European businesses. The advantages European E&C
firms enjoy in their former colonies are cultural similarity, geographical
advantages and historical backgrounds.
Japanese E&C firms have expanded into the international
market as Japanese industries have become more internationalized. They
began to export their engineering and construction services on a
commercial basis after World War II, having already had overseas
14
experience through participating in military, colonial, and government work
during the pre-war period. While the Japanese economy expanded and
invested overseas, Japanese E&C firms enjoyed the collaboration of
overseas businesses with Japanese industries. However, when the
Japanese economy headed into a recession and Japanese investments
began to be withdrawn from overseas, Japanese E&C firms realized that
their competitive advantages had been acceptable only in their
domestically based competition, and were not acceptable in the open
competition system of the international market. It became apparent that as
opposed to the international construction market, each country has its own
business traditions and rules, which are accepted only in that country.
Since the U.S. E&C industry has strongly influenced the behavior of the
international construction business, many U.S. business traditions and
rules have been built into the international construction market. Among
engineering and construction exporters, Japanese contractual practices
may be further from those of the international construction market because
of the unique evolutionary process that the Japanese construction industry
has taken.
Recent Japanese construction scandals have disclosed the unique
nature of this industry, and brought out its structural peculiarity, which may
be considered to be the cause of its weakness in the international
construction market. It is not too much to say that the Japanese construction
15
market, the largest in the world today, is dominated by Japanese E&C firms.
This is not because Japanese contractors have been highly competitive, but
because there have been many visible and invisible barriers which have
protected the industry from foreign competitors. In this environment,
Japanese construction firms have adjusted to their positions, shared
immense investments with each other, and enjoyed high profit margins.
Only when Japanese firms look for overseas projects, do they notice that
there is fierce competition in other markets. Takeshi Monden, a staff
engineer of the World Bank, in analyzing the reason why Japanese E&C
firms could not contract the projects funded by the World Bank, said that
they had no competitive cost advantage, which was critical for the World
Bank fund projects. He also believed that they were able to get a contract
only if they could supply tied funds from Japanese industries and the
government.
The U.S. construction industry was concerned that the invasion of
Japanese E&C firms into their construction markets might overwhelm many
U.S. firms. However, that has not happened so far. The U.S. imported
engineering and construction for $15.5 billion in 1987, but it decreased its
imports to $8.9 billion in 1991. This was due mostly to the recession and
the decrease of foreign investment in the United States. As Japanese
industries decreased their direct investment in the U.S., Japanese E&C
firms began to restructure their organizations and operations in order to
16
make them compatible with the U.S. market which is characterized by open
and fierce competition, low profit margins, difficult labor relations, high
wages, and many disputes. On the other hand, U.S. E&C firms are taking
the offensive in the Japanese market. The Japanese construction industry
has never regarded the Japanese domestic market as a part of the
international market. It has had to change both its domestic and overseas
strategies and adjust to changing business environments.
This thesis first describes the environment of the international
construction market from the perspective of Japanese E&C firms, then
studies structural issues of Japanese E&C industries, and finally explores
future strategies. The two cases studied in this thesis represent two major
engineering and construction exporters, general contractors and
engineering contractors.
17
chapter 2
OVERVIEW
2.1 The International Construction Market
The annual value of world construction put in place has been about
$3 trillion in recent years; construction services contribute about 6.5 percent
of the world's Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Table 1 shows each
country's construction market size, excluding construction materials,
machinery and equipment. Japan is the largest market in value, with more
than $650 billion in construction work completed in the year ending March
31, 1992. The annual value of construction put in place in the United States
has been more than $400 billion. The value of construction in Europe is
estimated at about $500 million a year. A large part of world construction
consists of small scale projects, such as the construction of housing and
road maintenance. This market, while only a fraction of total construction, is
nevertheless a big business and it dominated by relatively few major firms.
In the U.S., 200 firms conduct about 85 percent of the business, while in
Japan, 200 firms conduct about 45 percent. Industrial countries account for
18
Table 1. World Construction Market (GDP base)
- Comparative Statistics on Construction Service
as a Component in National Economics, 1990 -
Country GDP Percentage Total
($million) of GDP ($million)
Low-Income Economies
Ethiopia 6,034 3.6 217
Bangladesh 23,355 5.8 1,355
Mali 2,510 4.0 100
Zaire 3,007 2.0 60
Burkina Faso 1,454 0.6 9
Nepal 3,021 6.7 202
Myanmar 21,793 1.3 283
Malawi 1,841 4.2 77
Niger 2,122 4.0 85
Tanzania 5,904 1.5 89
Burundi 1,104 4.1 45
Uganda 4,463 7.2 321
Togo 1,050 3.5 37
Central African Republic 1,096 1.8 20
India 272,876 5.6 15,281
Madagascar 2,672 3.8 102
Somalia 1,612 3.8 61
Benin 1,528 4.9 75
Rwanda 2,378 6.9 164
China 301,660 5.7 17,195
Kenya 8,756 6.9 604
Sierra Leone 463 1.8 8
Haiti 2,281 5.1 116
Guinea 155 5.6 9
Ghana 6,226 3.1 193
Sri Lanka 7,935 7.4 587
Sudan 10,386 4.5 467
Pakistan 46,839 3.6 1,686
Senegal 4,625 2.9 134
Afghanistan 2,126 5.8 123
Bhutan 268 8.4 23
Chad 1,394 1.6 22
Laos 473 3.7 18
Mozambique 1,256 13.2 166
Vietnam 8,526 4.4 375
Sub-total (Low Income) 40,309
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cCountry GDP Percentage Total
($million) of GDP ($million)
Middle-Income Economies
Mauritania 1,005 5.6 56
ILberia 1,194 2.5 30
Zambia 3,910 3.5 137
ILesotho 582 18.7 11
Bolivia 5,477 2.7 148
Indonesia 107,294 5.5 5,901
Yemen 7,873 11.0 866
Cote d'lvoire 9,369 9.0 843
Philippines 43,858 4.4 1,930
Morocco 25,175 5.5 1,385
IHonduras 4,891 4.4 215
IEl Salvador 5,113 2.6 133
Papua New Guinea 3,201 5.7 182
IEgypt 62,932 5.0 3,147
iNigeria 32,426 1.9 616
;Zimbabwe 6,199 2.2 136
Cameroon 13,363 5.9 788
Nicaragua 34,136 3.5 1,195
'Thailand 80,172 7.2 5,772
Botswana 2,478 5.7 141
Dominican Republic 7,103 7.2 511
IPeru 40,835 8.1 3,308
Mauritius 2,537 7.1 180
Congo 2,425 1.8 44
Ecuador 10,876 3.3 359
,Jamaica 3,994 13.1 523
,Guatemala 7,644 2.0 153
'Turkey 108,411 6.6 7,155
Costa Rica 5,686 3.3 188
Paraguay 5,265 5.5 290
Tunisia 10,004 4.9 490
IColombia 41,122 5.7 2,344
Jordan 3,869 6.2 240
Syria 24,770 4.3 1,065
Angola 4,838 1.9 92
'Cuba 16,399 9.3 1,525
IKorea (North) 23,000 6.0 1,380
Lebanon 2,656 4.8 127
Mongolia 1,933 5.8 112
Sub-total (Middle Income) 43,718
20
Country GDP Percentage Total
($million) of GDP ($million)
Upper-Middle-Income
Economies
Chile 27,791 5.8 1,612
Brazil 447,473 7.0 31,323
Portugal 59,680 7.5 4,476
Malaysia 42,373 3.5 1,483
Panama 4,949 3.3 163
Uruguay 8,218 3.5 288
Mexico 241,386 3.9 9,414
Korea (South) 239,772 12.9 30,931
Yugoslavia 101,413 6.0 6,085
Argentina 105,751 1.9 2,009
South Africa 102,004 3.2 3,264
Algeria 54,100 17.3 9,359
Venezuela 48,274 4.9 2,365
Greece 65,958 6.8 4,485
Israel 53,968 5.3 2,860
Hong Kong 70,048 5.5 3853
Trinidad and Tobago 5,094 9.2 469
Singapore 34,599 6.1 2,111
Iran 392,807 5.3 20,819
Iraq 64,340 8.0 5,147
Sub-total (Upper Middle Income) 142,516
High Income Oil Exporters
C)man 10,622 3.1 329
Libya 27,963 12.7 3,551
Saudi Arabia 82,996 9.1 7,553
IKuwait 22,842 2.3 525
United Arab Emirates 33,780 9.2 3,108
Sub-total (Oil Exporters) 15,066
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Country
Percentage
of GDPIndustral Market Economes
Industrial Market Economies
Spain
Ireland
Italy
New Zealand
United Kingdom
Belgium
Austria
Netherlands
France
Japan
Finland
Germany
Denmark
Australia
Sweden
Canada
Norway
United States
Switzerland
Sub-total (Industrial Economies)
East European Economies
Hungary
Poland
Albania
Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia
Romania
former USSR
32,901
53,290
2,169
20,726
37,034
37,625
1,096,697
Sub-total (East Economies)
World Total
Sources: United Nations, "Statistical Yearbook," 1990/91.
Britannica, '"Book of the Year," 1993
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GDP
($million)
Total
($million)
491,260
42,612
1,090,755
44,026
980,124
192,392
157,378
279,153
1,190,772
2,940,362
137,251
1,488,234
129,264
294,639
228,110
570,137
105,703
5,392,200
224,845
8.3
9.0
5.9
3.5
6.8
5.8
7.0
6.2
5.3
8.8
9.7
5.6
5.8
8.8
7.6
6.6
4.2
4.8
7.6
40,775
3,835
64,355
1,541
66,648
11,159
11,016
17,307
63,111
2,58,752
13,313
83,341
7,479
25,928
17,336
37,629
4,440
258,826
17,088
1,003,897
5.1
9.5
6.4
8.0
10.0
9.3
11.0
1,678
5,063
139
1,658
3,703
3,499
120,637
136,377
1,381,883
73 percent of world construction value. Most construction demands in
industrial countries are fulfilled by the domestic industries, while most
international contract awards come from developing countries, due
primarily to their lack of technology, finances and resources. The
Engineering News Record (ENR) has reported the top 250/225 international
contractors for many years. These firms, which are estimated to account for
about 70% of the total international contract value, provide data showing
recent trends in the world construction market (Figures 1 and 2, and Table
2). In recent years, petrochemical projects have increased their dominance
of the international market (Figure 3). This means that high-level
management and coordinate skills are needed for large, complicated
projects, As a result, U.S. construction and engineering firms have
increased their business opportunities to dominate the world market. (Table
3 shows the value and percentage of the international operation of the five
largest contractors in selected countries.) The primary obstacle for fulfilling
these opportunities will be inadequate financing. Future opportunities will
require the adaptation of new financial techniques and strategies.
There are many incentives and disincentives to participate in the
international market. Although international contractors enjoy higher profit
margins in the international market (Figure 4), each exporter has a different
perspective. For instance, the Japanese E&C contractors' incentives
include the internationalization of Japanese industries, lower interest rates,
23
Figure 1.
International Contract Value Awarded to the ENR's Top
International Contractors
$ billion
.4 ^- ^
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Source: ENR, The Top International Contractors.
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Table 2.
Headlines about "The Top International Contractors" in ENR
(1982-1993)
1982 Foreign market growth despite recession
- Contractors confront problems in slow market -
1983 Recession cuts foreign work almost 9%
- Contractors confront changes -
1984 Foreign contracts take a dive
- Sagging markets abroad keep many contractors near home -
1985 Foreign contracts slump further
- Asia and North America only regions to improve in 1984 -
1986 Foreign contracts inch upward
- Smaller markets blossom as Midwest, Asia wither -
1987 Foreign awards continue decline in most regions
- Mideast work declines by a quarter -
1988 Foreign contracts hold steady
- Surge in Europe offsets most of the decline in other regions -
1989 Foreign contracts bouncing back
- Volume of international business best in six years -
1990 Foreign contracts stay alive as markets take on a new look
- Cautious contractors reposition themselves to exploit new
opportunities -
1991 Instability slows growth abroad
- Rapid economic, political changes restrain Europe as contractors
eye promising Far and Mideast markets -
1992 Firms set sail for hot markets
- Asia overtakes Europe as most active market in the world -
1993 International contracts dip slightly in 1992
-Mediocre year doesn't dampen spirits as contractors see brighter
days ahead -
Source: ENR, The Top International Contractors, 1982-1993.
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Table 3. Percentage of International Operations
- Rve Largest Contractors in Selected Countries -
Firm Plant % Int'l Total Int'l %
U.S.A.
1 Bechtel Group Inc. 57 15,172.6 23,656.8 64.1
2 Flour Daniel Inc. 86 4,880.0 22,946.0 21.3
3 Brown & Root Inc. 91 10,275.2 13,718.1 74.9
4 The M.W. Kellogg Co. 90 10,358.0 13,418.6 77.2
5 Foster Wheeler Corp. 95 6346.0 8794.0 72.2
U.K.
1 John Brown/Davy 96 10,081.0 13,040.0 77.3
2 Balfour Beatty Ltd. n/a 460.0 2,550.0 18.0
3 Trafalgar House Const. 0 1,007.0 2,172.0 46.4
4 Bovis Construction Group 2 1,325.0 2,105.0 62.9
5 Costain Group PLC 9 425.0 1178.0 36.1
German
1 Phillip Holzmann AG n/a 2,731.5 11,796.4 23.2
2 Hochtief AG 1 1,182.0 5,319.0 22.2
3 Bilfinger+Berger Bau AG 12 2,027.6 4,264.3 47.5
4 Dyckerhoff & Wildmann 29 326.0 2,605.0 12.5
5 Walter Bau AG 0 195.0 2,395.0 8.1
France
1 Bouygues 28 2,933.0 9,779.0 30.0
2 GTM-Entrepose 27 2,149.8 5,292.3 40.6
3 Spie Batignolles 17 1,285.0 3,940.0 32.6
4 CEGELEC 40 1,294.0 2,942.0 44.0
5 DUMEZ 14 1,473.0 2,621.0 56.2
Japan
1 Shimizu Corp. 13 1,071.0 17,653.0 6.1
2 Kajima Corp. 4 938.7 15,477.0 6.1
3 Taisei Corp. 12 444.8 14,187.6 3.1
4 Obayashi Corp. 0 917.9 13,356.7 6.9
5 Takenaka Corp. 0 703.3 12,884.3 5.5
Others
Hyundai E&C (Korea) 37 1,151.7 3,421.6 33.7
Skanska (Sweden) 2 662.0 3,652.0 18.1
China Harbour (China) 0 915.5 2,368.1 38.7
Source: ENR, The Top International Contractors, August 23, 1993
28
Figure 4.
Profit Margins of International Contractors
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
0 Foreign work
.
Domestic work
Source: ENR, The Too International Contractors.
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increasing ODA, high technologies in some fields, and the attractive Asian
market as a neighbor. The disincentives include the large domestic market,
language and cultural differences, a lack of capabilities in overseas
businesses, the continuing rise in the value of Japanese currency, and
unexpectedly fierce competition. Of course, even if there are more
incentives than disincentives, this does not mean that Japanese E&C firms
will do well in the international market. The ability to accomplish superior
work is necessary. Although the Japanese E&C industry has been
protected and has enjoyed running its business according to its own rules
in the domestic market, it has few competitive advantages when it competes
under other rules. This does not apply only to the Japanese case; almost
all countries set their own rules in domestic markets or impose entry
barriers on foreign exports. The point at issue is how international E&C
firms solve these problems and get into other markets.
2.1.1 The U.S. Market
New U.S. market contracts awarded to international contractors in
1992 accounted for only $8.9 billion or 6.1% of the international market.
This was only a fifth of the value of the Asian market or a fourth of the
European market. The U.S. gained many more contracts in the
international market than it gave; this would indicate that although many
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international E&C firms consider the U.S. market to be relatively open, there
must be strong invisible barriers. These barriers are visible statistically:
U.S. contracts to foreign contractors declined from $15.3 billion in 1990 to
$8.9 billion in 1992, a drop of 42%. This trend is partly due to the U.S.
recession which started in 1990. Further problems result from lower profit
margins and troublesome lawsuits, so that even if the entry barriers were
erased, the U.S. market might not be attractive to foreign firms.
Britain had the largest share of the U.S. market in 1992. Germany,
Japan, France, Italy and Canada followed. No country dominates this
market and there is fierce competition not only among the foreign
competitors but also within U.S. E&C firms. Only Italy increased its U.S.
contracts in 1992 over 1990. Japan lost 55%, Canada 53%, Britain 35%,
France 33% and Germany 32%.
Japanese E&C firms' performances in the U.S. have been greatly
affected by Japanese direct investments in the U.S. because 55% of the
total contracts in the U.S. are awarded by Japanese industries. In recent
years, however, not only has Japanese foreign direct investment declined
(see Table 4), but also failures of real estate and development investment
have added to the burden of Japanese E&C firms. The Japanese operation
in the U.S. needs restructuring along with other overseas strategies in
Japanese industries.
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Table 4. Japanese Foreign Direct Investment
($ million)
1989 1990 1991
Europe 14,808 (162.4%) 14,294 (96.5%) 9,371 (65.6%)
North America 33,902 (151.8%) 27,192 (80.2%) 18,823 (69.2%)
Asia 8,238 (147.9%) 7,054 (85.6%) 5,936 (84.2%)
Total 67,540 (143.6%) 56,912 (84.3%) 41,584 (73.1%)
*The percentage changed from previous year.
Source: OCAJI, "Kensetsu-ayo ovobi Sekaiteki Kiavo no Kokusai-ka. Genchi-ka Seisaku ni
Kansuru Chyosa Kenkyu," 1993.
2.1.2 The European Market
The European market was 23% of the total in 1992, having increased
steadily in size since 1983. Table 5 shows the growth rate of construction
markets in selected European countries. The amount of western European
construction investment as a whole, however, has not changed noticeably,
while eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union tantalize with their huge
potential markets but shortage of cash. Hence the expansion of the
European market is due mostly to market intervention between countries.
The U.S. was the top runner in the market in 1992. U.S. and
European E&C firms held a total of 93,6% of the market. Japan has moved
back as a result of decreasing Japanese direct investments in Europe.
Since Japanese E&C firms contracted 98% of their business from Japanese
firms, contracts in Europe have depended greatly on direct investments. It
is not too much to say that Japan cannot join the competition in Europe.
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Table 5.
Growth Rate of European Construction Markets
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Austria 3.1 5.7 4.1 5.8 5.9 4.9 4.2
Belgium 5.0 14.0 10.0 6.0 -1.0 1.0 2.0
Denmark 1.9 -4.3 -4.4 -5.0 -6.5 1.8 2.2
Finland 1,0 10.0 14.0 0.0 -14.0 -14.0 -3.0
France 4.2 5.2 4.8 2.5 0.3 -0.1 0.7
Germany 0.0 3.0 5.0 5.0 4.0 1.5 1.0
Ireland -3.4 11.4 14.7 -2.5 0.3 5.0
Italy -1.1 1.2 3.8 2.1 1.4 0.1 -0.9
Netherlands 2.0 11.0 3.1 1.5 -0.2 -3.4 -2.4
Norway -0.8 -13.0 -9.1 -3.3 -3.1 3.0
Spain 10.4 10.5 13.0 9.0 4.0 -1.0 2.0
Sweden 2.4 7.6 0.8 -1.5 -3.0 -4.3
Switzerland 5.8 6.4 6.1 0.3 -4.6 -3.2 2.0
United Kingdom 8.0 7.0 4.0 1.0 -9.0 -5.5 -0.5
Euroconstruct countries 3.2 4.8 4.8 2.9 -0.2 -0.7 0.5
* '92, '93 expected
Source: OCAJI, "Kensetsu-avo oyobi Sekaiteki na Kigyo no Kokusaika, Genchi-ka ni Kansuru
Chyosa Kenkyu," 1993.
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2.1.3 The Asian Market
Asia is the largest and the most promising market in the world. New
contracts grew by 23% in 1992 to $42.6 billion or 29.1% of the total.
Together with the European market, it controls the international market
today. By 1992 the U.S. contractors had penetrated this market very
successfully, and accounted for about a half of the total. Japan had 18.8%
of the market, and Europe had 22.1%. Despite the great number of
opportunities, competition for the Asian market is fierce, not just among
international contractors, but regional and national contractors are involved
as well. Table 6 shows major projects in progress in the Asian region.
Broadly based economic growth through much of east and south-
east Asia has fueled a strong demand for office, industrial, and residential
construction. Figure 5 shows the GDP growth rate in selected Asian
countries in 1993. Competitive pressures and rising materials costs may be
keeping contractors' profit margins narrower than they would like, but huge
investments have been put into public infrastructure projects. Roads, ports,
airports, and railways are in urgent need of expansion. Power generation
and delivery networks, stretched to the breaking point, threaten brownouts
and power cuts. Except for debt-burdened Indonesia and the Philippines,
governments are gearing up to spend unprecedented sums on the
essential foundation work for future economic growth.
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Table 6. Major Ongoing Projects in Asia
Project Owner Cost Period
South Korea
Transport Project in major cities Government $42,000 1900-2000
Development of west coast Government $35,000 1990-2011
Seoul Subway Project Seoul Metro. $6,100 1990-2000
Government
Sewage Treatment Project Government $3,000 1990-1995
Hong Kong
Expansion of port facilities Government $6,349 1991-2006
Chep Lap Kok airport Government $4,440 1991-2006
Highways and railway systems Government $3,456 1991-2006
Sewage treatment programme Environmental $2,560 1990-1995
Protection Board
Urban development at Tung Government $1,510 1991-2006
Chung
Taiwan
Power station projects Taiwan Power Co. $59,000 1989-2001
Environmental Protection EPA $40,000 1990-1999
Taipei Mass Transit System Taipei City Council $12,000 1988-2000
Chiang Kai Shek Airport II Government $716 1991-1995
Singapore
Road Development Programme Public Works Dept. $560 1990-1995
Pulau Brani Terminal Port Authority $467 1990-1994
Development
Indonesia
Otefin plant at Cilacap Pertamina/Shell $1,500 1990-1994
Jakarta Outer Ring Road PT Jasa Marga $824 1991-1996
Batam Industrial Park PT Batamindo $500 1990-1994
Investment Corp.
Jakarta Horbour Road PT Citra Latoro $350 1991-1996
Malaysia
North South Highway United Engineers $2,000 1990-1993
Thailand
Power Development Electricity $11,670 1990-2007
Programme Generation Auth.
Bangkok $2,100 1990-1995
Bangkok expressway project Expressway Ltd.
Expressway $1,200 1992-2000
Bangkok Skytrain Project Transit Authority
Source: Quak, S.K., Market Abroad: Competitive strategies and market niches for the
Singapore construction industry, 1991.
35
Figure 5.
GDP Growth Rates in Selected Asian Countries
(1993 est.)
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2.1.4 The Middle Eastern Market
As the third largest market, the Middle East attracts mainly process
plant engineering contractors.
Although the Middle East is still regrouping following the Persian Gulf
war, the region is beginning to show signs of forward movement. The
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) has taken steps to
secure firmer crude oil pricing, and projected growth in oil revenues in 1993
should allow the governments in the region to resume petrochemical
development projects postponed during the war. In the meantime,
reconstruction continues.
U.S. E&C contractors accounted for 60.4% of the Middle Eastern
market. Despite a shrinking market (4% less contracts awarded in 1992
than in 1991), the U.S. E&C firms began to dominate the market. The
Chemical Marketing Reporter analyzed the strength of the U.S. E&C firms
as the result of the good will generated by Operation Desert Storm.
Economic shifts by many countries toward privatization, the liberalization of
foreign exchange and increased joint venture type projects with foreign
partners are clear signals for American participation. At one time Korean
firms functioned in this market with cheap workers as their competitive
advantage, but they no longer have this cost advantage in the foreign
market and their status as international contractors has dropped.
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Clients in this market are not necessarily Middle Eastern
governments or their private sectors; many are multinational oil companies
and process companies with their headquarters in the U.S., which makes it
easier for U.S. E&C firms to perform well in this market.
2.1.5 The African Market
The size of the African market amounted to $14.5 billion in 1992,
down from $21.7 billion in 1991. U.S. contractors accounted for 33.5%, less
than the share it took for any other region. European contractors, having
linguistic, cultural, and geographic advantages in former colonized
countries, accounted for 52.7 %. Many Japanese go to Africa on a
temporary basis to work for ODA related projects, while some Japanese
firms have branch offices in African countries. Table 7 indicates the
economic situation of Africa.
2.1.6 The Japanese Market
The largest construction market today in terms of annual value is the
Japanese market, partly because of the inflated value of the Japanese yen.
Although it was the largest borrower from The International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) in the post war period, Japan has
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become the bank's largest contributor as well as the world's largest
investor. Total construction investments in 1992 amounted to V87.5 trillion
($818 billion) which accounted for 18.5% of the GNP. The private sector
invested about 61% of the total and the public sector invested about 39%.
The industry employed 619 million people, 9.6% of the total Japanese work
force. This huge investment is due largely to the insufficient infrastructure in
Japan. Table 8 shows Japan's poor social capitals.
Table 8. Comparison of Social Capitals
Japan U.S.A. U.K. France Germ.
Floor space per house (m2) 89.3 153.6 95.0 82.3 86.3
Floor space per person (m2) 25.0 61.8 35.2 30.7 37.2
Sewer system comp. rate (%) 44 73 95 64 91
Public space per person (m2) 2.5 19.2 30.4 12.2 37.4
(Tokyo) (N.Y.) (London) (Paris) (Bonn)
Paved road percentage (%) 66.7 90.0 100.0 100.0 99.0
Source: The Ministry of Construction, White Paper on Construction, 1991.
The ministry of construction conducted a survey of cases in which
international E&C contractors, designers, and consultants were awarded
contracts in both the private and the public sectors in Japan between 1985
and 1989. The total number of contracts awarded to international
contractors, designers and consultants was 204 during this period. Urban
development-related projects accounted for 46.1%, followed by resort
development-related projects, which accounted for 31.4%. The U.S. was
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the clear leader with 139 contracts, 68.1% of the total, while the U.K. had
9.3%, Italy, 5.9%, and France, 5.4%. Table 9 shows how U.S. firms have
been faring in Japan.
Table 9. U.S. Firms' Contract Amounts in the Japanese Market
$ mil. $ mil. $ mil. $ mil.
Public works Non-MPA public Japanese Federal U.S.
awarded to U.S. works awarded to private-sector projects won by
firms in Japan U.S. firms in jobs won by Japanese firms
under MPA Japan U.S. firms
1988 15 122 1 N/A
1989 92 106 214 52
1990 6 8 19 112
1991 248 272 26 100
1992 174 175 14 N/A
Source: ENR, U.S. ettina tough with Japanese. May 17, 1993.
2.2 Contractors
2.2.1 International Contractors
Who are main actors in the international market? The more
complicated the construction project, the more industries participate in this
market. In addition to traditional building and heavy civil contractors,
process engineering contractors, plant manufacturers, trading companies,
and steel companies have joined it. Today, general contractors and
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engineering contractors are the two major participants. Although both
contractors are called engineering and construction firms, it is necessary to
distinguish whether the firm is an engineering contractor or a general
contractor in order to establish specific strategies and organizations. Their
businesses are incompatible, and so are their strategies. General
contractors and engineering contractors are distinguished as follows: a
contractor with more than fifty percent sales from petroleum and industrial
plant projects is classified as an engineering contractor; otherwise it is a
general contractor.
A. General Contractors
According to the ENR (August, 1993), the amount of international
contracts awarded in 1992 to 76 general contractors among the top 100
international contractors was $59.4 billion, or 42% of the total contracts
(Table 10). Twenty-four engineering contractors accounted for $81.0
billion, or 58% of the total (Table 11). Engineering contractors enjoyed
higher contract values, and also had a higher international market share:
56% compared to 22% for general contractors (Table 12). Ten U.S.
building/civil contractors accounted for $9.3 billion, or $933 million per firm
on average, thirty-six European contractors accounted for $33.9 billion, or
$943 million per firm, and fourteen Japanese contractors accounted for $9.2
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Table 10.
Top International General Contractors (1992)
ENR Rank Firm Country International Total Int'l Ratio
9 Bouygues France 2,933 9,779 30%
10 Philipp Holzmann Germany 2,731 11,796 23%
11 Morrison Knudsen USA 2,316 4,887 47%
12 GTM France 2,150 5,292 41%
13 CRSS USA 2,109 4,659 45%
14 Bilfinger Berger Germany 2,028 4,264 48%
15 HBG Netherland 1,895 3,056 62%
16 Fiatimpresit Italy 1,887 4,208 45%
17 Mitsubishi Japan 1,857 9,638 19%
20 DUMEZ France 1,437 2,621 55%
21 Ebasco USA 1,399 5,340 26%
22 Bovis UK 1,325 2,105 63%
23 Ansald SPA Italy 1,310 3,637 36%
24 CEGELEC France 1,294 2,942 44%
25 Spie Batignolles France 1,285 3,940 33%
28 Hochtief AG Germany 1,182 5,319 22%
29 Hyundai Korea 1,152 3,422 34%
31 Ballast Nedam Netherland 1,074 1,685 64%
32 Shimizu Japan 1,071 17,653 6%
34 Trafalgar House UK 1,007 2,172 46%
35 IRITECNA SPA Italy 1,005 3,059 33%
36 Nishimatsu Japan 939 7,055 13%
37 Kajima Japan 939 15,477 6%
38 Obayashi Japan 918 13,357 7%
39 China Harbour China 916 2,368 39%
40 ABB SAE Italy 898 1,157 78%
42 Jacobs USA 827 8,657 10%
44 Aoki Japan 811 3,071 26%
45 Danieli & C. Italy 758 768 99%
47 Takenaka Japan 730 12,884 6%
48 Daewoo Korea 696 2,731 25%
49 Andrade Gutierrez Brazil 687 1,317 52%
50 Joannou & P. Cyprus 685 685 100%
51 Dragados Spain 681 3,075 22%
52 Skanska Sweden 662 3,652 18%
54 PCL USA 640 1,105 58%
55 Boskalis Netherland 630 745 85%
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56 The Austin USA 619 2,238 28%
57 Odebrecht Brazil 612 1,921 32%
58 China State China 574 2,383 24%
59 Mannesmann Germany 567 1,554 36%
60 Leigton Holdings Australia 566 1,428 40%
62 George A. Fuller USA 505 606 83%
64 Balfour UK 460 2,550 18%
65 Lurgi AG Germany 456 709 64%
66 Taisei Japan 445 14,188 3%
67 Belleli Italy 444 566 78%
69 ENKA Turkey 427 601 71%
70 Costain UK 425 1,178 36%
71 Rust USA 408 5,710 7%
72 Jean Lefebvre France 407 1,787 23%
73 Tokyu Japan 398 4,794 8%
74 IMPREGILO Italy 354 354 100%
77 Dyckerhoff Germany 326 2,605 13%
79 Astaldi Italy 307 443 69%
80 Sezai Turkes Turkey 297 299 99%
81 The Turner USA 295 3,342 9%°
82 Taikisha Japan 281 1,361 21%
83 Maeda Japan 272 4,852 6%
84 Ed. Zublin Germany 259 1,842 14%
85 KMG TRUDBENIK Yugoslavia 240 327 73%
86 Noell Germany 234 553 42%
87 S.B.B.M. & Six Belgium 227 794 29%
89 Solel Boneh Israel 222 222 100%
90 Dillingham USA 214 571 37%
91 Hazama Japan 212 5,855 4%
92 Sato Kogyo Japan 208 5,776 4%
93 IPCO Singapore 202 202 100%
94 McConnell Dowell Australia 198 236 84%
95 Walter Bau Germany 195 2,395 8%
96 Pomerleau Canada 189 420 45%
97 GAMA Turkey 184 366 50%
98 Keller UK 181 232 78%
100 Mitsui Japan 161 4,927 3%
Total 59,435 269,765 22%
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Source: ENR, The Top International Contractors, August 23, 1993.
Table 11.
Top International Engineering Contractors
ENR Rank Firm Country International Total Int'l Ratio
1 Bectel Group USA 15,173 23,657 64%
2 The M.W. Kellogg USA 10,358 13,419 77%
3 Brown & Root Inc. USA 10,275 13,718 75%
4 John Brown/Davy UK 10,081 13,040 77%
5 Foster Wheeler USA 6,346 8,794 72%
6ABB Lummus Crest USA 6,285 7,870 80%
7 Flour Daniel USA 4,880 22,946 21%
8 The Parsons USA 3,623 11,800 31%
18 TECHNIP France 1,700 1,870 91%
19 Stone & Webster USA 1,671 7,307 23%
26 Consolidated Contrac. Greece 1,263 1,263 100%
27 JGC Japan 1,262 2,156 59%
30 Snamprogetti Italy 1,137 1,649 69%
33 Filippo Fochi Italy 1,030 1,270 81%
41 Guy F. Atkinson USA 833 1,343 62%
43 Chiyoda Japan 814 2,394 34%
46 The Badger USA 730 950 77%
53 Tecnimont Italy 660 705 94%
61 TEC Japan 547 995 55%
63 McDermott USA 473 963 49%
68 Techint Italy 436 1,050 42%
75 Chicago B&l USA 343 704 49%
76 Daelim Korea 327 392 83%
78 SICOM Italy 322 328 98%
88 All Ocean Belgium 227 794 29%
99 United E&C USA 175 3,217 5%
Total 80,971 144,594 56%
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Source: ENR, The Top International Contractors, August 23, 1993.
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billion, or $660 million per firm. U.S. E&C firms as a whole accounted for
50% of the 100 top international contracts, U.S. building/civil contractors
contracted almost the same value per firm as the Europeans and Japanese
did because 85% of the total contracts awarded to the U.S. went to
engineering contractors. Although Japanese general contractors had a
lower international share than their foreign competitors, this does not
necessarily mean that they neglected the international market. Their
contract values were in no way inferior to those of foreign building/civil
contractors. Compared to the U.S. and Japanese general contractors,
Europeans accounted for a higher international share of total sales. Their
market segmentations were well-balanced, hence they were well-
diversified to hedge risks and to stabilize businesses. Since Japanese
general contractors rely mostly on the domestic market, their businesses
are always influenced by the domestic economic situation.
B. Engineering contractors
Twenty-four international engineering contractors accounted for
$81.0 billion, or 58% of the total of the top 100 contractors in 1992; their
total contracts accounted for more than the total of the 76 other top general
contractors (see above section). Internationalization is a must for
engineering contractors; they may not survive if they operate only in the
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domestic market because it is too limited. Clearly, the U.S. dominates the
international market. Seven contractors, Bechtel, Kellogg, Brown & Root,
Foster Wheeler, ABB Lummus Crest, Fluor, and Parsons, account for 70%
of the international process engineering market. Table 13 shows the major
U.S. players competing in the international market.
John Brown/Davy of the U.K. alone accounted for 12.5% of the
market, Japan accounted for 3.2%, and others competed for the rest. In
general, engineering contractors hold a higher percentage of international
contracts than general contractors. For example, nine European
engineering contractors account for 77% of total sales on the international
market. In the engineering business, a few large "monopolistic"
multinational enterprises actively contract projects from all over the world.
In summary, competition between general contractors is based
largely on cost, while competition between engineering contractors is
based on specialized technology. General contractors are domestically
oriented, while engineering contractors are internationally oriented.
Therefore, it would be unwise for Japanese general contractors to plunge
recklessly into the international market, even if they see more opportunities
in there. Chapter 4 studies the actual cases of Japanese general
contractors and engineering contractors in order to see what deteriorates
their competitiveness in the international market and what their strategies
should be in the future.
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Table 13.
Largest U.S. International Contractors
- U.S. Firms that held the top shares of the foreign market
between 1980 and 1988 -
Share of individual companies in foreign
Firm market held by US firms (%)
Bechtel Group, Inc. 16.0
Parsons Corp. 12.0
Fluor Daniel 7.2
Lummus Crest 7.2
M.W.Kellogg Co. 6.8
Foster Wheeler Corp. 6.7
Brown and Root, Inc. 4.5
C.F. Braun 4.3
Morrison-Knudsen Co. 2.7
Guy F. Atkinson Co. 2.4
Total 69.8
Source: Arditi and Gutieures, "Performance of US construction in foreign markets",
Construction, Management and Economics, No.9, 1991.
2.2.2 Learning Practices from foreign contractors
In the pre-industrialization period, the Japanese construction industry
was not composed of construction firms but of individuals such as
carpenters, steeplejacks, and manual laborers. As other industries
developed in the industrialization period, the construction industry also
evolved, as construction systems, methods, and management styles were
learned from the west. Even in the post-industrialization period, learning
better ways of construction and understanding foreign construction
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practices for import/export engineering and construction were important.
Today, in order to get contracts in the international market and make better
profits, an E&C contractor should know market characteristics, especially
cultural characteristics, business traditions, and legal matters. The first step
to success for an international contractor depend largely on how well it
understands foreign markets and foreign competition as well as its own
comparative and competitive advantages. The international engineering
and construction business is considered to be tougher and to require more
patience than international manufacturing or capital service businesses
because it is a labor intensive industry and requires good human relations.
Japanese overseas construction activity began at the turn of the
century with a railway project in Korea. During this early period, Japanese
E&C contractors did not need to learn much from their host countries, which
were mostly in east and south-east Asia, because overseas projects were
dominated by colonial, government, and military constructions. They
exported their domestic organizations overseas to execute projects for the
Japanese, by the Japanese. Immediately after World War II many
Japanese contractors operated in overseas markets, but, their projects at
that time were limited to postwar reparations. Only after the completion of
these reparations did Japanese contractors begin to export construction
services on a commercial basis. Foreign contracts awarded to Japanese
contractors increased in the 1970's, thanks to the Middle East
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petrochemical plant construction boom.
In addition to traditional building and heavy civil contractors, late-
comers to the engineering and construction industry such as process
engineering contractors, plant manufacturers, steel makers, and trading
companies started to export engineering and construction service to the
new market, the Middle East, by following Japanese overseas investments
and by learning from foreign competitors' experiences and technologies.
They expanded their business quickly and made their appearance in the
ranking of the top international contractors by using their competitive
advantages effectively. Although traditional general contractors had longer
experience in terms of overseas construction, they did not expand their
engineering services in the Middle East as quickly as the late-comers.
Because of their lack of competitive advantages in the petroleum
engineering field, their conservative business style and organizations, and
the huge domestic market, general contractors did not take a positive
attitude toward learning about the new market and about new fields,
especially process engineering projects. This reluctant attitude put
Japanese general contractors outside international competition and limited
them to the domestic market. They had to content themselves with sub-
contractor's positions in large process engineering type projects.
Unfortunately, many Japanese general contractors drew limits on its
business while other Japanese industries - process engineering
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contractors, plant manufactures, steel makers, and trading companies -
sought opportunities.
It is generally thought that the Japanese are very good at imitation
but weak at creation, and it is true to a degree that modern Japanese
society is based on imitations of Western systems. Japanese industries
adopted a wide range of new organizations, technologies, and institutional
systems from the West after the Meiji Restorations of 1868 and was able to
catch up with western powers within a few years. These
imitation/transformation practices made Japan the first non-Western
industrial country. Its success was attributed to its careful selection of
models, clear policies, and its awareness that Japan was a developing
country, not a developed country. Table 14 shows not only the sources
from which Japan drew its organizational models and the wide range of
institutional areas in which Western models were used, but also the rapidity
of the initial borrowings.
Japanese restructuring in the Meiji era was based on the imitation
and transfer of these systems from highly developed nations, and the same
thing has happened in the E&C industry. The Japanese E&C industry has
also grown with absorption of foreign technologies, organizations, and
systems. Many Japanese E&C firms have established their offices and
subsidiaries in the U.S. to learn sophisticated U.S. construction
management methods. Since both countries' industrial structures and
52
delivery systems are incompatible, the best way to learn U.S. E&C firms'
secret of success in the international market is to stay in the U.S. market
and learn from U.S. competitors through open competition.
Table 14. Major Organizational Emulation Cases in Meiji Japan
Source
Britain
France
United States
Germany
Belgium
Source: D.E. Westney
Organization
Navy
Telegraph system
Postal system
Postal saving system
Army
Primary school system
Police system
Judicial system
Military police
Primary school system
National bank system
Sapporo Agricultural College
Army
Bank of Japan
Imitation and Innovation ,1987.
Unlike European E&C firms, which penetrated the U.S. market
through company acquisitions, Japanese E&C firms have preferred to start
by establishing their own subsidiaries. The subsidiaries, in their turn, have
learned about the U.S. market while working for Japanese manufacturing
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Year
1869
1869
1872
1875
1869
1872
1874
1872
1881
1879
1972
1879
1878
1882
-
-
firms which have built their offices, plants and factories in the U.S., and
have developed other real estate there. Merger and acquisition (M&A) has
not been a familiar way to expand business in Japanese industries
because it goes against their "friendly coexistence" policy. It is also difficult
to delegate powers and responsibilities to foreign managers because many
Japanese believe that mutual understanding based on Japanese traditional
business styles and cultures has deteriorated. Accordingly, the learning
practice includes two key components: the gradual development of
Japanese contractors' management skills by taking on increasingly difficult
roles; and learning particular U.S. techniques by working closely with U.S.
firms through joint ventures and subcontracting relations. Detailed studies
using particular models will be done in chapter 4.
2.3 The Japanese Construction Industry
2.3.1 Japanese E&C firms in the International market
Overseas construction contracts awarded to the members of the
Overseas Construction Association of Japan, Inc. (OCAJI) in 1991
amounted to V1,063.9 billion (a 1.5% increase over the previous year,
Figure 6), of which V520.8 billion went to companies registered in Japan
and 542.1 billion to their overseas subsidiaries. These calculations do not
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Figure 6.
Overseas Contracts of Japanese E&C Firms by Region
100 million Yen
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Source: OCAJI, "Kensetsu-avo ovobi Sekaiteki na Kiavo no Kokusai-ka. Genchi-ka
Seisaku ni Kansuru Chyosa Kenkyu," 1993.
The Ministry of Construction, White Paper on Construction, 1991.
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include contract awarded to major engineering firms, such as JGC, Chiyoda
and TEC, which do not belong to OCAJI. Contracts in Asia accounted for
61.9% of the total, 23.2% in North America, 9.0% in Europe and the rest
was spread out in the other regions.
The primary reason why Japanese E&C firms have increased their
contract value in the international market is not because they are
competitive, nor because the international market has expanded, but
because Japanese foreign direct investment has increased. Table 15.
shows the clients of overseas contracts awarded to Japanese contractors.
Table 15. Overseas Clients of Japanese Contractors (1991)
billion yen
Public Private Japanese Total
(Overseas) (Overseas) Industries
Asia 255.0 (39%) 170.3 (26%) 233.4 (35%) 658.8
North America 36.1 (15%) 74.7 (30%) 135.8 (55%) 246.6
Europe 0.0 (0%) 1.8 (2%) 93.6 (98%) 95.4
Pacific 5.2 (19%) 6.3 (23%) 16.1 (58%) 27.7
Other 19.6 (55%) 8.0 (23%) 7.8 (22%) 35.4
Total 316.0 (30%) 261.1 (24%) 486.8 (46%) 1,063.9
Source: OCAJI, "Kensetsu-gvo ovobi Sekaiteki na Kigyo no Kokusai-ka. Genchi-ka ni
Kansuru chyosa Kenkyu." 1993.
The fact that about half of the contracts were awarded by Japanese
industries in overseas markets indicates that Japanese E&C firms
depended largely on the domestic economic situation. It would be untrue to
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say that Japanese E&C firms firmly established their business bases in
Europe and the Pacific region because clients of these markets are mostly
Japanese industries. Rather, it is because Japanese E&C firms started their
business in these regions only recently and the marketing and operation
systems of their regional subsidiaries are not well established yet. Even in
North America, where Japanese contractors established their subsidiaries
first, they could not penetrate the market successfully. Only a few large
technological-oriented firms have been awarded public works by the
governments in North America. On the other hand, Japanese contractors
have been more successful in the Asian market, where they have more
experience and a longer history than in other regions. Only 39% of the total
were Japanese clients in the Asian market. The data stated above show
Japanese contractors' basic strategies: first, learning the market and
business traditions through collaborating with Japanese clients, mostly
manufacturing industries; second, after gaining some experience in the
country working with Japanese clients, seeking more opportunities from the
government of that country; third, after acquiring a good reputation through
participating in public works, seeking opportunities from private sectors in
the country or from multinational industries operating there. At this time,
20% of the Asian and 37% of the Pacific region's public contracts are
supported by the Japanese government.
The recent trend is for overseas subsidiaries to replace their parent
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Figure 7.
Share of International Awardsin Japanese Parents Companies
and their Affiliated Firms
billion yen
x mnAA
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 198
Source: OCAJI, "Kensetsu-gyvo oyobi Sekaiteki na Kiavo no Kokusai-ka. Genchi-ka
ni Kansuru Chvosa Kenkvu," 1993.
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firms' headquarters as the main actors (see Figure 7). Ninety-one per cent
of the total contracts in North America and 89% in Europe have been
awarded through overseas subsidiaries (see Table 16). This is due largely
to the fact that Japanese industries operate through overseas subsidiaries
which function as primary clients in overseas markets, where they have
established independent regional offices.
Table 16. Divisions where Contracts were Awarded (1991)
(V billion)
Headquarters Overseas subs. Total
Asia 433.2 (66%) 225.6 (34%) 658.8
North America 23.0 (9%) 223.7 (91%) 246.6
Europe 10.9 (11%) 84.5 (89%) 95.4
Pacific 24.6 (89%) 3.2 (11%) 27.7
Other 29.1 (82%) 6.2 (18%) 35.4
Total 520.8 (49%) 543.1 (51%) 1,063.9
Source: OCAJI, "Kensetsu-avo oyvobi Sekaiteki na Kiavo no Kokusai-ka. Genchi-ka ni
Kansuru Chvosa Kenkyu," 1993.
Building-related construction is the main work exported by Japanese
contractors. Eighty-three per cent of the total contracts were building-
related projects in 1990. Table 17 shows the shares of construction export
among building, plant and heavy civil work and whether headquarters or
subsidiaries are in charge of the business. Since the major clients are
Japanese manufacturing industries, it may be reasonable for them to use
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Japanese contractors for constructing their factories, offices and R&D
facilities in overseas markets because they can hedge risks by using the
Japanese contractual practices familiar to them in the domestic market..
Table 17. Sharing of Projects by Responsible Branches
1990
Civil Works Plants Buildings Total
Headquarters 12% 2% 32% 46%
Overseas subs. 2% 1% 51% 54%
Total 14% 3% 83% 100%
1991
Civil Works Plants Buildings Total
Headquarters 24% 1% 22% 47%
Overseas subs. 1% 3% 49% 53%
Total 25% 4% 71% 100%
Source: OCAJI, "Kensetsu-gvo ovobi Sekaiteki na Kigyo no Kokusai-ka, Genchi-ka ni
Kansuru Chvosa Kenkvu," 1993.
In 1991, after the burst of the economic bubble in Japan and the
country's economy headed into a recession, Japanese foreign direct
investments decreased rapidly. Since about 90% of the building contracts
had been awarded by the private sector which was especially damaged by
the rapid recession, building-related contracts diminished in that year. On
the other hand, unlike building construction, which is largely operated by
overseas subsidiaries, heavy civil construction, mostly implemented by
headquarters, was not affected by the recession because the financial
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source for heavy civil works was the Japanese government which could
grant or lend funds regardless of the domestic economic situation.
2.3.2 The domestic market as an international market
The Ministry of Construction in Japan has stressed that the
"Japanese construction market, both private and public, is open to any
foreign firm, and its system in no way discriminates between foreign and
domestic companies". It has claimed the Japanese construction market as
an open market through implementing the Major Project Agreement (MPA),
which was negotiated in 1988, amended in 1990, and amended again in
1991 with additional "opened projects". On the strength of the MPA, the
Kansai International Airpoit project, an $ 8 billion facility on a man-made
island outside of Osaka,the largest city in western Japan, was begun. U.S.-
Japanese trade tensions became critical in 1986 when the Japanese
government announced the plan of the Kansai Airport because the Kansai
International Airport Company Ltd., the owner of the project and a public
corporation, intended to exclude all foreign E&C firms. It insisted that they
would not be qualified because only domestic E&C firms had the expertise
needed to work with unique Japanese soil and water conditions. This
brought complaints from the U.S. and other countries' E&C firms. In this
case, despite its promises of an open market, Japan had limited foreign
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participation in construction projects, citing unique specifications and
applying rigid licensing requirements.
The American Chamber of Commerce in Japan evaluated the result
of this agreement in its 1993 US-Japan Trade White Paper noting "The
1988 market-opening measures of MPA notwithstanding, the entire
domestic Japanese architectural, engineering and construction market
share enjoyed by U.S. AEC firms combined in Japan is roughly estimated at
0.02%, hardly a level which can be considered a major success." The
paper further recommended a need for American "patience" and
"understanding". In April, 1993, in a report to Congress, U.S. Trade
Representative Mickey Kantor identified Japan under Title VII of the 1988
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act, which provides identification of
countries that discriminate against Americaii firms in their government
practices. Identification under the statute requires that negotiations to end
discrimination be initiated immediately and, if the ensuring negotiations are
not successful, the statute provides for sanctions. Clearly, Japan on the
one hand and the U.S. and the rest of the world on the other see the
economic issues that separate them very differently.
One of the purposes of this thesis is to identify how the Japanese
construction industry is protected, and then what weaknesses, derived from
unique opportunities in domestic markets, can be obstacles to international
competition.
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2.3.3 Japanese construction market entry barriers
Every country would prefer to implement its construction activities
without importing construction services from foreign countries because the
construction industry is essential to a country's economy. Still, a country
may be forced to import engineering and construction services when it does
not have capabilities in finance, technologies, management skills, and
resources. Lee and Walters (1989) identified three major issues found in
construction exports: market protection, third-market competition (or,
offensive protectionism), and regulatory concordance (both between
nations and between federal and local levels of jurisdiction within a single
nation).
The importance of construction in a country's economy is explained
by its size, its work force, the effect it has on or suffers from other industries,
government involvement, and its infrastructure as that country's assets. The
value of the final products of the construction industry, including materials,
accounted for V87,480 billion or 19.3 % of the gross domestic product in
1991. Net output, excluding materials and supplies bought from other
industries, accounted for 9.5% of the gross domestic product in that year.
Employment accounted for 619 million or 9.6% of the total in Japan. The
impact of the construction industry on the economy is enormous (Figure 8),
and the economic policy (including the trade policy) and general economy
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Figure 8.
Effects of Construction Investments on Other Industries
Steel
Service
Metalworking
Ceramic & Quarrying
Transportation & Communication
Trading
Paper & Wood
Finance
Petro. & Coal
Machine
0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12 0.14
* Construction investments = 1.00
** As of 1989
Source:JFCC, Nikkenren Handbook 93.
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profoundly affect the performance of the construction industry. Generally
speaking, because the construction industry is a key industry, developing
countries are inclined to promote their domestic construction industry more
frequently than do developed countries.
Market protection involves visible and invisible barriers. Visible
barriers include currency restrictions, government procurement
preferences, government subsidies, investment barriers, domestic
requirements, tax discrimination, personnel qualifications, licenses,
technical standards and regulations. Table 18 shows the criteria for
obtaining construction business licenses in Japan. In 1982, in order to
overcome protection barriers in many countries, the U.S. Government
started pressing its trading partners in the existing General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), to extend this trade agreement to service
industries including construction. This effort by the U.S. Government has
continued for several years but an agreement has never been reached.
Table 19 shows the entry barriers of selected countries.
Invisible barriers include contractual practices, languages, laws,
business customs and traditions, union and labor management, pre-
qualification incoherence, cultural differences, country risks, legal matters,
industrial organization, and safety control. The ENR reported with surprise
that fewer U.S. contractors attempted to enter the Japanese construction
market than expected by the government officials in both countries. They
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Table 18. Criteria for Japanese Construction Business Licenses
Ordinary Construction Work Special Construction Work
1 At least one full-time board director At least one full-time board director
must have a minimum of 5 years must have a minimum of 5 years
management experience at a management experience at a
construction company in Japan. construction company in Japan.
2 Each of the applicant's business Each of the applicant's business
premisses in Japan must have at premisses in Japan must have one
least one full-time engineer for full-time engineer for each type of
each type of construction work to be construction work to be performed.
performed. Each engineer must Each engineer must meet one of
meet one of the following the following requirements and the
requirements; applicant wishing to perform civil
(1) Japanese high school graduate engineering work, architecture,
with at least 5 years experience, or plumbing, steel structure work or
Japanese university graduate with paving work must have an
at least 3 years experience in engineer who fulfills the
Japanese construction businesses, requirement of (2) below or their
both having studied subjects premisses.
specified in the Ordinances of the (1) The same requirements for
Ministry of Construction while in "Ordinary Construction Work," plus
school at least 2 years of experience
(2) At least 10 years experience as supervising construction contracts
an engineer in the specific field for worth ¥30 million or more in Japan.
which a license will be sought. (2) Certified first-class supervising
(3) Anyone qualified in Japan as a engineer, first-class architect or
supervising engineer, architect, technician.
engineer or technician, etc.
3 There must be no possibility that There must be no possibility that
the applicant will violate the terms the applicant will violate the terms
of the contract, particularly those of the contract, particularly those
governing the content and period of governing the content and period of
the construction work and the construction work and
compensation for damages. compensation for damages.
4 The applicant must satisfy any one The applicant must satisfy all of the
of the following basic financial following basic financial
requirements: requirements:
(1) own capital of at least V3 million. (1 ) capital of at least ¥15 million.
(2) Fund raising ability of at least V3 (2) own capital of at least 30
million. million.
(3) 3 years of continuous (3) losses equivalent to no more
construction business operations than 20% of capital, and
prior to the date of application. (4) a current ratio of at least 75%.
Source: Ministry of Construction, Japan's Construction Market, 1991.
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might have been reluctant to enter the Japanese market because they
found the invisible barriers were too extensive. It seems that these invisible
or non-regulatory barriers, which are based on cultural differences, are the
real issues that prevent foreign contractors from entering the Japanese
market.
Table 19. Entry Barriers in Selected Countries
Barrier Type Country
Government Procurement Canada, India, Japan, Mexico, U.S.
Subsidies Canada, Italy, Japan, Korea, Sweden
Domestic Requirements Brazil, India, Korea, Saudi Arabia
Personnel Qualifications Brazil, Canada, U.S., Venezuela
Investment Barriers Canada, Ecuador, Iceland, U.K.
Tax Discrimination Brazil, Korea
Currency Restrictions Iceland
Source: J.R. Lee and D. Walters, International Trade in Construction. Design. and
Engineerina Services, 1989.
How do we know, objectively, that one country has higher invisible
entry barriers than others? Some indicators are the export-import ratio or
trade balance in construction (Table 20), the unemployment rate (Figure 9),
the profit margin (Figure 10), and the number of firms working in a country
(Figure 11).
The export-import ratios have many implications, such as the degree
of comparative advantage, the degree of competition, and the degree of
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market openness. If all contractors competed under the same rule, the
higher a country's export/import ratio, the more competitive it would be.
A low unemployment rate may indicate not only a healthy domestic
economy but also the existence of barriers, because the prosperity of the
domestic industry may be attributed to a protected business environment. A
low unemployment rate also implies that the labor market is closed to
foreign workers.
Wherever there is less competition, a contractor can enjoy a higher
profit margin. The differences in the profit margins between countries
indicates that they compete under different rules. Japanese general
contractors enjoy high profit margins, as do U.S. engineering contractors.
They both may face less competition in their particular markets. The
percentage of international contracts of Japanese genera' contractors is
relatively low, compared to that of the U.S. engineering contractors. This
may mean that Japanese general contractors have less competition in the
domestic market, and U.S. engineering contractors have less competition in
the international market. Figure 10 shows not only gross profit margins but
also net profit margins. The difference between the gross profit margin and
the net profit margin goes mostly to a general administrative fee and tax.
The general administrative fee varies from industry to industry, as well as
from country to country. The difference in administrative fees between
countries is attributed to the each country's specific contractual practice.
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The number of contractors working in a country indicates the
country's attractiveness, openness, and degree of opportunities. Although
the size of the market should be considered, the number itself shows the
degree of entry barriers.
Table 20. Construction Export-import Ratio in 1992
Contractor Nationality Export ($ mill.) Import ($ mill.) Ex./Im. Ratio
U.S. 72,157.3 8,949.1 8.1
Canadian 443.1 4,197.2 0.1
European 52,285.9 34,350.6 1.5
Japanese 12,373.1 190.9* 64.8
*estimated from "Japan's Construction Market", Ministry of Construction, Japan
Source: ENR, The Top International Contractors, Aug. 23, 1993.
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Figure 9.
Unemployment Rate in Selected Countries
percent
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Source: Keizai Koho Center, "Japan 1993: An International Comparison."
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Figure 10.
Gross and Net Profit Margins of Selected Contractors
Taisei (J)
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*The net profit margin of TECNIP is not shown.
Source: Annual Reports.
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Figure 11.
The Number of Foreign Contractors Working
in Countries (1992)
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Source: ENR, The Too International Contractors, Aug. 23, 1993.
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2.3.4 Foreign Contractors' Performance in the Japanese Market
Since the Major Project Agreement was concluded in 1988, foreign
contractors have opened their offices and started businesses in Japan in
quick succession. Table 21 shows U.S. contractors who cooperate with
Japanese contractors and Table 22 shows the foreign contractors who have
been granted construction business licenses in Japan. However, some of
them (e.g. Brown & Root, Guy F. Atkinson, and Morrison Knudsen) have
already withdrawn from the Japanese construction market. This section
investigates the strategies of foreign contractors.
Table 21. Cooperation between U.S. and Japanese Firms
U.S. Firm Japanese Firm
Overseas Bechtel Inc. Taisei Corporation
Fluor Daniel Japan Inc. Obayashi Corporation
Schal Associates Inc. Dai Nippon Construction
Parsons Construction Inc. Shimizu Corporation
Turner Construction Company Kumagai Gumi Co., Ltd.
Tishman Construction Corp. of Japan Aoki Corporation
Morrison-Knudsen International Co. Hazama Corporation
Guy F. Atkinson Co. Toda Construction Co., Ltd.
The Austin Company Nishimatsu Construction Co., Ltd.
Parsons-Brinkerhof International Nishimatsu Construction Co., Ltd.
J.A. Jones Construction Co. Mitsui Construction Co., Ltd.
Source: Ministry of Construction, Japan's Construction Market, 1991.
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Table 22.
Foreign Firms Granted Construction Business Licenses
in Japan (as of Feb. 1991)
Firm
Overseas Bechtel, Inc.
Fluor Daniel Japan, Inc.
Schal Associates, Inc.
Tishman Const. Corp. of Japan
Parsons Constructors, Inc.
Turner Construction Co.
Samsung Construction Co., Ltd.
Samwhan Co.
Hyundai E&C Co., Ltd.
Dumez Japan S.A.
Dongbu Construction Co., Ltd.
Ssangyong Construction Co., Ltd.
Morrison-Knudsen Int'l Co., Inc.
Guy F. Atkinson Co., Ltd.
Henry Walker Group, Ltd.
The Austin Company
SGS Inc.
Austin Industries, Inc.
Akzo Japan, Ltd.
Parsons Brinckerhoff International
Dong Ah Construction Ind. Co., Ltd.
Kuk Dong Construction Co., Ltd
Daewoo Corporation
J.A. Jones Construction Co.
Hanil Development Co., Ltd.
YES Homes
Lucky Development Co., Ltd.
Head Office or
Parent Company
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
Korea
Korea
Korea
France
Korea
Korea
USA
USA
Australia
USA
Switzerland
USA
Netherlands
USA
Korea
Korea
Korea
USA
Korea
USA
Korea
Relation-
ship
Branch
Corporation
Branch
Corporation
Branch
Branch
Branch
Branch
Branch
Corporation
Branch
Branch
Branch
Branch
Branch
Branch
Branch
Branch
Corporation
Branch
Branch
Branch
Branch
Branch
Branch
Corporation
Branch
Date of
Approval
Sep. 1987
Aug. 1988
Sep. 1988
Oct. 1988
Oct. 1988
Oct. 1988
Oct. 1988
Oct. 1988
Oct. 1988
Nov. 1988
Feb. 1989
Feb. 1989
Mar. 1989
May 1989
May 1989
May 1989
Aug. 1989
Aug. 1989
Aug. 1989
Oct. 1989
Oct. 1989
Feb. 1990
Mar. 1990
Mar. 1990
April 1990
April 1990
Feb. 1991
Source: JFCC, Construction in Japan, 1991.
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According to Nikkei Construction (July 23, 1993), Overseas Bechtel
Inc. was the most successful contractor in Japan between 1988 and 1993,
followed by Schal Bovis Inc. and The Turner Corporation. Table 23 shows
the performance of the top contractors in Japan.
Bechtel's average contract value per project was V5.4 billion, which
far exceeded that of Schal. (1.5 billion) Bechtel has not yet tendered a bid
alone but has always made joint venture with Taisei in the Tokyo area and
with Takenaka in the Osaka area because it does not have subcontractors
who know Bechtel's management and heavy construction machines.
Despite its success in the Japanese market, Bechtel has been unable to
demonstrate its strong points in design and engineering because
government engineers do the designing and engineering in Japan. Bechtel
has pressed the U.S. government to force the Japanese designing and
engineering market open, feeling that it can contract only MPA projects
under the present situation.
Schal has taken a different stance toward the Japanese construction
market. Unlike Bechtel, Schal has tried to learn the Japanese way of
business and to establish a stable base in Japan without causing a conflict.
Schal's basic policies for entry to the Japanese market are, first, top
management should become accustomed to Japanese business traditions;
second, the U.S. headquarters should delegate responsibility as much as
possible because of the difference in the contract system, and third, it
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should not request special treatment as does Bechtel. However, Schal also
looks for opportunities in the CM field. It believes that there should be a
good CM system suitable to the Japanese construction market.
Korean contractors have to adopt different strategies from U.S.
contractors because their experience in the Korean market is not accepted
by the Japanese government. The Japanese government accepts only the
experience of U.S. contractors; therefore, Korean contractors have to get
their results in the Japanese private construction market. Despite this unfair
treatment, Korean contractors have become deeply rooted in the Japanese
market through steady efforts. For example, Hyundai Corporation works
mostly as the subcontractor of Kajima. In addition, Korean contractors send
their employees to Japanese contractors to learn the Japanese
management system and advanced construction technologies.
Two French contractors, GTM and DUMEZ, have opened their offices
in Tokyo. Their primary purpose in maintaining offices is to establish a
close relationship and to cooperate in contracting third countries' projects
with Japanese general contractors rather than to invade the Japanese
market.
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chapter 3
GLOBALIZATION
3.1 The Concept of Global Strategy
The basic principles of globalization include how a firm creates
competitive advantages through its overseas strategy, and how this strategy
reinforces competitive advantages gained at home. The design of an
overseas strategy is based on the interplay between the comparative
advantages of countries and the competitive advantages of firms. Since
patterns of competition differ from industry to industry and from segment to
segment, a firm should firmly define who it is, and what business it is in.
Porter identifies roughly two patterns of overseas competition,
multidomestic competition and global competition. Competition is
essentially independent in each country. Some assets that an E&C firm
may have in one country, such as reputation, capital, and personnel may
have little impact in another. The competitive advantages of multidomestic
industries are largely confined to the country in which they compete. On the
other hand, a firm's competitive position in one country sometimes affects
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(and affected by) its position in other countries. Rivals compete against
each other on a worldwide basis, drawing on competitive advantages that
grow out of their entire network of worldwide activities. Assets such as
technologies, management skills, and experience strongly affect an E&C
firm's overseas operation. In global industries, firms are compelled to
compete internationally in order to achieve or sustain their competitive edge
in most important industry segments.
A global strategy in E&C firms is one in which a firm sells its E&C
services in many countries, and procures and employs an integrated
worldwide approach in doing so. Just being multidomestic does not imply
having a global strategy if the firm has freestanding subsidiaries that
operate independently in each country. If a firm competing globally adopts
a multidomestic strategy, it will likey diminish its competitive advantage and
provide an opportunity for competitors to overtake it, as has been the
experience of many Europeans and Americans in the manufacturing
industry.
3.1.1 Strategic Choices
A global approach to strategy provides two distinctive ways in which
a firm can gain competitive advantages or offset domestic disadvantages.
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A. Configuration
The first is in the way a global firm can configure activities among
countries to gain comparative advantages. In configuring its worldwide
activities in an industry, a firm faces two broad choices. One choice is
whether to concentrate its activities in one or only a few countries or to
disperse them to many countries. The degree of concentration of activities
is decided by factors such as, economies of scale and proprietary learning
in an activity; the comparative advantage for performing a certain activity;
and a close relationship between activities, such as R&D and production,
homogeneous product needs, lower transport and storage costs, less
nationalistic purchasing. A dispersion of activities is the result of a low level
of intensity in these factors. The second choice, a firm faces in its
configuration is where it will locate its activities and how many sites it will
chose. Activities are usually located initially in the home nation. In a global
strategy, however, a firm can choose any nation in which to raise capital,
conduct R&D and design, procure raw materials, or even recruit skilled and
unskilled workers.
B. Coordination
The second way in which a global firm can gain competitive
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advantages is via its ability to coordinate its dispersed activities.
Coordination refers to how activities performed in different countries are
coordinated with each other. It involves sharing information, allocating
responsibility, and aligning efforts. Dispersed activities, if they are not
coordinated, do not allow a firm to respond to its competitors' global
challenges nor to its clients' global needs. Well-coordinated information
yields the opportunity to choose where and how to fight against competitors.
Although the importance of global coordination is easy to understand,
achieving coordination among subsidiaries in a global strategy involves
formidable organizational challenges because of linguistic differences,
cultural differences, and the need for high levels of open and credible
information exchange. Another possible difficulty is that country
subsidiaries often see each other more as competitors han as
collaborators, and that full and open coordination is the exception rather
than the rule in global firms.
3.1.2 The Process
Industries globalize because shifts in technology, client needs,
government policies, or country infrastructures create major differences in
the competitive position of firms from different countries and make the
advantages of a global strategy more significant. In process engineering
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plant construction, for example, the industry has been globalizing as U.S.
firms have gained substantial competitive advantages in technology, global
procurement and management skill, as the demand for process plants in
different countries has become more similar, and as operating costs have
fallen.
Global industry leaders always begin with some advantage created
at home, whether it is a new technology, a high level of management skill, a
new marketing concept, or a factor cost advantage. The home based
advantage then becomes the booster to enter overseas markets. A global
strategy can supplement original competitive advantages by locating
selected activities in foreign nations and competing head to head to retain a
competitive edge. A good example is the Japanese process engineering
industry, where firms initially competed with exported technology to meet
the needs of Japanese industries. As they began to penetrate the overseas
market, they gained newer technology learnt from clients, and management
skills learnt from joint venture partners. An increase in contracts then
helped to support investment for their own R&D and to achieve proprietary
technology. However, once they have globalized, they can sustain their
advantage only if they remain competitive and continually upgrade.
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3.2 International Trade
3.2.1 Emerging Trade Theory
The most remarkable patterns in international E&C trade are intra-
industry trade and intra-firm trade, which are relatively modern concepts
and difficult to explain by traditional trade theory. Intra-industry trade is
explained as the bi-way trade of differentiated products/services between
countries with similar high income levels. This type of trade is often
recognized in the international E&C market. In fact, European E&C
contractors are always scrambling their markets together. Intra-industry
trade occurs wherever demand for variety exists. Intra-firm trade is defined
as trade among affiliates of the same multinational enterprise (MNE), and it
accounts for a significant portion of the entire trade of U.S. and Japanese
firms. Intra-firm trade is important in understanding the globalization of the
E&C industry because it coordinates dispersed activities. The emergence
of intra-industry in the E&C industry is explained by reduced barriers to
entry and lower coordination costs.
3.2.2 International Trade and Multinational Enterprises
Wherever the international trade theory can be applied, perfect
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competition should exist. The conventional models in international trade
have been based on the assumption of perfect competition, therefore any
theory of the multinational firm must meet with perfect competition. As
Krugman (1986) pointed out, foreign direct investment generally occurs in
an oligopolistic market and in response to market failures. Thus, a
prerequisite to a formal model of multinational enterprise must be a
tractable model of imperfect competition.
There are two types of foreign direct investment (FDI): "horizontal"
investment, associated with product/service differentiation, and "vertical"
foreign investment, associated with backward integration into raw materials.
In a differentiation model, countries want to trade because they have
acquired different technologies, taking the form of the knowledge of how to
design, mange, construct, and sometimes operate an E&C industry, or how
to produce different products in the manufacturing industry. They can trade
this knowledge through technology transfer within multinational firms (or
licensing), or they can trade it indirectly, through trade in final products,
including drawings, systems, and manuals, embodying their special
technological advantages. International E&C firms sell their management
and engineering knowledge to coordinate labor, materials and equipment,
services, and financial capitals sourced worldwide in order to physically
create structures in foreign countries. This implies that the E&C industry is
knowledge-intensive. An international firm requires significant internal
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coordination to make maximum use of its dispersed knowledge.
The other important style of multinational enterprises is when the firm
is vertically integrated, controlling different stages of a production process
that takes place in different countries. By going multinational and
integrating backward, the firm can eliminate distortion and appropriate the
efficiency gain.
3.3 Theoretical Framework
In globalization, an E&C firm must consider three distinctive
elements, geographic, internal, and external. Geographic globalization is
associated basically with the geographic market scope of an E&C firm.
How a firm organizes and where it competes is tne fundamental decision
which must made in order to enter global competition. Internal globalization
is defined as the organizational change necessary for a firm to respond to
emerging business opportunities and environments. How a firm competes
in the international market, based on the advantages gained from the
configuration and coordination of its internal activities, is important The
degree of configuration and coordination is determined by the extent to
which the firm disperses and coordinates its internal activities for gaining
overseas competitiveness. External globalization is defined by how a firm
competes in the international market based on the competitive advantages
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gained from the configuration and coordination of external factors, which
include machinery and materials input by suppliers, services input by
subcontractors, consultants, and partners, and capital input by financial
institutions. Compared to geographic globalization, internal and external
globalization are associated with the question of how a firm competes.
Although a firm's internal and external factors for globalization seem to be
general for all international E&C firms, they may respond to these factors in
different ways and with various levels of intensity due to other factors
specific to each firm, such as the ability and historical style of its
management, the historical development of its internal assets and expertise
as well as those factors which are specific to a particular segment or
nationality.
E&C firms' competition in the international market is based either on
the specific factors of a firm or on its competitive advantages, or on factors
specific to its home country or comparative advantages. Concrete
examples are: decisions as to how widely firms will seek to market
geographically, how firms will concentrate or disperse their activities, how
well firms will integrate a chain of different but sequential internal activities
vertically and horizontally, how firms will concentrate or disperse external
input, what completes the value-chain of an entire project, and how firms
will coordinate flows of inputs for their geographically dispersed operations.
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3.3.1 Value Chain
It is very important to distinguish between strategies based on
competitive advantage and those based on comparative advantage. These
two advantages determine the answer to the two principal questions in
global strategy: 1. Where should the value chain be broken across
borders? 2. In what functional activities should a firm concentrate its
resources? The concept of the value chain is developed in order to analyze
the competitive position of the firm in a global industry. The competitive
advantage, as stated above, influences the decision on which activities and
technologies along the value chain a firm should focus its investment and
managerial resources in applying environmental factors in the business.
Although the generic strategies of low cost and differentiation are also
effective for the E&C industry, these strategies do not suggest where costs
should be cut or how technology/service should be differentiated. Thus,
linkages of each activity are important to aggregate cost structure and in
understanding how each segment contributes to the total cost. By
comparing the costs incurred by each link against competitors, a firm can
locate the "critical success factors" that must be addressed. Such a
comparison can lead to radical changes in strategy, such as the decision to
divest or to acquire new technologies in certain links. By isolating those
links that are not currently viable relative to competition, a firm can
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understand its strengths and weaknesses, its current position in the
industry, and the degree of configuration and coordination of its operation.
3.3.2 Competition
The value chain could be applied under two different assumptions.
The first assumption is that there is no distinctive technological difference
among competitors, but that costs vary because of differences in sourcing.
Under this assumption, costs can be readily estimated by incorporating
factor costs, which include wages, equipment, and materials, into the
estimates of E&C costs. The second assumption allows for differences in
technologies and estimates E&C costs when competitors may be at an
advantage or a disadvantage in terms of firm-specific assets. By focusing
on competitors' configuration strategies and technological advantages, the
value chain analysis is fundamental in determining where the value chain
should be broken across borders and where new investment should be
located. The value chain is also used for designing integrated strategies
that address particular national characteristics while exploiting upstream
competitive advantages in the value-added chain. The key challenge of a
global strategy is to determine which links are to be centralized and which
links decentralized.
B. Kogut (1985) suggested three modes of global competition. One
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mode is based on the dispersion of the links in the chain of comparative
advantage among countries. In this mode competition between countries
with different comparative advantages is inter-industry with no cross flows of
similar factors. It is primarily comparative advantage that explains the
pattern of competition between vertically integrated multinationals. A
second mode of competition is based on differences in the chain of
competitive advantage among firms. If relative factor costs among countries
are similar, then competition is driven entirely by differences in the
competitive advantages between firms. The patterns of competition
between firms with similar factors and FDI for market penetration are called
intra-industry and horizontal, respectively. This pattern can be seen in the
E&C industry in the forms of licensing, merger and acquisition, or
establishing foreign affiliates. The third mode of competition consists of the
interplay between competitive and comparative advantages along a value
chain. Whereas differences in competitive advantage promote intra-
industry trade or horizontal investments in other countries, the combination
of comparative advantages generates a complex pattern of the international
dispersion of the firm's activities. These activities are conducted internally,
for the competitive strength of the firm is based on whether the firm owns
specialized processes, technologies, or quality control measures that
cannot be bought in the marketplace easily. Competition between firms is
based on the relative superiority of their configuration of overseas sourcing
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locations, competitive advantages, and product/market decisions.
3.4 Theoretical Application of Globalization for E&C Firms
Although the E&C industry has unique features for globalization, this
section explores the possibility of applying a theoretical framework to the
industry before moving to case studies.
3.4.1 Geographic Globalization
Geographic globalization is the process by which a firm expands its
geographic market. It is not concerned with how a firm competes; rather, it
is associated with several questions: 1. What competitive advantages,
gained from domestic or other markets, are applicable to the particular
market? 2. What kind of competition does the market have? 3. Are there
comparative or absolute advantages between the exporter and the
importer? 4. What are the incentives to expanding business globally?
Under global strategies, in order to create and maintain
competitiveness, a firm should choose a principle location for its operation
based on a consideration of advantages arising from the location, such as
the availability of appropriate personnel with allowable wages, accessibility
to the international capital market, and political factors including political
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risks, rather than choosing a location based on a preference for obtaining
projects in the country of the location.
Sugimoto (1990) suggested the following factors as driving forces in
globalization:
A. Macroeconomic Factors
The demand-supply relationship affecting the inter- and intra-industry
trade aspects of E&C services provides a plausible explanation for the
horizontal expansion of E&C firms. The principal asset of E&C firms is their
human resources who have a knowledge of engineering and project
management, as well as experience in their home countries. Since most of
the exporters of E&C services developed in home or industrial countries,
they have already experienced economic development and construction
booms. Having gained this absolute advantage, they can then export their
services to developing countries. Moreover, as these firms accumulate
knowledge obtained in their international operations, they gain a new
dimension in their absolute advantage. However, for E&C firms to obtain a
truly absolute advantage, they must specialize narrowly and continually
enhance their expertise. Many such advantages are universal and difficult
to diversify among E&C firms in developed countries.
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B. Imperfect Market
Since the principal asset of E&C firms is its human resources, a firm
should exert a maximum effort to exploit the market to use this asset
effectively. However, the more advanced, specific and narrow the
technological field, the fewer opportunities the firm has. Therefore, the E&C
firm which has a large reserve of human resources must plunge into the
international market in order to maintain its resources and continue its
business.
C. Incentives
Each firm has distinctive incentives for globalization exerted by its
goal, history, experiences, resources, and strategies. These may be clients'
needs, competitors' promotions, executives' preferences, fierce domestic
competition, or diversification. Examples of overseas market incentives of
Japanese E&C firms may include a zero-sum domestic market, higher
technologies in some fields, increasing Japanese ODA, extended
information networks of Japanese trading companies, Japanese global
industries, and learning opportunities.
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3.4.2 Internal Globalization
Internal globalization is concerned with how E&C firms disperse
various activities geographically and how they coordinate them over
geographic distances. Different combinations of configuration and
coordination provide different sources of competitiveness to firms while the
degree of internal globalization of the firms is determined by the extent of
the coordination of internal activities.
What factors influence a firm's decision as to whether its activity
should be concentrated or dispersed? As each firm has a distinctive goal,
the strategy of configuration varies from firm to firm. However, factors
generally favoring a concentration of activities at one or a few locations
include economies of scale, proprietary learning, comparative advantage of
location, linkage of activities, homogeneous preference, transportation
costs, fewer government impediments, and regional economic pacts.
An important task in constructing a globalization model for an E&C
firm is to examine what coordination means and how it may be
systematically categorized in order to be operative. More specifically, it is
essential to analyze where incentives for coordination come from and how
a competitive edge is shaped. Again, this is an organizational challenge for
global competition. The case studies will show how Japanese E&C firms
established their local operation centers and how they organized, and how
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they verified what the issues were.
3.4.3 External Globalization
External globalization is defined by how a firm configures the
locations of input geographically and how it coordinates the flow of input to
projects in multiple locations. Compared to internal globalization, which
accompanies institutional change, external globalization seems easier and
more effective for E&C firms because it is applicable to economic theories.
Major factors influencing external globalization are represented by sourcing
and trade policy. An E&C firm can gain competitive advantages from
adequate sourcing which is derived from comparative advantages. Since
global information networks and flexible organizations are a must for
competitive sourcing, the relationships or inter-organizational coordination
among headquarters, subsidiaries, local offices, and project offices are
critical factors in differentiating between competitors. Major trade policy
includes the host country's government regulations or entry barriers, the
home country's government subsidies, and a third country's intervention.
Each case study will examine these factors, which sometimes create
competitive advantages in the short term view, and disadvantages in the
long term view.
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3.4.4 Other Factors for Globalization
Influential factors in determining a country's comparative advantages
in the E&C industry are the contractual systems or business traditions,
which vary from country to country. Another important factor is domestic
competition. Japanese E&C firms tend to compare financial numbers with
domestic same-size competitors and ignore those of foreign competitors,
even when they are considered to be tough, and Japanese firms are often
satisfied with the results of domestic competition. Case studies should
explore the significance of how domestic competition influences the
globalization of E&C firms.
3.4.5 Lessons Learnt from Sugimoto's Epirical Study
This section summarizes the empirical analysis done by Sugimoto
(1990), based on questionnaires sent to ENR's top international contractors.
A. Why Global?
Unlike traditionally understood "legendary" motivations for
globalization, Sugimoto's study shows interesting aspects of E&C firms'
attitudes toward globalization. The reasons for E&C firms' globalization,
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such as foreign opportunities and the firm's reputation, which are
considered as high motivations, are explained. On the other hand,
competitors' attitudes toward the global market, geographical
diversification, and stagnant domestic markets had low scores in motivation.
Japanese E&C firms, unlike U.S. firms, seemed to evaluate foreign projects
as unprofitable, and, though reputable, less technological.
Although the theory designates entry barriers as major impediments
to geographic expansion, the study shows that they do not trouble E&C
firms too seriously because of the establishment of local subsidiaries which
may provide access to a particular market. Engineering contractors ignore
entry barriers because they compete on the basis of technology which
allows them to circumvent such barriers.
B. Configuration and Coordination
The survey shows that headquarters plays a significant role in such
overseas activities as sourcing and financing. Project offices, on the
contrary, seem to be responsible only to unskilled labor and bulk materials
sourcing. There are some patterns of configuration among groups, for
example, the Japanese delegate more responsibilities to their subsidiaries
and project offices. Heavy civil and building projects rely more on project
offices for sourcing than do engineering projects. Europeans prefer merger
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and acquisition to establishing subsidiaries in order to expand business
into new markets. The U.S. does not. Following the European example,
some Japanese bought foreign firms, but after finding this kind of ownership
too complicated, they have begun to sell them.
C. Competitors
International contractors often encounter the same competitors for
different projects. This is frequently the case with engineering contractors
because of their specialized technology, which limits the number of
contractors who can have access to this market.
3.5 Summary of the Chapter
U.S. engineering contractors achieve efficient worldwide operations
through the rationalization of their activities by integrating several key
activities at headquarters, where they perform most of the project
management and engineering for local units and coordinate various
activities at project offices and for subsidiaries which are dispersed
throughout the world. The efficiency of this system contributes to their
competitiveness. On the other hand, European firms give their foreign
subsidiaries substantial authorization. Their subsidiaries and project offices
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compete on the basis of their management and engineering expertise and
their familiarity with local factors. The roles of the European headquarters
are limited to preparing subsidies for projects and negotiating political
issues with the governments. Japanese cases will be discussed in detail in
the next chapter.
98
chapter 4
CASE STUDIES
4.1 Introduction
This chapter first studies the historical background and uniqueness
of the Japanese engineering and construction industries, then examines
their domestic and overseas strategies in the light of how this historical
background and unique contractual system have influenced their strategies.
The contractual system of Japanese public construction works has
never received more attention than it has today. The U.S. government's
market opening pressure, the construction bribery scandals, and the dango
issue have all combined to press the Japanese construction industry to
reconsider its contractual practices. It is generally thought that Japanese
contractual practices are unique because of the government's fair
distribution policy, and that this policy has made the Japanese construction
market stable and well organized, thus contributing to the high employment
rate in Japan. However, when one compares Japanese contractors with
their foreign counterparts, one finds that they are not necessarily
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competitive, especially in the international market. In fact, the highly
individual organization of Japanese contractors, which is derived from their
unique contractual system, makes them weak in the international market.
Therefore, it is important to study how the contractual system has eroded
the international competitiveness of Japanese contractors. Superficial
literature reviews are insufficient because this issue is so complex. The
contractual practices were developed by the government contractual policy,
in accordance public interest.
This chapter is composed of two case studies concerning general
contractors and engineering contractors. Each case consists of the author's
experiences, interviews, and questionnaires as well as literature reviews.
The study of general contractors focuses on the major general contractor,
the Kajima Corporation and the study of engineering contractors focuses on
Japan's three largest engineering contractors, JGC, Chiyoda, and TEC.
4.2 General Contractor: Kajima Corporation
The major Japanese general contractors (known as genecon(s), an
abbreviated and Japanese version of general contractors) are called
department stores of construction; they boast a wide variety of engineering
and construction services, from housing to nuclear power stations. They
are big businesses, and hold an important position in the Japanese
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economy as well as in its politics. At first the status of the construction
industry was low because of the nature of "contract" industry. Then after
Rokuro Ishikawa, the chairman of Kajima Corporation, got the position of
the chair of The Japanese Chamber of Commerce, the construction industry
was recognized as one of the key industries in Japan. The industry's status
dropped again to its former position when Rokuro Ishikawa resigned from
his chairmanship in reaction to public opinion against a series of
construction scandals.
According to the press, four genecons, Kajima, Shimizu, Taisei, and
Takenaka, were ranked by income at the top 30 of all Japanese enterprises
in 1992. They were also world class contractors in terms of revenue.
(Shimizu, Kajima, and Taisei were the third, fourth, and fifth largest
contractors in the world respectively in 1992.) The industry, in cooperation
with the government, created unique contractual systems, which were
based largely on the industry's unique traditions and rules, and which
prevented new entries to the industry both from domestic and from foreign
countries. These contractual systems practice a policy of prosperous
coexistence while maintaining an exclusive exterior and a tightly banded
internal structure. Only minor differences can be found among the genecon
in terms of the variety of businesses, organizations, structures of revenues
and expenditures and holding technologies, due largely to the government
"equal treatment" policy which does not allow a firm to have outstanding
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competitive advantages in such fields as technology and management
capability. Each genecon accommodates its own traditional groups. For
example, for decades the "big five" has meant the above mentioned four
firms, Kajima Shimizu, Taisei, and Takenaka plus Obayashi. Once
Kumagai-gumi tried to break into the "big five" and turn it into the "big six" by
expanding its domestic business with low profit margins and its overseas
business with radical strategies. But so far all of Kumagai's efforts have
ended in failure and it has lost its reputation domestically due to corner-
cutting. It has also been severely damaged by overseas "gamble-like"
investments due to a worldwide depression in real estate. Kumagai's
experience taught the construction industry that the construction business
needs to make a steady effort to obtain not only a stable position in the
industry, but also its clients' confidence. It is very difficult to change a firm's
status in the industry because of the "designated accommodation" policy
which acts as a constraint. If a firm satisfies its designated position in the
industry, it can survive without any difficulty. A rebellious firm is ostracized.
This is the real reason for the industry's opposition to an open market
policy; it is afraid its systematic order would collapse if it were to accept the
entry of foreign contractors. Although the construction industry is being
urged to change its exclusive nature by domestic anti-dango opinion and
the pressure of the real opposition party, the U.S. government, it seems very
reluctant to abandon its privileges. It is supported by the Japanese
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government in this resistance.
This section will study how the unique contractual system and the
structure of the industry have weakened its competitiveness and explore the
future strategy of Kajima Corporation. This case study introduces, first, the
unique structure and contractual system in the industry by retracing
Kajima's practices. Empirical studies will be used for understanding the
actual flow of contract practices. Kajima's domestic and overseas strategies
will be studied next, and then, Kajima's overseas operation using KEC, a
U.S. subsidiary of Kajima, as an example. Fourth and last, this study will
explore future opportunities and issues.
The case study will compare Kajima Corporation with the other top
genecons, Shimizu, Taisei, Takenaka, and Obayashi, because they have
taken the induutry's leadership and moreover, they are the very firms which
really need to change. Table 24 shows basic data of the five general
contractors.
Table 24. Basic Data of The Big Five
Kajima Shimizu Taisei Obayashi Takenaka
Established 1840 1804 1873 1892 1610
Capital V64.1 bill V74.3 bill V94.2 bill 57.7 bill V50.3 bill
Author. share 1,920 mill 1,500 mill 1,200 mill 1,248 mill 100 mill
#of employees 14,384 11,951 13,386 12,020 9,334
Head office Tokyo Tokyo Tokyo Osaka Osaka
*The data of Kajima, Shimizu, and Taisei are as of March 31, 1993; those of Obayashi and
Takenaka are as of March 31, 1992.
Source: Annual reDorts
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4.2.1 Historical Background
The genecon, Kajima Corporation, established in 1840, has always
led the Japanese engineering and construction industry. It has taken good
advantage of its reputation, large market share, and better profits. Strong
leadership is necessary for E&C firms in order for them to take advantage of
new market penetration; their operations are always associated with high
risk and the need to "go"; thus the strategies mentioned here include future
core competency. Kajima has been a pioneer in many fields, such as the
construction of high-rise buildings, nuclear power stations, and
underground power stations. It is very strong in heavy civil engineering
fields where technical expertise is vital. This technical expertise does not
necessarily directly affect Kajima's business results, although it certainly
influences the contractual practices of public works. The relationship
between technical expertise and contractual practices is studied in a later
sector of this chapter.
Although Kajima has 45% market share of high-rise building, it has
reconciled itself to fourth position after Shimizu, Takenaka and Taisei in
building construction. This may be because most clients of building
construction are in the private sector and the contracts are often determined
by business relationships rather than by technological competitiveness.
Only a few types of building construction need the advanced technologies
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which differentiate Kajima from other contractors. Table 25 illustrates how
technical expertise helps to maintain Kajima's large share in the industry.
Table 25. Kajima's Share in Selected Construction Fields
Field
High-rise building (>100m)
Dry dock (>300,000t)
Nuclear power plant
Sea berth
LNG, crude oil underground storage tank
Cable-strained bridge
High-tech building
Underground power station
Arch dam
Crude oil storage facility
Source: Kajima Corporation, Kaiima Style Book '90
Share (%)
45
68
47
48
40
40
23
28
25
29
Overcoming many technological difficulties, Kajima constructed
Japan's first high-rise building, the Kasumigaseki building, in 1968. It was a
landmark in Japan where earthquakes regularly occur and a victory in
construction technology. Kajima invited Tokyo University Professor Kiyoshi
Muto, the greatest authority on seismic technology in Japan, to apply his
theory to the design of Kasumigaseki building. He did so using a
supercomputer, the first supercomputer the industry had and one of only
three in Japan at that time. Kajima also constructed Japan's first nuclear
power plant.
The history and the business environment of the Kajima Corporation
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will be studied in the following sections in order to understand the unique
features of the Japanese construction industry and its leader, Kajima.
A. The Postwar Period
Immediately after World War II, construction firms began to
restructure their organization and resume business. The establishment of
the Ministry of Construction in 1948 and the amendment of the Contractors
Act in 1949 restored the industry. The main role of construction firms in the
pre-war period had been to supply the work force; however, learning from
the U.S. military forces stationed in Japan in the post-war period, they
began to use heavy machines for large scale post-war reconstruction of the
country. In 1949 Kajinia founded the Institute of Construction Technology,
the first research facility in the construction industry, in order to study mainly
soil and rock mechanics. This investment immediately bore fruit. Technical
expertise greatly increased large scale project contracts, such as iron plants
and petro-chemical complexes.
Another new construction practice introduced into Japan by the U.S.
in this period was the concept of joint venture. The first joint venture
company in Japan was established by Morrison Knudsen (U.S.), Kajima,
Obayashi, and Takenaka to construct one of the facilities of the U.S. military
base in Okinawa. This practice immediately popularized joint venture
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companies throughout Japan. However, the advantages of establishing
joint ventures were the transfer of technology and fair distribution rather
than the sharing of risk and of bringing in capital. Public sector clients
began the unique practice of selecting and assigning all joint venture
members in order to take advantage of technical transfer and fair
distribution in which large genecons and small local contractors could
participate. Therefore genecons such as Kajima had no choice but to
include other smaller contractors in their bid, regardless of whether they
could handle the project alone or not. The government assigned one major
genecon, one or two middle-size contractors and one or several small local
contractors to large-scale projects funded by local governments. It has not
been possible to apply this practice in the outside world; thus recent
pressure from the U.S. government has forced the Japanese government to
reconsider this practice.
During this early period, construction firms were struggling to
survive, due mostly to high inflation. Although Kajima was not the leading
firm in the industry, it laid the foundation for its future growth by learning
various new concepts from the U.S. construction industry. Kajima could
change its business style to keep up with the trend of the rapidly growing
Japanese economy. The then president, Morinosuke Kajima, the restorer of
the Kajima Corporation and also a politician, proposed two principles when
he became the president: scientific management, composed of budget
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control and managerial comparison, and strengthened construction
capabilities, which made it possible for Kajima to use scale of economy.
The following twenty directives he presented when he assumed presidency
stimulate Kajima's strategies even today;
1. Abandon the idea that the traditional way is the best
2. Keep trying to improve without saying it is impossible
3. Train capable managers
4. Educate employees
5. Check results
6. Make a time to read books
7. Make salaries as high as possible
8. Be a manager who has subordinates who woi k hard
9. Make rewards and punishments clear
10. Use as many machines as possible
11. Obtain subordinates cooperation
12. Balance is more important than size
13. Planning should come first
14. Keep adopting new methods and new ways of thinking
15. Complacency leads to failure
16. Avoid yesmen in subordinates
17. Fix defects
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18. Do not envy others' success
19. Avoid waste
20. Enjoy your job as you do your hobby
Another achievement of Morinosuke Kajima was to raise the status of
the construction industry by adopting claims. For example, Kajima took the
unreasonable behavior of U.S. Army, which used unilateral contracts as
their excuse, to the military court with the help of Morrison Knudsen. In this
case, the fair play of the General Headquarters helped to correct unilateral
contracts and to recognize the rights of contractors. Although the parties
concerned should have avoided disputes as much as possible, it was
important for the contractors to complain against unfairness. It was the first
official claim made by a Japanese contractor. Traditional Japanese
managers had never made claims against clients; therefore, Kajima's action
set a precedent the construction industry.
B. The Period of High Economic Growth
Japan enjoyed a high rate of growth from the late 1950's. The heavy
chemical industry took the initiative as a pull cart of the Japanese economy.
The petrochemical industry in particular invested in large scale
petrochemical complexes one after another. Kajima participated in almost
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all major complex projects by applying its technological advantages in the
fields of soil and rock mechanics. Together with petrochemical complex
construction, highway construction, which also required expertise in soil
and rock engineering, boomed and was the focus of public attention in
those days.
During this period, Kajima expanded its business and established its
reputation as the top construction firm in Japan. Its attitude toward new
markets was flexible and entrepreneurial; the CEO, Morinosuke Kajima,
headed Kajima into new markets which were considered risky at the time,
looking for future opportunities and long-term profits.
Table 26. Contracts Awarded to Japanese Big Five in the 1960's
Year Kajima Taisei Shimizu Obayashi Takenaka
1960 73.4 71.6 66.4 65.6 70.7
1961 106.8 97.7 104.1 98.8 93.5
1962 115.2 96.9 107.3 93.3 91.2
1963 124.3 111.5 109.5 97.7 121.6
1964 152.9 145.7 136.1 128.7 138.6
1965 146.0 146.6 135.4 127.4 120.9
1966 152.3 141.4 140.7 129.2 120.9
1967 191.9 163.0 159.7 154.8 154.8
* billion yen
** Bold indicates the largest number
Source: Kajima Corporation, (1986), Kajima's one hundred and forty years history, Kajima
Press.
According to Table 26, there is no significant difference in accounting
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numbers among firms; however, It is clear that Kajima was the leading firm
during this period. As noted before, through experiencing Japan's rapid
industrialization and through collaborating with industries, Japanese
construction firms gradually learned competitive advantages such as
technical expertise, management skills for large projects, and vertically
integrated organizations. The major reason for Kajima's place as the
leading firm could have been that, at this time, Kajima had been putting a
great deal of effort into heavy civil fields and, as a result, the ratio of the
Japanese construction investment to heavy civil construction and building
construction was 1 to 1. Thus, Kajima might have been able to dominate
the other firms. Today, Kajima still has the greatest capabilities and the
most advanced technical expertise in most heavy civil engineering fields.
Kajima is seen and known as a heavy civil contractor rather than a building
contractor in spite of its larger revenues from building construction. The
following tables show Kajima's outstanding position in the civil engineering
field:
Table 27. Number of Civil Engineers
Firm The number of civil engineers
1. Kajima 2,546
2. Kumagai 2,527
3. Obayashi 2,096
4. Taisei 1,744
5. Shimizu 1,726
Source: Nikkei Construction, Aug. 28, 1992
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Table 28. Contracts of Heavy Civil Construction
Firm Contracts ( million)
1. Kajima 480,182
2. Obayashi 444,690
3. Taisei 443,176
4. Shimizu 410,902
5. Kumagai 365,785
Source: Nikkei Construction, Aug. 28, 1992
Table 29. Contracts of Building Construction
Firm Contracts ( million)
1. Shimizu 2,045,522
2. Takenaka 1,914,813
3. Taisei 1,777,564
4. Kajima 1,746,591
5. Obayashi 1,413,156
Source: Nikkei Construction, Aug. 28, 1992
C. The Period of Slowdown
The dollar crash in 1971 terminated the era of high growth in the
Japanese economy, and the oil crisis in 1973 did further damage to the
economy which had grown to rely heavily on the petrochemical industry.
Japanese industries groped to streamline management, reorganize,
develop new markets, and to internationalize. During this period Kajima
was focused on diversification, Total Quality Control (TQC), and on
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expanding from a contractor into an engineering contractor as its vertical
strategies and on internationalization as its horizontal strategy. These
were the basic stances all major Japanese general contractors took to
survive the depression.
The government's role also changed during this period.
Traditionally, the government adjusted its total domestic construction
investments to increasing public investments when private investments
decreased, and decreasing or stabilizing public investments when private
investments increased. This theory, that increasing public investments for
the construction industry is the fastest way to recover the economic
situation, had been accepted for a long time. However, during this
recession, even private sectors were reluctant to invest and the government
did not increase its investments for construction because of the tightened
budget. For the first time the construction industry experienced a "zero
ceiling" situation. What was more, although the above mentioned
measures had been devised to deal with this situation in each construction
firm, the disparity in the profitability, technical expertise, and managerial
skills among construction firms had become wider. Under these
circumstances, the strategies of other Japanese industries and private
clients were diversification, internationalization and rationalization. As
clients' requirements became more diversified, construction firms were
required to expand their business.
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D. Bubble and the After
A record-breaking construction boom supported by the steep rising
prices of stock and land had begun in the late 1980's. The Japanese
capital market stands on unreasonably high-priced land mortgages, and
this skyrocketing land price pushed up private investments. The larger the
firm, the more money the firm invested. Since the largest construction firms
had large investors as clients, they profited from this situation the most. But
even the big five firms could not relax for long because, in theory, a bubble
economy is usually accompanied by a flash burst.
In 1991 a May Day was sent from the Tokyo stock exchange market
and the bubble economy or Heisei prosperity ended. Today, several years
after the bubble economy burst, it is generally thought that the Ministi y of
Finance, the Bank of Japan, large real estate firms, and the big five
construction firms profited the most from the bubble economy. However,
Kajima, one of the firms which most benefitted from the bubble economy,
has had a hard time cleaning up after the party.
4.2.2 Operational Peculiarity
As department stores of construction, large genecons like Kajima
have vertically and horizontally dispersed organizations, from their bulky
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headquarters, R&D institutions, information processing centers, to their
overseas offices, and the large number of employees who are guaranteed
lifetime employment. Figure 12 is the cooperate organization of the Kajima
Corporation. It is not easy to maintain an extended organization and many
employees regardless of the economic situation. The vice president of
Overseas Bechtel Inc. and its Tokyo office representative, John Moore,
pointed out the peculiarity of the Japanese construction industry as follows
(Asahi Shimbun, June 30, 1993);
"The principle of the contractual practice in Japan was based on a
quota system rather than on competition. A contractor tried to maintain
equivalent levels of the sales amount, the number of employees, the
technological advancement, and the degree of diversification to its same
size competitors. For instance, the number of employees of the Bechtel
group was about 23,000 in 1993, reduced from 40,000 in 1985. It seemed
to be impossible for Japanese contractors to manage such a change
because of their corporate cultures. The management systems of Japanese
and U.S. E&C firms seem to be totally incompatible."
As John Moore said, U.S. E&C firms are much more rational with
smaller headquarters, concentrating on specific businesses, adapting
flexible employment systems, and competing on the basis of open and fair
contractual procedures. U.S. firms still need to strengthen and continue to
center down their businesses in order to survive in one of the most
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Figure 12. Kajima's Organizational Chart
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competitive and severest domestic markets, as well as in the international
market.
This section compares various data of both Japanese and U.S. E&C
firms to demonstrate the differences of income, cost structure and
productivity.
A. Income Statement
The first table compares the consolidated income structures of the
Japanese big five in 1992.
Table 30. Income Structure of the Big Five (1992)
* Shimizu Corporation has
the public.
opened only non-consolidated financial data to
Source: Annual reports
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Kajima Shimizu Taisei Obayashi Takenaka
Revenues V2,200 bill V2,130 bill* V2,029 bill i 1,538 bill V1,765 bill
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Gross profit V255 bill V263 bill V269 bill V179 bill V222 bill
(margin) (11.6%) (12.3%) (13.3%) (11.6%) (12.6%)
Gen. & admi. 128 bill V126 bill V126 bill V107 bill V132 bill
expenses (5.8%) (5.9%) (6.2%) (7.0%) (7.5%)
Operating V127 bill V137 bill V143 bill V72 bill V91 bill
income (5.8%) (6.4%) (7.0%) (4.7%) (5.2%)
Income before 123 bill V108 bill V122 bill V53 bill V97 bill
tax (5.6%) (5.1%) (6.0%) (3.4%) (5.5%)
Net income 60 bill V45 bill 40 bill V23 bill V49 bill
(2.7%) (2.1%) (2.0%) (1.5%) (2.8%)
The Numbers of each genecon are similar, as are the structures. In
addition, they all have operated more than 90% in the domestic market.
These five firms have been in almost the same positions in the industry for
decades. At one time Kumagai-gumi seemed about to join this top group,
but it dropped away because of the too rapid expansion of its operation,
especially in overseas markets. From the above table, it can be said that
Japanese major genecons need to have more than a 10% gross profit of
the total revenue to make a 2 to 3% net income. R&D expenditures have
been high for them. (Table 31) A question arising from the comparison is
why are Japanese genecons similar in areas ranging from income structure
and organization to holding technologies represented by the R&D budget,
or why do they have to pursue an equivalent business style. The answer
will be explored in the next section.
Table 31. R&D Expenditure of the Big Five in 1990
Kajima Shimizu Taisei Obayashi Takenaka
R&D budget V19.2 bill V16.0 bill V12.5 bill V12.8 bill N/A
(% of the revenue) (1.13%) (0.85%) (0.81%) (0.96%)
Full-time staff 417 400 375 335 269
Source: Anthony C. Webster, "Japanese Building Design and Construction Technologies.",
Journal of Professional Issues in Engineerina Education and Practice, Vol. 119, No. 4,
October, 1993.
In addition to its long-term planning activities for private and public
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sector construction work and the development and implementing of a
national building code, the Ministry of Construction also operates two
research organizations, the Building Research Institute (BRI) and the Public
Works Research Institute (PWRI). Annual budgets are $15 million and $50
million, and the number of full-time staff is 170 and 475 respectively.
The next table shows selected U.S. firms' income structures in 1991.
Table 32. Income Structure of Selected U.S. E&C Firms
" 1 ne aata are rom IaliDiurton
Source: Annual reports
Company, the parent or Brown & Hoot.
It may be unfair to compare the financial data of Japanese and U.S.
E&C firms because businesses are to some extent different. However, the
structural differences between them are clearly indicated. U.S. engineering
contractors seem to need a higher profit margin, perhaps because they
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Fluor Foster W. Turner Morrison K. Brown & R.*
Revenues $6,572 mill 2,032 mill 2,672 mill V1,980 mill 6,108 mill
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Gross profit V218 mill V263 mill V58 mill V77 mill 432 mill
(margin) (3.3%) (12.9%) (2.2%) (3.9%) (7.1%)
Gen. & admini. V57 mill V201 mill V15 mill V45 mill V336 mill
expenses (0.9%) (9.9%) (0.6%) (2.3%) (5.5%)
Operating V161 mill V52 bill V43 mill V32 mill V96 mill
income (2.4%) (2.6%) (1.6%) (1.6%) (1.6%)
Income before V228 mill V61 mill V19 mill V58 mill V93 mill
tax (3.4%) (3.0%) (0.7%) (2.9%) (1.5%)
Net income V164 mill V43 bill V11 mill V35 mill V27 mill
(2.5%) (2.1%) (0.4%) (1.8%) (0.4%)
dbnl~
n
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consider R&D the critical factor in having technological competitive
advantages. The Foster Wheeler Corporation spent $34.7 million (1.7% of
the revenue) on R&D, and Halliburton spent $117 million (1.9% of the
revenue). Both the Turner Corporation and Morrison Knudsen, considered
general contractors, are struggling with lower incomes in their competitive
domestic market. In any case, It is clear that Japanese contractors need a
higher gross profit margin in order to make a net profit margin equivalent to
that of U.S. contractors. Then the question is how should Japanese
contractors spend money in order to keep on track in the business. Section
4.2.3. will focus on the contractual practice in Japan.
B. Construction costs and the productivity
Unlike Japanese manufacturing industries such as automobile,
consumer electronics, and semiconductors which are always facing global
competition, the Japanese construction industry has lost competitiveness as
a result of its governments' "fair distribution" and "prosperous coexistence"
policies. In effect, construction costs, productivity, and morale have been
sacrificed without competing with foreign firms for a long time.
Reasons for high construction costs may be found in low productivity,
the high cost of labor and materials, the complex delivery system,
indifference to cost reduction, excessive safety and quality control, the high
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percentage of sub-contracting and the contractual system in which nobody
suffers a loss except the tax payers or silent majorities. In addition, Japan
has adopted the lump-sum contract system. Under the lump sum contract,
contractors take almost all construction risks, which are often shifted to
subcontractors. Figure 13 shows an example of construction costs in
selected countries.
Labor productivity in the Japanese construction industry is
surprisingly low. (Figure 14) The fact that the majority of the industry
consists of small-size firms, may be a cause of low productivity, (Figure 15)
but other factors, such as less reliance on pre-fabricated materials, more
administrative functions in firms, and a life-time employment system should
be taken into account. Compared to U.S. general contractors, which often
maintain in-house site crews, Japanese genecons do not directly employ
workers. Instead, they hire subcontractors which usually have had a
longstanding relationship with certain genecons and have become almost
captive subcontractors, working exclusively for them. For example, Kajima
entirely controls about 20,000 subcontractors. Table 33 shows the cost
structure of contractors. The issue is that these prime subcontractors hire
lower-tier subcontractors depending on the worker demand of the
genecons. This system of multi-tiered subcontractors has caused many
problems, including illegal workers, lower skills, and lower wages. These
lower tier subcontractors are used as buffers against economic instability.
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Figure 13.
Construction Costs in Small Size Office Buildings
Japan
U.K.
Finland
Germany
Canada
Austria
Spain
U.S.A. (Chicago)
$0 $500 $1000 $1500 $2000 $2500 $3000
Source: Nikkei Business, Jiritsu sevo Kensetsu-avo, Nov. 15, 1993.
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Figure 14.
Construction Productivity in the U.S. and Japan
constant 1982 dollars per labor hour
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Source: Oyama,K., A Comparative Study of the US-Japan Construction Industry,
Unpublished thesis, MIT.
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Figure 15.
Value Added Productivity by Contractor's Size of Capital
million yen per person
'75 '76 '77 '78 '79 '80 '81 '82 '83 '84 '85 '86 '87 '88 '89 '90 '91
Source: JFCC, Nikkenren Handbook 93.
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Table 33. Cost Structure by Types of Construction
Large Small Road Marine NTT Plant & Total
Genecon Genecon related Equip.
Material 15.4 17.2 43.5 24.5 8.5 36.8 26.4
Labor 14.3 0.8 10.4 1.8 1.3 15.4 10.9
Sub-con. 55.4 69.1 25.6 46.7 63.8 31.3 50.3
Other 14.9 13.0 20.5 27.1 26.5 16.5 12.4
Source: Yoshimitsu Nakamura, Kensetsu Gyokai. Kyoikusya, 1982.
High material costs are attributed largely to the following factors:
actual high costs; complicated delivery systems; cartels; and political
decisions on "designated" materials. Everything is expensive in Japan.
Procuring construction materials from overseas is very difficult both
because of high tariffs and because of many non-tariff barriers. Not only the
system of contractual practice in the construction industry, but the Japanese
economic system itself should be changed in order to reduce construction
costs.
The cost indifference of the public sector promotes high construction
costs. Governors, bureaucrats, and politicians seem to consider that by
offering public works they are returning taxes. There are no incentives to
reduce construction costs. The more money a government spends, the
more the local economy prospers. This is the basic idea of equal society in
Japan.
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4.2.3 Contractual Practices
The construction of the Koyama Dam, located in the Ibaragi
Prefecture, northeast of Tokyo, Japan, is now in progress, sponsored by
Tobishima Corporation, one of the second tier genecons. This dam has
lately attracted considerable attention as one of the conspicuous cases of
construction bribe scandals. Sukemasa Uera, an advisor to Tobishima
Corporation, was arrested on suspicion of bribery concerning the
contracting of the Koyama Dam. The Asahi Shimbun (daily paper) reported
that he gave a bribe of V30 million to the governor of Ibaragi Prefecture to
get rid of "the favorite" construction firm, Taisei Corporation, and to win the
contract as sponsor of the "designated" joint venture. To put it simply,
Tobishima overturned the contract with a bribe against Taisei, the contractor
which many in the industry had expected to win by the arrangement of
dango. At almost the same time, other governors and executives of several
top genecons were arrested nationwide on suspicion in cases similar to
Koyama Dam. The issue is not whether either dango or bribery is right or
wrong; at question is the system itself that allows these practices.
These continuous construction bribe scandals have unique features
that do not exist in other industries. First, the main actors were top firms
representing the industry; that meant the issue involved the whole industry.
Second, prosecutors have revealed that the scandals were considered
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"daily practices" under the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) regime. The
practice of bribery was closely linked with the industry's other issues, such
as an arrangement of dango, a designated bid, and an amakudari (descent
from heaven, which means the appointment of a former official to an
important post in a private firm to get advantages for contracts). These
"unusual" practices are the results of the unique structure and contractual
systems of the industry. they may also be the results of the political system
in Japan, or even of Japanese cultural consciousness.
This section investigates the historical background and real issues of
contractual systems in Japan compared with those of other countries, and
explains how the Japanese contractual system has weakened the
industry's competitiveness in the international market.
A. Historical Background
It is necessary to trace back to the proclamation of an accounting law
in 1900 in order to investigate the origin of the Japanese contractual
system. Before the adoption of that law, the then Meiji government had
directly employed laborers who worked under the control of government
engineers. At this time, the construction industry was the labor supply
industry. After the proclamation of the accounting law, anyone who could
submit a bid bond might tender a bid which brought a sudden flow of new
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entrants to the industry. It was a kind of ideal free market situation. Since
the primary role of heavy civil contractors was to supply laborers, it was
easy for entrepreneurs to start businesses, and traditionally operated firms
were caught in fierce cost competitions. The increasing number of new
entrants included unqualified firms, which often abandoned a project
halfway through or performed very poorly. Thus, the government needed to
reexamine the contractual system to select qualified firms. The solution to
this situation was the adoption of the designated bid system. This system
gave the government tremendous authority through the process of selecting
qualified firms. Examples of abuses which result from this tremendous
authority include the exclusion of a firm from the list of designations for the
next fiscal year if the awarded contractor refuses to sign the contract or even
refuses to tender the bid, to accept the "amakudari" official, or to cooperate
in supporting an election campaign of the government's favored
candidates. These practices will be discussed in the next section.
The major public sectors in Japan are: the Ministry of Construction;
the Ministry of Transportation; the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and
Fishery; the Japan Highway Public Corporation; the Japan Water
Resources Development Public Corporation; forty-eight prefectural
governments and municipal governments. The Ministry of Construction has
controlled these public agencies in terms of the contractual system and
represents the construction industry in fair trade negotiations between the
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U.S. and Japan. The structure of the public sector is hierarchical and
administrative power is centralized. The budgeting of public works is mostly
handled by ministries of the national government or, if a lower level of
public agency, prefectural or municipal, is to perform the budgeting, such
activity is strictly supervised by the upper level agency.
B. Contractual Process
Because of the difference between the government policy of fair
distribution and the winning criteria that is the lowest bid, the contractual
process in the public sector is complex. In order to deal with these two
conflicting practices, contractors collude among themselves to arrange their
turn to win contracts. Table 34 lists the official contractual process and a
behind-the-scenes contractual process. It shows that there is considerable
involvement by genecons in pre-bid activities, including feasibility studies,
designs, and estimates. It also implies that there is competition in the pre-
bid phase and that the competition finishes before the bidding. These pre-
bid activities cost genecons a considerable amount of money. Therefore,
the genecons' strategies are based on competitiveness in the pre-bid
phase so that they can win a contract. The initial assumption was that the
absence of competition had weakened the competitiveness of Japanese
contractors in the international market. It is clear, though, that Japanese
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Table 34. Contract Procedures in Public Works
Official Procedure
1. The Government develops the
concept of the project.
2. The government contracts site
investigation with a consultant.
3. The government contracts basic
designs with a consultant.
4. The government staff studies
feasibility of the project.
5. The government contracts detailed
designs with a consultant.
6. The government engineers do the
estimates.
7. The government announces the
bid, designates qualified contractors
and selects the joint venture
participants.
8. The government holds the briefing
session for the project.
9. The government invites bids.
Unofficial Procedure
1.1 Interest groups try to influence the
development decision.
2.1. Genecons help the consultant
investigate site conditions.
2.2. Genecons investigate the site
conditions and submit their report to
the government.
3.1. Genecons help the consultant
with the basic design.
4.1. Genecons help the government
staff with a feasibility study.
5.1. Genecons help the consultant
with detailed designs
5.2. These genecons can have
important data about the project.
6.1. The government engineers
consult with genecon estimators on
costs.
7.1. Interest groups including
politicians try to influence the choice
of contractors and joint venture
members.
7.2. Genecons may be told the name
of the possible winning contractor by
the government.
7.3. The chosen genecon can pledge
to change a new date of designation
until after the disqualification period.
8.1. The schedule of dango is
determined.
8.2. Dango meetings are held and
bid prices are assigned to every
designated contractor or joint
venture.
9.1. Every candidate knows the
winner before the bidding.
Source: Washimi, T.
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contractors compete under a different contractual system from the system
used in the international market and in the United States. The difference in
contractual systems between markets is caused by the difference in
government policy toward public investment. The U.S. government
believes that keeping the cost of construction to a minimum contributes to
the public good; the Japanese government believes that a fair distribution
of public works contributes to the public good. The next section introduces
unique contractual practices which are developed because of conflicts
between policy and practice.
C. Unique Features In Japanese Contractual Practice
The following items, considered unique features in the Japanese
public contractual system, are inter-related and lead to the necessity of
dango which prevents competition and weakens the competitiveness of
Japanese construction firms in the international market.
1. Designated Bid
Kishiro Nakamura, former Minister of Construction, declared in
June,1993 that the Ministry of Construction would stick to the designated
bid system regardless of the pressure of the U.S. government. However,
131
shortly after this resolution, the Ministry had to change its policy because of
continuous construction bribery scandals which were partly caused by
defects in the designated bid system. The designated bid system is one of
pre-qualification processes adopted in the Japanese public sector: Table
35 shows the bid system of selected countries. A contractor must be
designated to participate in Japanese public works. In order to be
designated, the interested contractor has to submit a request for nomination
on the particular agency's vendor list. Once the contractor is listed, the
public agency evaluates its rank based on the data obtained from it; this
rating procedure is unknown to the public. According to Levy (1993), each
of the datum obtained from the contractor is weighed and becomes part of a
formula which produces the ultimate contractor rank (Formula 1). The
ranking system varies from agency to agency; thus a large contractor
usually submits thousands of requests for nomination every year. Although
this system is controversial, it has many good features, such as
guaranteeing qualitative work, fair distribution, and the exclusion of
unqualified firms. However, these advantages have been biased to favor
officialdom rather than the people. In order to be qualified and to appear on
a short list, a firm has to be under the public sector's thumb. For example,
once designated, a firm cannot refuse to join the bid; if it does, it will lose the
right to be designated for the rest of the fiscal year, and this would mean a
death sentence. The result was that, after the adoption of the designated
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bid system, the behavior of high-handed officials became even more
impudent.
Most municipal governments have designated bid committees
composed only of municipal officials headed by the deputy governor.
However, according to Nikkei Business (Nov. 15, 1993), the study reported
by the Ministry of Construction indicated that only about a half of the
municipal governments opened the criteria of qualification to the public and,
to its surprise, 21% of the city governments and 52% of the municipalities
had no bidder assignation criteria at all. Arbitrary selections have been
common in these public sectors. It is generally thought that to lodge a
complaint against governmental decisions would be impossible. In
addition, as a unique practice in Japan, the governments often open the
designated bidders' names to the public and hold a pre-bid meeting,
gathering all designated bidders to avoid repeating complicated bid
procedures and to let bidders know who the candidates are. The pre-bid
meeting participants immediately understand the officials' implications and
then hold a dango meeting.
A study of the bidding process for public works projects has
uncovered another unique feature which effectively shuts foreign
construction firms out of the Japanese market. (Asahi Evening News, Oct.
27, 1993) Japan's Management and Coordination Agency conducted a
study of construction contracts at 160 government ministries and public
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cooperations between July and September in 1992. It found that 31% of
the total governments and public agencies had kept the names of
designated bidders and bid results secret. No public sector explained to
the excluded firms why they had been disqualified. Seventeen of the 35
government bodies screened construction firms to determine which ones
were eligible to take part in the bidding process. In their screening they
included criteria of areal factors and local experience, which could have
prevented foreign firms from participating In addition, a prefectural
government required pre-qualification documents filling 50 cardboard
boxes.
Table 35. Bid Systems Adopted by Countries
Open Open with Desig- Negotiat-
PQ. nated edJapan O- 
Philippines O - X
Indonesia - 0 - A
Thailand O X X- 
Malaysia O A - X
Korea O X X A
U.S. (Federal) O A
U.S. (States) A A - -U.K. O- 
Germany A O A 
France 0 A 
Canada 0 -
0: Major; A: Moderate; X: Minor; -: Non
Source: Nikkei Construction, "Yuragu Shimei Kyoso Nvusatsu," Sep. 24, 1993.
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Formula 1. Factors in The Contractor Rating System
The formula:
(1 )X[(2)+(3)]/70+(4)/40+[(5)+(6)]/55+(7)+(8)+(9)+( 10)
The information obtained from contractors and the range of values are as
follows:
1. Annual average value of completed construction works in the field of
interest to the firm (178-14)
2. Net worth (120-60)
3. Number of staff members engaged in the construction business (60-30)
4. Business conditions (184-0)
a. Profitability
b. Liquidity
c. Productivity
d. Stability
5. Number of technical staff members (200-26)
6. Number of years in business (50-10)
7. Construction performances (675-300)
8. Experience in special construction (200-0)
9. Safety performance in construction (0-15)
10. State of labor welfare (5-15)
Source: Levy,Sidney M, Japan's big six, 1993.
2. Performance Guarantee
Three types of performance guarantees are authorized by the
Ministry of Construction to tender public works: performance guarantor,
deposit, and performance bond. The performance guarantor system has
been commonly used in Japan because contractors do not have to pay
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premiums or deposits. The Ministry of Construction has not approved the
inclusion of these insurance fees in the estimation, which would result in a
higher bid price for a contractor who adopts bond or deposit. The
performance guarantor system is considered to be a rational way to reduce
construction costs. On the other hand, recent criticism of dango has
indicated that this practice might lead to the necessity of dango. In this
system, if the contractor cannot complete the project, its guarantor, one of
the designated contractors for the bid, will take responsibility for it.
Contractors guarantee each other's performance. Kajima usually chooses
Shimizu or Taisei as a guarantor for its performance but has never asked
either of them to take over its responsibility. In addition to the above issue
which is related to dango, several other issues have come up as a result of
this system. First, it is unnatural that the guarantor who tendered the higher
bid price should settle the problems of the lowest bid contractor. Second, it
is difficult for new entrants to find a guarantor, especially in regional markets
which are regarded as closed markets. Third, a designated bidder breaking
away from dango may be refused as a guarantor by other designated
bidders. The U.S. government has claimed that having competitors
guarantee each other is an unfair practice and for the moment it assumes
that the performance guarantee system can exist only under the dango
system. The Ministry of Construction is thus faced with having to consider
an alternative to this practice.
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3. Absolute Estimated Cost
Under present Japanese accounting law, the contract price cannot
exceed the estimated cost calculated by government engineers. This
practice is a vestige of the era when contractors could not estimate costs
and relied completely on government engineers. Today, the situation has
changed; there is no longer any confidence in the estimations of
government engineers because of new technologies which contractors
have introduced, and because of quickly changing market conditions and
the fluctuating cost of materials and labor. The estimates of engineers in
the U.S. and other countries must also be considered. However, they are
usually used as references and cannot bind bid price. In Japan,
government engineers do not wish their estimates be merely a point of
reference. As a result, they have to consult contractors unofficially about
reasonable costs of construction first. The public sector has to re-consider
which cost it considers proper, the cost thus estimated by government
engineers or the cost derived from bidders' free competition.
4. Joint Venture
The concept of joint venture was first introduced by Morrison
Knudsen to hedge risks and supplement limited capabilities for the
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construction of military facilities in Okinawa. However, the purpose of
increasing the number of joint ventures in the public sector has changed
from what was originally intended. The unique goals of joint venture in
Japan today are for a fair distribution and the sharing of common
construction technologies. Under the present system, contractors can
tender a bid on the condition that the contractor follow the governments'
directions in its joint venture assignments. In Japan, a joint venture
company is not made according to the private sector's interest, but
according to the public sector's implication. The commonly used form of
joint venture is a combination of a large genecon and several local
contractors which have been included in order to promote the local
economy. Since politicians often intervene in determining joint venture
members, this mandatory joint venture practice is a hotbed not only of
dango, but also of bribery. The Ministry of Construction is under pressure
from the U.S. government to abolish this practice.
5. The concept of "Fair Distribution"
A Councilor, Tetsuo Kutugake, former chief engineer of the Ministry
of Construction, recalled that the two most important goals which his
superior had taught him again and again in his younger days, were first,
qualitative work with minimum budgets, and second, fair distribution. (Nikkei
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Business, Nov. 15, 1993) The concept of fair distribution has had priority
over that of a fair competition in public works.
For instance, the Tokyo metropolitan government divided a subway
construction project into sixteen packages, selected fifty-six qualified
contractors and directed joint venture combinations to the bid. For each
package, five joint ventures tendered bids and shared the result. This
meant that every one of the fifty-six contractors got a contract and no
contractor got more than one. It is not officially prohibited for a contractor to
contract more than one section package, but, such a practice could break
the government policy of fair distribution. As a result, contractors needed
adjustments or dango to avoid the double win situation. The Nikkei
Business Magazine pointed out that large genecons like Kajima or Taisei
are capable of contracting for a whole project, which would surely make the
project cost less through effective machine arrangements.
6. Amakudari
The amakudari system, the appointment of a former official to an
important post in a private firm, does not directly relate to the issue of
contractual practice. This practice is not unique to the Ministry of
Construction; most of the public sector and competent authorities expect
post retirement positions in the private sector. It is a practice that is common
139
in Japan and in other countries as well. For example, Bechtel Inc. has
invited many former officials including George Shultz, Casper Weinberger,
and Carla Hills to join it. In Japan, accepting amakudari officials has
become indispensable for construction firms to keep good relationships
with governments. Contractors regard the amakudari system as a form of
insurance, permitting them to get timely and appropriate information
concerning new contracts through officials who once worked for amakudari
employees. Asahi Shimbun reported that the Ministry of Construction has
requested contractors to pay retiring officials the same salary as they were
receiving at the time of their retirement and to give them an appropriate
position. An official invitation form which includes the date of invitation,
position, income, and office location must be submitted. Most amakudari
employees, who are connected witn government officials, work for
marketing divisions as order takers or trouble settlers.
7. Pre-bid Activities
In Japan people believe that clean water, safety, and service are
free. This can explain why the concept of CM (construction management)
has had difficulty being accepted by the industry. Designing, consulting
and engineering services have never paid well in Japan. Even engineering
firms have to participate in procurement and construction to make a profit.
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The status of consulting firms is relatively low in Japan because in principle,
government officials design and supervise public projects. However, in
practice, governments give orders for designs to consulting firms which rely
largely on genecons' extended expertise in their design divisions. This
practice, called marketing design, designing public projects instead of
acting as a consultant free of charge, commonly occurs and it can be a
strong weapon in the dango meeting for the bid.
In fact, the government as well as the consultants ask the genecons
for many services during the pre-bid period, including a feasibility study, soil
survey, structural analysis, and estimation. In order to recover these costs,
genecons need to claim these services at dango meetings. It may be time
now to revise these bad habits and introduce a design-build system,
generally accepted in private projects, and an accounting system that
makes a pre-bid order possible. Table 36 shows that Japanese general
contractors cover many construction phases.
8. Dango
Dango, in simple terms, means collusion. In Levy's description in his
book, Japan's Big Six, "dango is alleged to take place when a consortium of
contractors meets in some hidden place to determine whose turn it is to win
that next big contract; all contractors participating in this collusive exercise
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receive either a cash payment or a profitable portion of the job when it has
been awarded to the predesignated low-bidder."
However, this is not always correct. Not only have contractors
benefitted from the dango system but the interest groups concerned have
too. In addition, contractors are not necessarily able to receive a profitable
portion of the job; they sometimes have to contract unprofitable ones under
this quota system.
Although it has long been believed that contractors held dango
meetings solely for their own profit, construction scandals and criticism by
U.S. Trade Representatives have made it clear that governments or
bureaucrats played principal roles in dango meetings to keep their authority
over the industry through the designated bid system. The Ministry of
Construction considered changing its bid systenl from the designated bid to
an open bid in 1982 as a result of a dango scandal in Shizuoka Prefecture.
However, the Ministry never carried out its intention because it found that to
abandon its authority of designation meant that it would no longer be able
to have power over the industry and it would be difficult for its officials to find
amakudari positions in construction firms after they retired. An OB of the
Fair Trade Commission asserted that 80% of the dango were led by the
government. These factors - the designated bid system, performance
guarantees, absolute estimated cost, joint venture, the "fair distribution"
concept, amakudari, and pre-bid activities have allowed the dango system
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to exist.
The Dango system has been considered a necessary evil partly
because Japanese businesses are based largely on the concept of
prosperous coexistence or fair distribution, rather than fair opportunity or
open competition, on which U.S. businesses are based. This idea may be
derived from Confucianism and the national character of islanders, the
Japanese.
Regarding market distribution, the opinion that the largest genecons
can dominate the market is based on their large financial and technological
capabilities. Another opinion is that the largest genecons, which operate
nationwide, and the small contractors, which are closely related to the local
community, may be able to survive, but the middle class, which has few
specific factors, may not. In any case, firms which have no clear mission or
competitive advantages could be candidates for M&A (merger and
acquisition). Nomura Soken (think-tank) predicted that the largest
nationwide contractors would eventually join to form around twenty firms
which would get about a half share of the total construction market. (Today,
the top 100 firms have about a 30% share of the total, Figure 16.)
The most important factors are, first the government's attitude and its
willingness to accept good change in order to recover the industry's
reputation, and second, the breaking up cozy relationships among big
businesses, politicians, and bureaucrats, in order to have competitive
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Figure 16.
Domestic Market Share of the Top Japanese Contractors
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advantages applicable to the international market. There are many
advantages of the dango system which governments have enjoyed. For
example, even if a budget is considered lower than the market cost and
nobody wants to take it, the dango system forces a designated contractor to
accept it. This firm may be rewarded with an advantage in the future. Also,
the bid for tunnel works using TBM (Tunnel Boring Machine) has often been
tendered on condition of dango because specially ordered TBMs are used
for tunnel projects. In addition, Construction methods, machine designs,
and machine construction should start a considerable period before the bid.
Without the dango system, project completion would be delayed for as long
a period as the design and construction of the TBM machines would need.
A dango master mentioned six important criteria in order to win
dango deals to the Nikkei Business (Nov. 15, 1993).
a. It is necessary to study the project in detail, to start pre-bid activities
earlier than competitors, and to have these efforts recognized by the
decision-making manager who is working for the client.
b. It is necessary to have priority in terms of the location and good local
connections.
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c. It is often necessary for the head of the firm to win the approval of heads
of rival firms, especially in large projects.
d. Timely "aimed at reaching a consensus" between the industry and the
political circle is important.
e. It is necessary to know more about the client's financial situation and the
project detail planning. In addition, the firm should exceed its rivals in its
marketing effort and demonstrate this effort to the client, the political world,
and the industry.
f. In order to contract one project, the firm needs to concede three to five
projects to its rivals. Thus, the firm needs to have three to five times as
much information as the others and it also must study them closely in order
to convince the other contractors in dango.
The dango system seems to be just an exchange of quibbling. There
used to be order in the industry's dango world. However, it has become
difficult to achieve a fair and peaceful distribution by dango because of the
intervention of governors and politicians, and the increasing number of
dango-breakers. After the economy's bubble burst, contractors rushed to
public works to make up their decreasing private investments. Since it is
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impossible to compete freely in public works under the present system,
these contractors offered bribes aimed at securing orders for new
construction to governors. Today, the dango system and the industry's
business environment prevent competition in the industry, and this has
made the industry deteriorate in competitiveness, productivity, and pride.
The reformation of contractual practice will encourage the industry to
reorganize and become competitive. Unless it introduces the principle of
competition in cost, productivity, and technology, which is common in other
industries, the Japanese construction industry could become just a sub-
contractor of overseas enterprises.
D. The Iron Triangle
Many people inside the industry still insist on the necessity of
"adjusting orders." Certainly, a system under which everyone exploits
public works expenditures would be convenient, as long as Japan
continues to be exclusive and as long as the people do not complain.
Under such a system, both large and small firms share profits in a friendly
manner, politicians collect secret donations and anticipate electoral
support, bureaucrats secure post-mandatory retirement jobs in the private
sector in order to "help the industry grow". However, this "Japanese-style
interdependence" may no longer be tolerated. First, as the Japan-U.S.
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construction talks have indicated, the system itself is not internationally
acceptable. Second, as the voters' anger with corruption has shown, it is
impossible to fool the people forever, as Asahi Shimbun pointed out.
The MIT political science professor, Richard Samuels described this
cozy relationship among politicians, bureaucrats, and big businesses
indigenous to Japan as the game of "scissors-paper-rock" in the eternal
triangle. This practice is not peculiar to the construction industry; Every
industry has its involvement with government authorities and its "in-house"
politicians, who create an iron triangle. Each group helps the other within
the triangle, ignoring the outside world.
Figure 41 shows the inter-relationships between the three actors. A
further comparative study of the politics-government-big business triangles
between the Japanese construction industry and the U.S. defense industry
will be made in a later section of this chapter.
E. Section Summary
This section introduced the unique contractual system in the
Japanese construction industry which has forced structural constraints upon
the industry. It has also prevented the cost competition between contractors
that exists in the United States. Although cost competition has not been
adopted in many developed countries, international contractors need to
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have cost competitiveness because many of the international construction
projects are planned in developing countries which adopt cost competition.
Because the differences between bid prices made by contractors are clear
from the point of view of cost, cost competition is accepted in the
international construction market, even though it is difficult to compare their
capabilities, which include quality, services, management skills, and
technical expertise. On the other hand, the competitiveness of Japanese
contractors is based largely on their total capability in the domestic market,
in which the relationships between governments and contractors have been
established over a long term. The Japanese government and the
construction industry do not fear the entry of foreign engineering and
construction firms in the market; however, they are afraid that the contract
system peculiar to Japan, which has worked very well inside the triangle,
will be forced to change with the opening of the market. The Japanese
construction industry has already lost much of its international
competitiveness under the unique contractual system. The critical issue is
that public sectors have denied open competition with a fair distribution
policy. They are now at a crossroad; they must decide whether they will
defend their contractual system and be reconciled to the loss of their
international competitiveness, which is not easy to accept, or they must
reconsider their system and adjust it to the international market. In any
case, the industry should be aware that the domestic market must compete
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under international rules both domestically and internationally.
4.2.4 Empirical Studies of Contractual Practices
Section 4.2.3. described the unique features of the Japanese
contractual systems including the designated bid, performance guarantee,
absolute estimated cost, joint venture, the concept of fair distribution,
amakudari, pre-bid activities, and dango. Japanese contractors
demonstrate their ability in these fields in order to get contracts in the
domestic market. However, in other markets, such as the U.S, market,
competition by U.S. general contractors is based primarily on cost
advantage. The question then is, how does the system really work? And
what process does a contractor need to go through in order to claim priority
when the industry holds a dango meeting? Within Japan, therefore,
competitiveness means using the above mentioned practices to position a
contractor so that it is eligible to bid on contracts Although it is very
different from U.S. competition, there does exist competition within Japan.
In order to verify the peculiarity of the Japanese contractual system and
answer the above questions, three of the largest public construction works
in progress in Japan, Projects A, B, C, were chosen for an empirical study.
The four questions asked were:
151
1. What was the detailed process for getting the contract?
2. What kind of pre-bid activities were needed to get the contract?
3. What are the competitive advantages of your firm?
4. What will your future strategies be?
These questions were sent to X, Y, Z, the general managers of
projects A, B, C, working for genecon XX, YY, ZZ, respectively. The
following are their summarized opinions.
A. Project A
1. Description
General manager X responded to questions by describing the
background of the project in a general terms in order to preserve
confidentiality. His response follows.
Five years prior to the official announcement of the project, the
government awarded its basic design to consulting firm B. However, this
project was too difficult and too risky in terms of technical expertise and size
for B to take sole responsibility for the basic design. Therefore, genecon C,
which was closely related to B, helped B on most of the design. Then, the
sales division of C asked for XX and two other genecons to join the group in
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order to study the project further. The number of participants for project A
was determined according to the possible size of the project. Two years
later, the details of the design were awarded to consulting firm D. XX and
two other genecons from the above mentioned four helped firm D with the
detailed design. Then, according to the industry's adjustment (described in
section 4.2.3), the project was divided into three sections among the three
genecons which participated in the detailed design.
2. Pre-bid Activities
In general, in order to be involved in a public bid, a contractor has the
following choices.
a. Bribery
This is rare because it is against the industry's rules of fair
distribution and stability.
b. Work experiences.
Demonstrating work experience, being geographically close to the
targeted project and being related to the project provide strong advantages.
153
c. Services.
In order to claim priority against other genecons, genecons often
help consulting firms with both basic and detailed designs free of charge.
d. New technology.
Introducing new technologies, which may improve safety and quality,
and may save time and money, are the most reasonable ways of having
competitiveness.
e. Influential persons.
Counting on locally influential persons is often the most effective, but
requires some compensation.
3. Competitive Advantages
Advanced technical expertise has lead XX to be at the competitive
edge. However, this situation may not last.
4. Future Strategies.
Having advanced technical expertise will maintain XX as the top
contractor in the industry; however, the competition will include cost factors
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in the future and XX should reduce various overhead costs to survive in cost
based competition. Future strategies will be;
a. XX should find out about possible problems before its competitors. Then
it can be superior to them by suggesting proper solutions to the problems.
b. Regardless of the bid system in the future, it is always important to have
not only distinguished technologies but also a superior record in past
construction projects, such as in high quality experienced work, a proper
completion date, and an absence of disputes. The criteria for selection will
be similar to those of pre-qualification adopted for international bids today.
c. A contractor who can propose a specific development for a property will
have advantages even in public works because of increasing privatization.
d. Continuing investment in R&D focusing on future technologies is
necessary to maintain XX in a advantageous position.
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B. Project B
1. Description
General manager Y responded to questions by describing the
background of the project in general terms in order to preserve
confidentiality. His response follows.
This project is a pioneer work and is considered to be technically
very difficult. It required a detailed feasibility study, a considerable amount
of structural calculation, and careful estimates. This study cost about $20
million. Only two genecons, YY and WW, were considered able to do such
a large-scale feasibility study. These two contractors dominated the design-
build construction market during Japan's high econom.lic growth period, and
still have large design divisions. For example, YY has five hundred
designers solely for heavy civil engineering fields. With such capability, in
the industry's traditional system it was only a matter of course that these two
contractors got and shared the contract.
2. Pre-bid Activities
There was an official announcement for open bids on this project.
However, the procedure was a formality and the bid was actually negotiated
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because only two contractors were considered to have technical and
personnel capabilities for this kind of work. Also, since the preliminary cost
was so high, only serious contractors could tender the bid at reasonable
prices.
3. Competitive Advantages
Expertise is the most important competitive advantage that a
contractor should have. Since it is impossible that a bid price exceed an
engineer's estimation under present accounting laws, contractors are
forced to bid lower than the government's initial budget even though they
might consider that more should be budgeted. During construction, a prime
contractor looks for reasonable ways to take advantage of changing orders.
In order to change orders without conflict, the contractor uses its technical
expertise to persuade government engineers to allow the change.
4. Future Strategies
Future competition will probably be based on cost and quality.
However, this depends on the contractual policy of the local, municipal, and
national governments. The U.S. government's proposal of "open policy"
may reduce opportunities for large genecons in the short term because they
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no longer will have a cost advantage. Too, the policy may deteriorate the
quality of project works. Japanese clients, including both the public and the
private sector, have enjoyed receiving high quality work and various
supporting services and are accustomed to them. It is doubtful that
contractors will be able to satisfy the client with the same quality and service
under a policy that considers low cost to be the most important factor. Thus,
in the long term, large genecons can still have competitive advantages on
the basis of technical expertise if they are able to maintain their level of
expertise. Y personally considers the present contractual system the most
reasonable and the fairest for the public.
C. Project C
1. Description
2. Pre-bid Activities
General manager Z stated that it was impossible to comment about
questions A and B. He responded to questions C and D in general terms in
order to preserve confidentiality. His response follows.
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3. Competitive Advantages
a. The capability of ZZ's engineering work force.
In the construction industry, clients do not rely on technology itself but
on engineering experts who can handle any difficulty with experience,
knowledge, and cooperation, using managing tools as well as technical
expertise. The most important asset in a construction firm is its human
resources, especially engineers.
b. Investment for technological advancement.
Contractor ZZ has traditionally spent a considerable amount for
research for every large project in order to advance its technology, which
may result in future technological advantages in the similar projects.
c. The size.
Clients often prefer larger contractors because they have greater
total capability than smaller ones. ZZ is one of the largest contractors in
Japan, which means that clients are assured that the project will be
completed without any difficulty.
It is difficult for the government to evaluate the total capability and
past performances of contractors because of the uniqueness of large
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construction projects. Even though structures may be the same, site
conditions such as soil, underground water, and the location itself are totally
different. Therefore, the government tends to base its decision only on
cost.
4. Future Strategies
To be the leader of this industry, the most important factor is
reliability. This is a basic human characteristics. Therefore, the firm should
always behave so as not to spoil its reputation for reliability. Future
competition will be based on cost in the short term and should be based on
performance in the long term. ZZ may face fierce competition when the
government changes its contractual policy from fair distribution to fair
opportunity. This change means that ZZ must change the way it does
business and its bureaucratic organization as well. To have outstanding
total capability, ZZ needs to provide training in order to have confident
engineers.
D. Section Summary
It is clear that such informal but traditional pre-bid activities are
important to get contracts. Existing contractual practices in Japan, as
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mentioned in section 4.2.3, have produced better quality than fair
opportunity practices have in the United States.
General managers, although all are civil engineers, believe that
technical expertise provides the most important competitive advantage in
order to get contracts. Under the existing fair distribution policy, genecons
have in-house design divisions in order to support feasibility studies,
designs and estimations for the government and consulting firms for public
works. Contractors maintain and encourage team relationships between
the government and consulting or design firms, so that the coordination of
contractors' internal activities is crucial for participation in projects from the
early phase to completion.
Changing from fair distribution to fair opportunity may disrupt the
industry for the short term. Even if cost becomes more important in future
competition, general managers predict technical expertise will be the major
competitive advantage of genecons. Also, it would be difficult to terminate
the close and cooperative traditional relations which have existed between
the parties concerned.
4.2.5 Domestic Strategy
As a result of their unique contractual system, competition in the
domestic public construction market is based on the total capability of
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Japanese general contractors. Cost competitiveness is not critical; it is only
one of the factors. A contractor needs to prove his total capability not only to
be designated for the bid as the first step of contract, but also to persuade
designated competitors to abandon any further effort to obtain the contract.
This total capability can be maintained only by the present contractual
system because the costs of a large and capable organization are too high
to be supported by cost competition. Through retracing recent business
and corporate strategies, this section investigates what strategies have
been developed in order to have competitive advantages, and what
practices have made Kajima a leading contractor in the public construction
market in Japan.
A. Business Strategy
The business strategies developed by Kajima for winning contracts
can be categorized in three orderly steps: designation, contract, and
construction.
1. Strategy for Designation
The first and most important step in getting a contract of public works
is to be designated for the bid. Without being designated, a contractor
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cannot tender the bid or even join a dango meeting. The designation of a
contractor is based on the annual contractor rating (Formula 1, chapter
section 4.2.3.) evaluated by each government and public sector, by the fair
distribution policy, which does not allow a contractor to contract projects in
succession, and by some arbitrary decisions . The criteria of this contractor
rating system implies two important factors for designation, which are:
a. Size
b. Technical expertise
Kajima's strategies for designation have been established in order to
meet these factors. The following is a brief description of important factors.
a. Size
Size is the most important factor in being designated. As Formula 1
indicated, the public sector determines the contractors' yearly rating and its
ranking, based largely on size factors, such as the value of completed
construction work, the net worth, the number of staff members, the number
of technical staff members and experience. Larger contractors have more
opportunity to participate in larger projects, which are generally higher
value added, more profitable, more reputable and more difficult. Other
criteria are also influenced by the size factor of the contractor. In terms of
productivity, for example, the larger the contractor, the more productive it is
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(Figure 15). On the other hand, under the present " fair opportunity" policy
of the government, large genecons have almost no chance to get smaller
contracts. For example, the Tokyo metropolitan government divided
licensed contractors into five rankings (Table 37). A contractor ranked A
has no chance for a project designed for B ranking contractors.
Table 37. Number of Qualified Contractors by Construction Type
in the Tokyo Metropolitan Government (1991)
Ranking A B C D E Total
Road construction 86 300 602 387 258 1,633
Bridge construction 115 100 186 89 36 526
River structure 171 246 330 153 55 955
Water supply facili. 108 187 440 340 244 1,319
Sewer facility 211 276 431 227 127 1,272
General civil work 287 408 711 459 420 2,285
*For example, the maximum contract amount per order in road construction
is: A - more than V200 million, B - V200-V80 mill., C - V80-V30 mill., D - V30-
V7 mill., E - less than V7 mill.
Source: Nikkei Construction, "Yuraau Shimei Kyoso Nvusatsu," Sep. 24, 1993.
Although large genecons cannot directly contract a project designed
for contractors in category B,C,D and E, there are secret paths. A commonly
used way is "ura joint venture", a Japanese term of secret joint venture, in
which a large genecon actually takes responsibility for the project under the
name of smaller contractors. It means that the staff of a large genecon
wears the uniform and has the business cards of the smaller contractor, and
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then the smaller contractor earns the commission. Although this practice is
very disappointing for the staff of large genecons, it permits large genecons
to cover all types of work.
Once Kajima proposed to reduce the number of its employees during
the recession period which lasted from the mid 70's to mid 80's. During this
period, Kajima hired about a hundred new employees annually compared
to the five hundred it hired before and after that period. There were two
reasons for this. One was because Kajima wanted to change its core
business from contract of implementation to design and engineering, which
requires a smaller number of advanced technical experts rather than many
"general" managers. The other was that the government's "zero ceiling"
construction budget policy had produced a sense of impending crisis for
large organizations. However, Kajima noticed that by cutting back it had
weakened a scale advantage which it had developed over time with
considerable efforts and by spending considerable money.
Today, the government is groping for an alternative pre-qualification
system to the current designated bid system. Size superiority may remain
important because the great concern of the government is the quality of
work, and only a large licensed technical staff seems to be able to suggest
qualitative work.
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b. Technical Expertise
Although its size factor can differentiate Kajima from smaller
contractors, it is not enough when it competes with other genecons. For
example, Table 37 shows that there are a hundred and fifteen A class
contractors for bridge construction. Technical expertise and experience in
special construction (Formula 1, item #8) differentiate Kajima from others.
For example, Kajima has always been designated for cable-stayed bridge
projects because of its advanced technical expertise. Not only are thirty
civil engineers currently working uniquely on the structural analysis of
cable-stayed bridges (eight projects under construction in March, 1994),
many researchers are also working for R&D in related fields in Kajima. As a
result, Kajima hold a 50% domestic share in this field.
Although the contractor is finally determined by bid price, having
technical expertise, as in the case of Kajima, is important in order to
proceed to the next step. The only possible exception for Kajima is
disqualification, which is effected if dango practice is uncovered.
2. Strategy for Contract
Once designated, the bargaining among designated contractors
begins. Contractors have to tender a bid regardless of the degree of their
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willingness to accept the project. On the other hand, under the present "fair
distribution" policy, even Kajima cannot contract for more than its share of
the projects. As a result, Kajima needs to select favorable projects, and to
make an effort to contract them without fail. Since pre-bid activities cost a
great deal, as former sections have described, Kajima needs to contract
targeted projects in order to recover these costs. Kajima's strategies in the
contract phase are as follows:
a. Its vertically integrated organization
b. Its coordination of pre-bid activities
a. The Vertically Integrated Organization
Kajima's head office buildings are located in Akasaka, downtown
Tokyo. Here, about two thousand employees work for the headquarters
and support divisions. Although Kajima does not directly employ skilled
workers and subcontracts nearly all of the work to be performed, it cannot
keep its organization small because of the demands of the contractual
system. This is why Kajima maintains a large vertically and horizontally
diversified organization. Many divisions seem to be irrelevant to the
contract practice and construction activity at first glance, but they are
indirectly involved in it. In order to fit in with the contractual system and to
differentiate itself from others, Kajima has expanded its business fields
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mostly to technical upstreaming, such as R&D, design, and information
technology, where experts are directly involved in the contract practices.
1) R&D
Today, the industry's first R&D institution, Kajima Technical Research
Institute (KTRI) leads Japanese construction technologies with highly
sophisticated facilities and testing equipment. In 1991 Kajima's corporate
R&D budget was $180 million, with $72 million going directly to the KTRI,
where 440 full-time employees work. Three major roles of KTRI are: R&D,
technical cooperation and consultation, and training and diffusion. R&D
programs with broader perspectives and views include various middle and
long range fundamental theoretical studies as well as the exploitation of
and experimentation with new technology. The R&D results are effectively
utilized for actual projects through the company-wide management channel
from planning and design to implementation. With this outcome and
feedback effect KTRI extends its capability not only for the enhancement of
its internal expertise but also for its external consultation. In addition, KTRI
continues to train its in-house engineering staff and also handles the
publicity concerning Kajima's potentiality at home and abroad. The
following are major activities of KTRI.
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a) R&D
i) KTRI R&D
Along with the company R&D policy, KTRI leads original research
programs to exploit new technologies.
ii) Corporate R&D
By forming a company-wide project team, synthesized production
technology for marketable commodities is being developed.
iii) Joint R&D with Outside Organizations
Collaborating with the government and other public organizations,
KTRI promotes various joint research programs to utilize professional
proficiency.
b) Technical Cooperation and Consultation
i) Finding Solutions to Technical Problems at Construction Sites
By analyzing and solving problems at an early stage, KTRI assures
and improves the quality of its design and implementation.
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ii) Consignment Research
KTRI involves a variety of research consigned by the public and
private sectors.
c) Training and Diffusion
i) Training
KTRI conducts training programs for Kajima's engineers and
middle managers.
ii) Lectures
In addition to conducting an annual report presentation, reviewing
up-to-date research results and information, KTRI contributes technical
training and lectures.
iii) Publicity
KTRI's state of the art R&D is well known through exhibitions and
through publications such as research articles published for quarterly
and annual proceedings.
These activities have contributed very little to Kajima's international
competitiveness, but they have certainly contributed to its domestic
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competitiveness. The R&D activities pursued at Kajima are similar to those
performed by its rivals because it has to avoid falling behind its competitors
in any important and potential growth area. Falling behind in a field means
that Kajima could develop a weak point in the contract practice of a specific
field. It is important for Kajima to give evidence that it promotes construction
technology and technical expertise in every field regardless of the degree of
its importance for Kajima's immediate strategy.
In addition to its reluctant investment in R&D activities to avoid falling
behind its competitors, Kajima takes the initiative in many technological
fields, such as concrete material and construction, earthquake vibration
control and isolation, membrance structure, great depth excavation, wave
energy utilization and environmental control. The incentives for starting
new R&D activities originate with Kajima's strategic marketing policy, the
government's technological policy and the private sector's inquiries. It is
only natural that Kajima should have priority for the bid if it has promoted
particular research of a new construction as directed from the government.
In addition to construction technologies, KTRI has unique laboratories such
as the Marine Science Laboratory (MSL) and the Plant Cultivation
Laboratory (PCL). MSL conducts research on the cultivation of fish and
shell fish as well as on the preservation of marine ecology, which is
effective for proposing marine structures such as a waste water treatment
plant for a nuclear power station. MSL researches the environmental
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impacts of sunlight quantity, temperature and humidity on the growth of
plants and lawn grasses and on environmental preservation, and applies
this research to environmentally concerned projects.
2) Design
a) Civil Engineering Design Division (CEDD)
The Civil Engineering Design Division conducts the design and
structural analysis of heavy civil construction. The first design division for
heavy civil engineering construction was established in the KTRI in 1951.
In 1963 it became independent from KTRI and became a division belonging
to Kajima's headquarters. Today, every branch has its own design division
in order to correspond to its regional demands. These design divisions
collaborate on design-related work with the headquarter's design division
as well as with KTRI and the Information Processing Center (IPC). The two
main roles of CEDD are first, to serve large design-build type projects such
as underground hydroelectric power stations and concrete cable stayed
bridges, and second, to help consulting firms with public work designs in
order to gain an advantage over its competitors. This pre-bid activity was
described in detail in section 4.2.3. The CEDD has three hundred and fifty
civil engineers who are in charge of various engineering and consulting
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services from investigation and planning to design and after-care.
b) Architectural and Engineering Group (AE)
Kajima's Architectural and Engineering Group is one of the largest
and most reputable AE organizations in Japan. It has about 1,250
employees including architects, planners, designers and structural,
mechanical and electrical engineers, who offer expertise in the areas of
architecture and planning, project development and feasibility studies,
space planning, interior design, structural, mechanical and electrical
engineering, and other technical services. Performing these services is a
constant staff of 750 employees in the architectural design division in
Tokyo, and 350 employees in nine domestic branch offices. In addition,
150 employees work for overseas projects. They engage in a broad range
of projects and work in close coordination with the headquarters in Tokyo.
Kajima's building construction team, including the AE group and the
building construction division, has mostly conducted private construction
works. Thanks to its AE group, Kajima has the highest ratio (88%) of the
negotiated bids in the industry for private building construction. This means
that Kajima can expect higher profits from the private sector without
involving the unique contractual system in the public sector.
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c) Information Technology
Kajima's Information Processing Center (IPC) first began using
computers in 1963 to carry out structural calculations for the seismic design
of high rise buildings and bridges. The role that its computers now play
includes planning, designing, and construction. IPC has not only
developed systems to analyze nuclear power plants and off-shore
structures and to determine the appropriateness of business and
construction planning; it has also expanded to include Artificial Intelligence
(Al), Factory Automation (FA), and Computer Graphics (CG) systems.
By gaining the support of technical expertise from these three
organizations, and by collaborating with headquarters, the general
managers of Kajirra have had an advantage over its competitors in the total
capability needed for contract awards.
b. The coordination of pre-bid activities
Competition may be the one thing that most differentiates public
construction in Japan from other markets. Although the winning contractor
is already determined by dango before the bid, there is usually fierce rivalry
among the designated contractors in order to have priority in the dango.
The dango for public work is a sort of all-out war. A motivated contractor
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has to convince the other candidates to give up the project by claiming its
priority over them. Prioritization is based largely on the degree to which a
contractor is involved in the project's pre-bid activities. Other
considerations are geographical and experiential advantages. Inferior
contractors often use political arrangements to encroach upon the rights of
superior contractors. Therefore total capability is important; many
interrelated divisions have to be involved in pre-bid activities, from the top
management and Business Promotion Division to KTRI, CEDD, IPC, the
Civil Engineering Technology Division and finally the estimator, who is
expected to be the general manager of the project. These activities should
be well-coordinated under the top management in order to include all fields,
and appropriate, timely measures should be taken in order to secure a
superior position.
3. Strategy for Construction
Kajima, like other Japanese construction firms, is strongly oriented
toward a long-term view and takes care to maintain close long-term
relationships with its subcontractors, suppliers and stock-holders. An
important reason why Japanese construction firms need long-term
relationships is that their contracts are based on total satisfaction rather
than cost. As a matter of fact, wherever cost is the crucial factor in contracts,
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as it is in the U.S. construction market, firms cannot consider long-term
relationships. Japanese contractors must be extremely sensitive to their
clients; if they fall short of their clients' expectations it will be very difficult for
them to recover their position of trust. Therefore, in order to get future
contracts, it is important for contractors to maintain the quality of their work,
the scheduled construction period, safety, the projected budget, and the
avoidance of disputes. Kajima's capability in the construction phase is
superior to its competitors because its strategies of construction are
essentially having capable subcontractors and using its technical expertise
effectively.
a. Subcontractors
Kajima's good reputation is based largely on its subcontractors who
work for Kajima exclusively. This close relationship has both advantages
and drawbacks. On the one hand, the subcontractors know the operation
system of Kajima, they never complain about short term loss or
unreasonable requests, and they can train Kajima's young engineers. On
the other hand, this cozy relationship may deteriorate productivity and
create arrogance in subcontractor management. Kajima makes the
following efforts in order to secure capable subcontractors.
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1) It keeps strictly to the payment period and amount.
2) It keeps on providing contracts. (In case of absence of continuous work,
Kajima helps them find jobs.)
3) It promotes their employees' technical training and various construction
license acquisitions.
4) It checks and advises its subcontractors' financial conditions.
5) It takes responsibility for all construction accidents. (Kajima has never
shifted its responsibility concerning safety onto its subcontractors.)
Kajima's prime subcontractor association, Rokuei-kai, is composed
of about 20,000 firms including subcontractors, surveyors, R&D institutions
and suppliers. These members, who have been carefully screened before
their admission to the association, enjoy various privileges including those
from financial institutions.
b. Effective application of technical expertise
Since there is no CM (construction management) contract in Japan,
genecons are much closer to their clients than U.S. general contractors are
to theirs, even though many clients have their own in-house civil engineers.
Site-engineers, performing current projects with future work in mind,
participate in the marketing efforts of genecons. In order to respond to client
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expectations, Kajima's construction site offices are closely connected with
its supporting divisions, not only the above mentioned KTRI, CEDD, and
IPC, but also with its Civil Engineering Technology Division, which is
composed of senior technical experts, its Machinery and Equipment
Department, which is equivalent to a medium-size heavy machine
manufacturer, and its Business Promotion Division, which is in charge of
marketing and client service. Kajima also promotes personnel transfer
between its construction office and support divisions; for example, its heavy
civil project office usually has structural designers, computer engineers, civil
engineering researchers, and mechanical and electrical engineers as well
as construction managers.
B. The Corporate Strategy
1. The strategy in the 1980's
Although Kajima had not always led in the number of annual contract
awards and revenue, it earned the highest income in the industry for a long
time because of having the highest percentage of negotiated contracts in
the private market, where it could secure a higher profit margin than that of
its competitors. However, during the economic downturn of the early 1980,
Kajima lost its position of superiority because its major regular clients,
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heavy industries such as steel, heavy machinery, automobile, and
petrochemical, decreased their investments. In addition, the government
did not increase its investment as it usually did whenever there was a
recession. As a result, the construction industry found itself in a cost war.
Every genecon tried to find a means of escape from this situation in
overseas markets by preparing for lower profit margins.
Kajima's top management was required to restore the business.
First, it analyzed the causes by introducing TQC. (Total Quality Control) The
TQC study indicated that the major problems were declining profitability in
new contracts, failure to increase the contract amount, and increasing
general and administrative costs. As a result, Kajima clarified its goal as
one of high profitability rather than contract volume. The phrases frequently
referred to in order to restore competitiveness during this period were
"Market in" and "Project making".
The phrase, "Market in" referred to the necessity for Kajima to read its
clients' needs properly and correspond to those needs, not from a
contractor's point of view but from a client's point of view in response to the
client's need to keep diversifying. The top management organized strategic
technological development meetings in order to develop new technologies
which could provide competitive advantages in the future. Members of this
meeting included top management and the business promotion, planning,
and civil engineering divisions.
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The phrase "project making" describes the synergistic effects of the
construction business and its related fields as a result of coordinating
market needs and Kajima's soft engineering. In short, Kajima expanded its
business fields by utilizing its total capability as well as by collaborating with
other industries. Soft engineering included business planning, financing,
and project management. The goal intended by the top management was
to become an engineering contractor rather than just a contractor. The top
management believed that Kajima had this capability, but it has not felt the
need to take further step.
2. The strategy in the 1990's
Kajima experienced both depression and prosperity in the 1980.
Although it developed several strategies to regain competitiveness during
this depression, the sudden improvement of the economic situation in the
late 1980 made these strategies unnecessary. However, another
depression attacked Japan later making Kajima reorganize its structure and
reconsider their strategies more seriously than before.
a. Reorganization
In conjunction with the long-range business plan developed by
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company management, Kajima initiated major restructuring in 1991 with the
goal of developing an organization that could "create a truly comfortable
and attractive environment." While construction projects have traditionally
accounted for the bulk of Kajima's business, changing lifestyles and
societal trends - including the greater integration of information
technologies into people's daily lives and increasingly borderless economic
activity - are altering the overall environment in which Kajima operates. By
focusing special attention on developing diversified business opportunities
and on future growth, the restructuring allowed the company to be more
responsive to these conditions.
Kajima set up four interconnected yet basically autonomous groups
in its reorganization plan. This coalition of independently-managed entities
consisted of the Construction Group, the Architectural and Engineering
Design Group, the Development Group, and the New Business Group.
Together with various related subsidiaries and affiliated companies, these
groups operate under the overall strategic direction of Kajima's top
management. In recognition of the increasing importance of global
business activity, they have adopted a two-tier divisional structure to cover
both domestic and international operations while cooperating with each
other. Their goal is to develop their own specialized capabilities and
expertise to the greatest extent possible.
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b. Corporate Strategy
Kajima's basic strategy - diversification, globalization, and federated
management - may give a misleading impression of the firm. Although
Kajima's formation is based on four interconnected but autonomous groups
- construction, architectural and engineering design, development, and new
business, 95% of the total revenue comes from the construction business,
3% from development and 2% from other businesses. Kajima has invested
in diversification and internationalization, but construction still forms the
basis of its business.
While problems with diversification and globalization have forced
Kajima for the moment to accept a gap between its corporate strategy and
its practice, its construction group can set a more practical strategy which
includes expanding market shares in weaker fields such as housing and
small construction, challenging new fields in private markets, improving
employees' capability, improving profitability, promoting R&D and securing
capable subcontractors.
On January 4, 1994, Kajima president Akira Miyazaki gave an
address concerning Kajima's policy describing its goal as a response "to
client needs with fair quality and price through its total capability." He said
Kajima "needs to make a sure and steady effort" in order to recover
confidence lost by the construction scandals which occurred in 1993. He
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recognized "the changing public contractual system and continuous low-
level construction investment" and defined Kajima's strategy as "client-
oriented business promotion, expanding weaker markets, restructuring the
construction system, promoting R&D for future opportunity, and simplifying
the headquarters" Finally he asked all employees to remember Kajima's
principle which is to contribute to creating a better living environment and a
brighter future for all mankind.
C. Summary of the Section
The strategy of contractors tends to be controlled by clients'
contractual policies. Because Kajima's strategy for public works has been
controlled by the government, it has not been allowed to have a corporate
strategy, only a business strategy based on the contractual system. All the
same, in comparison with other general contractors, Kajima has enjoyed a
special position in private construction, perhaps because of Morinosuke
Kajima's challenging encouragement of new types of construction when he
was the president.
After having been managed according to this contractual-system-
oriented business strategy for a long time, Kajima began to develop a
corporate strategy of diversification and globalization. It accomplished this
recently by moving from being simply a contractor to being an architecture,
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engineering and construction firm with a vertically and horizontally
integrated organization. However, since business strategy concentrates on
the traditional contractual system, it is not compatible with this movement to
diversify and globalize. Although Kajima cannot ignore the public
contractual system, it should develop a new concept of business strategy
based on its new corporate strategy.
4.2.6 Overseas Strategy
A. Introduction
Kajima's overseas operation is divided into two styles, indirect
operation through overseas affiliates and direct operation through its
overseas division in its headquarters. Direct operation is classified into two
further contractual practices depending on the sources and the form of
financing. Contract practices in the private sector are largely associated
with business relationships in Japan, while in the public sector they have
unique features. This section introduces the unique aspects of these
overseas contractual systems and considers their strategies. There are
three types of financing for overseas public works; Japanese tied funds,
Japanese un-tied funds and non-Japanese funds.
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1. Japanese tied Funds
Japan's Official Development Assistance (ODA) has adopted three
financing methods (Figure 17): project-type technical cooperation offered
through the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), grant aids
offered through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and loans offered
through Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF). The construction
industry is interested in economic infrastructure assistance, which is
designed mainly for the construction of energy, transportation and
communication facilities. Figure 18 shows Japan's high percentage in this
type of assistance. Regardless of the financing method, an orderer is a host
government. Every grant aid is designed for tied works or intended to
contract with Japanese consultants and Japanese contractors. The contruct
award is determined by arrangements in the industry similar to domestic
contractual practice, making strategies for grant works similar to those of
domestic works. Here, pre-bid activities are important.
The following are the examples of pre-bid activities that an overseas
sales manager mentioned.
a. Cooperation in project finding
Participating in the project finding commission of OCAJI, the staff of a
contractor helps with miscellaneous work such as writing reports to the
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Figure 17. Japan's ODA System
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Through JICA, the Ministry of Construction has contributed to
developing countries in specific areas such as (1) research and surveys
into numerous development projects, (2) the dispatch of experts over long-
term and short-term periods, (3) taking the lead in enhancing technology
transfer by (a) accepting and training overseas trainees, and (b) by
managing overseas centers for research and training to transfer relevant
technology from Japan.
The Ministry of Construction also contributes to the promotion of
economic cooperation projects covering construction as well as
engineering services related to the OECF loans and the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs' grant aid projects.
Source: Ministry of Construction, Japan's ODA, 1991.
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authorities of both Japan and the host countries and arranging the term of
reference (TOR) for the host countries.
b. Cooperation with consultants
A contractor helps the consultant draw up his basic design and detail
design in order to make them favorable to the contractor. The contractor
also helps make estimations in order to generate more profits.
c. Making good connections
In order to secure better information for possible projects, the staff
needs to form good relationships with information providers such as
consultants and government officials. The contractor must also try to
advance all participants' interests.
It is clear that the contract is awarded on a basis of arrangements, not
on cost competition. Because these arrangements are similar to those of
domestic contractual practices, they have also been applied to the
strategies used for grant projects overseas.
2. Japanese un-tied Fund
Any pre-qualified contractor can tender a bid and the lowest bidder
wins. However, there are still some tricky contractual practices here. Since
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Japanese consulting firms always contract design and engineering jobs for
the projects funded by Japan, genecons can get detailed information such
as design, soil condition, and estimation through cooperation with the
consultant. This makes it easier for them to give accurate estimates
because they do not have to account for an unnecessary contingency fee.
In order to get good and timely information from consulting firms, genecons
always show cooperative attitudes toward them.
3. Non-Japanese fund
In this case Japan is considered to have no comparative or
competitive advantages except in some niche fields based on technologies.
Low cost is the critical factor for success. There seems to be no
comparative advantage for Japanese contractors; however, they can have
cost advantages through appropriate strategies. The first strategy for cost
reduction is geological configuration. Choosing which countries to put effort
into is important. For example, Kajima has the cost advantage in several
African countries such as Algeria, Tanzania, and Zambia. This is because it
has continuously contracted projects in these countries and has the heavy
machines needed for construction, so that it does not have to include
machine fees, which sometimes account for a large part of the bid price.
The second strategy is a construction method based on advanced
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technologies and experience in the same kind of projects. Since Kajima
has a large construction R&D division, it can suggest alternative
construction methods suitable to varying site conditions.
B. Organization
The organization for overseas operations consists of a headquarters
and three regional main offices. (Figure 19) The headquarters includes the
overseas construction division which principally conducts projects funded
by Japan. Before KUSA was established in N.Y. in 1986, Kajima had few
long-term overseas perspectives. Since most overseas contracts were
awarded from Japanese industries at that time, Kajima's overseas strategy
was just to serve its Japanese clients and then to withdraw from the
countries after the completion of projects. The purpose of establishing
KUSA was not only to administrate U.S. subsidiaries as a holding company,
but also to collect information and to understand the American culture,
business traditions, and ways of thinking. The U.S. was the best country in
which to establish a base camp because it was a world information center
as well as the largest and the most advanced market. Kajima established
two other regional main offices in Amsterdam and Singapore which
covered Europe and Asia respectively.
Compared to the roles of the three regional main offices, which
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operate as independent organizations, those of the overseas construction
division are different. First, it operates as a division of Kajima Corporation.
Most overseas public works require contractors to submit a pre-qualification
application, in which contractors must state their capabilities for the project,
such as capital and personnel capabilities, similar work experience, and
holding machines. Kajima Corporation has no problem being qualified for
overseas public projects with its abundant domestic work experience, but its
subsidiaries do have difficulties. Although some public sectors accept the
experience of Kajima Corporation as those of its subsidiaries as well, many
do not. For example, although the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT)
accepted Kajima's experience as its subsidiary's, KEC's experience, they
limit annual contracts from DOT based on the capital capability of KEC.
Therefore, KEC is limited to $40 million in DOT contracts in 1994 and will
need to make joint ventures with the parent or other contractors if it wishes
to contract more. In addition to the PQ issue, the advantage of doing
business as Kajima Corporation is that the contract practices of overseas
projects funded by Japan are similar to those of domestic public works,
which are described in the above section. Meetings for arrangements are
held in Tokyo; pre-bid activities are also executed in Tokyo.
The second major role of the overseas construction division is in the
function of personnel matters. It administrates the personnel matters of all
of Kajima's engineers working in foreign countries. Almost all the Japanese
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staff is on loan from Kajima Corporation to its subsidiaries. Therefore, the
overseas construction division is in charge of exchanging personnel
between overseas offices and transferring personnel from/to domestic
divisions.
Overseas subsidiaries face severe competition in their markets, so
they must shape their organizations to fit their business environments. If
Kajima's overseas construction division or even its their domestic divisions
learn its subsidiaries' business practices and succeed in introducing their
advantages as more competitive models, Kajima may abandon its
traditional style of business, a style which makes it lose competitiveness in
the international market, and thereby regain its superior position.
C. Strategy
In order to develop a strategy, Kajima should take into account
factors in the present situation as well as future perspectives such as
economic situation, business environments, clients' needs, comparative
and competitive advantages and financial, technical and personnel
capabilities. This section will study the ways Kajima applies the
advantages it developed in its domestic operation to its overseas operation.
The subject will be broken into three segments: policy, issues and strategy.
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1. Policy
In the mid-1 980's, when the Japanese economy was in a depression
and the construction industry was struggling to survive, Kajima planned to
increase its overseas share in order to cover the "zero-ceiling" domestic
market. However, as a result of being dragged into a cost war in the
international market, many projects contracted during this period showed a
loss, and the overseas management of Kajima was forced to restructure its
organization, policy and strategy.
On April 8, 1991, reflecting upon its 150th anniversary, top
management determined that a major organizational restructuring of Kajima
was in order to meet the challenges of the next century, and KE 21 (the
short form of Kajima Evolution 21) was announced. It projected the
formation of four interconnected but autonomous units within the firm. Each
of these entities was to be independently managed and operated under the
firm's overall strategy and master plan. These new groups, as the previous
section described, were the Construction Group, the Architectural and
Engineering Design Group, the development Group, and the New Business
Group, and they were to act as profit centers working toward Kajima's basic
strategy: diversification, globalization, and federated management. The
core concept of globalization was expressed as follows: "Individual groups
are to look outside Japan's domestic market for new opportunities. They
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must respond to Japan's emerging open-market policy, which would
include increased activity on joint ventures of all kinds within the country.
Each group should pursue its own search to acquire subsidiaries and
affiliates to reinforce its global position."
As a result of the above experiences and corporate-wide
restructuring, Kajima's overseas management determined its policy as
follows:
a. Localization
Japanese construction export once just consisted of bringing the
domestic organization and business traditions to overseas markets.
However, this system had to be abandoned because the domestic
organization cost too much and the Japanese way of doing business was
incompatible with other business practices. Thus it was necessary to
establish overseas operational bases to take advantage of the opportunities
in each market. In order to apply Kajima's competitive advantages and
Japan's comparative advantages to overseas business environments,
Kajima should be neither purely local nor purely Japanese, but a Japanese
contractor with a through understanding of local business traditions.
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b. Geographical market concentration
Each geographical market has different characteristics. Kajima's
method of achieving success in one country does not necessary mean that
this method will work in another country. As a first step toward
globalization, Kajima should study where it can make maximum use of its
competitive and comparative advantages. Then it should make an effort to
establish a local appearance firmly in the long term view.
c. Profit first
Kajima's overseas management recognized that unprofitable
projects brought nothing but deficit and miserable memories. Unprofitable
projects often make sense in the domestic market where long term
relationships are much more important than short term profit. However,
Kajima should avoid unreasonable contracts awarded through a cost-war.
2. Issues
This section has studied the unique Japanese contractual system.
The questions are whether this contractual system has affected the
international business of Japanese contractors, and how it has deteriorated
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their international competitiveness.
Although the three largest genecons, Shimizu, Taisei and Kajima,
have been struggling for leadership in the industry for decades, Kajima has
maintained its top position in terms of public construction. By so doing
Kajima helped to create and maintain the contractual system of the industry,
which has in turn further reinforced its leadership in the system. Kajima has
structured its organization in order to correspond to the system; for example,
large headquarters are maintained for various activities including political
matters, the R&D institute was established for maintaining technical
expertise, and the largest civil engineering design division in Japan is held
for pre-bid activities. Kajima has had to keep high gross profit margins in
order to maintain these organizations. This corporate structure is relatively
removed from U.S. contractors and does not affect Kajima's
competitiveness in the international market, except for Japanese funded
projects, where the contractual procedures are similar to the domestic ones.
Many of Kajima's employees attribute the cause of its poor
performance in the international market to the fact that Kajima has not been
serious about overseas business. In fact, few employees want to work in
overseas subsidiaries and construction offices and Kajima has to
compensate them for their hardships. For example, Kajima pays $15,000
per month including taxes to an assistant manager (35 years old) who is
working for KEC in the U.S. According to him, for that price KEC could hire
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three equivalent non-Japanese engineers. Although It is difficult to have
Japanese employees in a market like the U.S. where contractors compete
by cost, this is the Japanese business style. As Lee Kuan Yew, a former
prime Minister of Singapore, told Business Week (Nov. 29, 1993), "There is
much more transfer of skills, management, and technology with American
multinationals than the Japanese. There is only one Singaporean who is a
managing director at a Japanese multinational here. But look at American
multinationals, and there are any number of them. I think the Japanese will
play a role. But I doubt it will be a dominant role." Japanese tend to place
Japanese managers in important positions even in foreign subsidiaries. In
KEC, the chairman, president and eleven directors are all Japanese and
seven of them, including the chairman and the president, have held posts in
KEC and Kajima Corporation concurrently since August, 1992. The reason
for this practice may related to the idea that mutual understanding (in the
Japanese way) may deteriorate if foreign managing directors have power.
3. Strategies
Unlike the domestic market, where Kajima clearly has competitive
advantages in public construction work, the international market does not
accept its domestic advantages - which have developed under the present
contractual system peculiar to Japan - as international competitive
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advantages. There are three ways in which Kajima might gain
competitiveness in the international market. First, it could expand its
domestic advantages without changing its domestic strategy. Second, it
could modify its organization and business practices if the government were
to change its policy to fair opportunity. Third, it could shift its business style
to make it totally suitable for international business. Evaluations of and
possibilities for these three strategies follows.
a. Expanding domestic advantages
Domestic advantages do not mean such capabilities as in dango or
the iron triangle, but rather total capability from feasibility studies, design
and R&D to construction, operation and maintenance. In addition to such
advantages, Japanese contractors can count on the financing capability of
Japanese finance institutions and the procurement capability of Japanese
trading companies. Therefore, Japanese contractors may be able to
demonstrate their total capabilities in large, complex, capital intensive
projects, such as BOT (Build-Operate-Transfer) projects. Kajima has been
reluctant to join BOT projects because of possible high risks; however,
since there is every indication that BOT projects will increase in Asian
countries, it has begun to study this method. Kajima's attitude toward BOT
projects will be discussed in the next section of this chapter.
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b. Modifying its organization and business practices
Many genecons have recently begun to study the modification of
their organization and strategy. Although they consider the present system
reasonable, they admit that using bribes is unethical. In addition, they
expect that pressure from the U.S. government may change the present
system anyhow. In this transition period, contractors should study the
system carefully because its changes will affect not only their international,
but also their domestic competitiveness. In terms of competitiveness in the
international market, halfway measures can only mean a loss in the
domestic share. On the other hand, because issues in the construction
industry reflect Japanese society, rapid and comprehensive change may be
difficult. The strategy of modifying its organization and business practices,
seems to be the most realistic solution for having some degree of
international competitiveness.
c. Shifting business style
Shifting the business style will incur considerable cost and pain.
Substantial managerial reform will be required, which may be more difficult
in large genecons than in medium and small contractors. However, this
seems to be the only way to have a cost advantage. Although it is
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incredible that competition in the Japanese construction market will be
based solely on cost, shifting the business style is a good strategy for small
firms in order to differentiate themselves from others. The Daiwa House
Corporation, one of the largest housing firms in Japan, has adopted this
strategy. According to the Nikkei Business magazine (Nov. 15, 1993), no
dango meeting is held when Daiwa is one of the designated contractors
because it always refuses dango based on its cost advantage. Daiwa has
pursued a cost advantage by promoting the maximization of the use of
prefabricated construction materials. In addition, the standardization of
design, equipment and materials has made a shorter construction period
possible. Because of this overall rationalization, Daiwa is called "a
discounter of the construction industry." Although most of the contracts
awarded to Daiwa come from the private sector, it provides a good example
of differentiating a strategy through shifting a business style.
D. Japanese Government Policy to Promote Overseas Contracts
The involvement of the Japanese government in the overseas
operations of contractors is relatively light. This may be because these
operations are outside of the iron triangle, thus the government and
politicians cannot control that aspect of the construction industry and benefit
little from the international market. Rather, Japan has focused its export
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policy on the manufacturing industry, which benefits the domestic economy
and eases access to foreign currencies. According to Strassmann and
Wells (1988), the following are general government policies.
1. Overseas Construction Policy by the Government as a Whole
a. Institutional Financing
Yen credit is provided by the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund
of Japan (OECF). Export and technology suppliers' credit is provided by the
Export-Import Bank of Japan.
b. Export insurance
The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) offers the
following export insurances: general export insurance, export proceeds
insurance, exchange risks insurance, export bond insurance, overseas
investment insurance and technical services supply insurance. The last is
the most important for the construction industry.
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c. Tax reduction system
Preferential treatment is afforded to Japan's export industries not by
tax credits but by the reduction of its taxable income. Twenty percent of the
total income of overseas consulting firms is deductible prior to taxation; this
is not only to counter high political risks but also to enable them to raise
research and development funds and to foster business vitality.
d. Official Development Assistance (ODA)
ODA is administrated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on a country to
country basis, in the form of a grant or direct loan, or on a multilateral basis,
in the form of financial support for international organizations.
e. The Japan International Co-operation Agency (JICA)
JICA's functions include: inviting people from developing countries
for technical training in Japan; dispatching Japanese experts and
volunteers abroad; dispatching survey teams to help in formulating
development plans and projects; providing grants for equipment; extending
project-type technical cooperation.
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2. Overseas Construction Promotion Policy by the Ministry of
Construction
In addition to the above government policies, Strassmann and Wells
(1988) describes specific measures undertaken by the Ministry of
Construction as follows:
a. The establishment of an overseas construction promotion fund in order to
supply low interest credit for pre-bid feasibility studies.
b. A financial guarantee system for overseas construction projects by
overseas construction and consulting firms.
c. An 'Infrastructural Facilities Investigation' and 'feasibility studies for
construction projects' to search for and to form suitable projects in
developing countries, as suggested by Strassmann and Wells.
d. An overseas construction technology development project to develop the
appropriate technology of construction in conformity with natural and socio-
economic conditions of developing regions.
e. A training system of consultants and project managers in charge of
overseas construction projects.
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E. Summary of the section
It has been generally thought that Japanese genecons have no
strategic plans for its globalization and that it looks for overseas
opportunities whenever the domestic market declines. However, the
situation has changed because the domestic market has become a part of
the international market. This section introduced three strategic possibilities
for Kajima; it must choose one in order to compete in the international
market. Any one of the three will require radical restructuring of Kajima. In
order to assess its abilities, Kajima should analyze specific segments of the
market such as type of clients, financial status of clients, contract type,
geographical position, project type, nature of competition, labor
relationships, needed services, and various environments. By doing so,
Kajima will be able to evaluate its advantages and disadvantages better. In
any case, the operation style of Kajima's domestic division and overseas
division should be compatible in order to demonstrate Kajima's maximum
total capability.
4.2.7 BOT
The concept of BOT (Build-Operate-Transfer) has been introduced
recently to the international engineering and construction market for the
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construction and operation of infrastructure mainly in developing countries.
Because inquiries for BOT projects have increased in recent years, Kajima
began to study the possibility of BOT and drew the following conclusions:
A. Overview of BOT
1. BOT covers identifying a need for a project, assembling a team to do a
feasibility study, designing, engineering, construction, financing,
maintaining, and operating the facility, and, after a certain pay-back period,
turning the project over to a local government agency at no cost to the new
owner.
2. BOT projects are risky because they need large amounts of initial
funding and a certain period to repay with unknown risks.
3. The profitability of a BOT project is estimated from the internal rate of
return (IRR) which may change after a period of construction and operation.
4. Many fluctuating factors in an unknown future make BOT a "high risk and
low return" business rather than "high risk and high return".
5. Kajima's participation should be limited only to construction; operation
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should be delegated to joint venture partners in order to hedge risks as
much as possible.
B. Description
In order to reduce debt, less developed countries have aggressively
adopted the BOT method, which requires a consortium to be responsible for
a project from beginning to end. The consortium, which usually includes
banks, construction firms, plant manufactures and trading companies, is
involved from feasibility studies to design and construction to operation and
finally to transfer. However, worldwide recession has made some
developed countries such as U.K. and Australia adopt BOT as well. The
ultimate incentive for adopting this method is that the government does not
need to budget for the project, while the incentive for the consortium may be
increased opportunities.
Two important steps must be taken before a project begins; there
must be a concession agreement and project financing. The concession
agreement concluded between a local government and a consortium
determines both the profitability and the success of the project. The
consortium should include as many preferred conditions in the agreement
as possible. The purpose of introducing project financing is to limit the
consortium's financial responsibility. However, the financing syndicates
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always require higher interest rates for BOT, which the consortium has to
bear anyway. In addition, the syndicate closely supervises the project.
C. Case Study
1. The Organization
Usually, Japanese investors, such as banks, trade companies, plant
manufactures and contractors, establish a Japanese consortium and host
country project consortium, and invest in or finance the host country project
consortium through the Japanese consortium. Financing often includes
subsidies from the Export-Import Bank of Japan. Figure 20 shows an
example of BOT organization.
Figure 20. Organization of a Typical BOT Project
Government,
Syndicate Investors
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Investors Consortium _ ::: Project::::
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Commercial Construction
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Source: Kajima Corporation, The Possibility of BOT Proiects, Unpublished Paper.
208
2. Case 1: Bangkok Expressway (second stage)
a. Description
Project:
Est. cost of construction:
Construction Period:
Concession period:
Project company:
Organization:
a 39 km elevated expressway
V112 billion
1990 - 1995
30 years (1988 - 2018)
Bangkok Expressway
see Figure 21.
Figure 21. Organization of the Bangkok Expressway Project
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Source: Kajima Corporation, The Possibility of BOT proects, Unpublished Paper.
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b. Financing
Capital: V27.5 billion (20% of the total cost) provided by the Kumagai
Gumi Corp. (Japanese contractor), local contractors and local
banks.
Debt: 110 billion (80% of the total cost) borrowed by a syndicate
consisting of eleven banks including three Thai banks. Borrowed
in local currency (baht) in order to hedge the exchange risk.
c. Balance of the project
The toll revenue will be divided between the Thai government (40%)
and the Thai project consortium (60%) as stated in the concession
agreement which includes an inflation clause. The consortium was
guaranteed a minimum internal rate of return (15%) by the Thai
government. On the other hand, the project consortium has to buy the land
for the construction.
d. Construction
A CM (construction management) contract was concluded between
Kumagai and the Thai project consortium. Kumagai expected to secure its
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profit by using a cost-plus-fee contract. The Thai project consortium
expected to hedge construction risks by transferring them to Thai
contractors.
e. Evaluation of the project
Although Kumagai initially concluded the relatively advantageous
agreement with the Thai government with a detailed feasibility study, after
construction began, the government ordered a reduction of the toll fee. In
1993, another toll fee reduction from the Thai government caused the
project to be suspended and finally Kumagai had to abandon the project.
This was a kind of confiscation, something foreign investors dread. This
Kumagai experience shows that even an agreement concluded between a
government and a consortium can become a worthless piece of paper
because of an unreasonable decision by a government.
3. Case 2: Aryia Thermal Power Station, Turkey
a. Description
Project: Thermal Power Station
Capacity: 500Mw X 2 units, 6.2 billion kwh per year
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Fuel:
Construction Cost:
Finance:
Schedule:
Kajima's portion:
Imported coal, 2.3 million tons per year
V137 billion
Capital (18 bill.) Japan - 70%, Turkey - 30%, Finance
(V119 bill.) The Export-Import Bank of Japan and
commercial banks
Construction - 4 years, Operation - 15.5 years
Initial investment V350 million (2.38% of the total) and
the power station construction (7 billion)
b. Organization
The Japanese consortium, comprised of the Electric Power
Development Company, Mitsubishi Corporation, Mitsui Corporation,
Hitachi, IHI, Hazama, Nihon Yusen and Kajima, was to construct the power
station and sell power to the Turkey Electric Authority under the "take-and-
pay" contract. The consortium planned to import coal from Australia, U.S.A.
and China. Figure 22 shows the organization of this project.
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Figure 22. Organization of the Aryia Thermal Power Station Project
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Source: Kajima Corporation, The Possibility of BOT Proiects, Unpublished Paper.
c. Evaluation of the project
This project was to be the first Japanese BOT project in Turkey,
where BOT was initially proposed. However, a member of the opposition in
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the Turkish assembly joined with environmental groups to bring a suit
against the Turkish project consortium to suspend the project because of
possible environmental deterioration. Responding to the suit, the court
ordered the project's suspension in 1989. Although the feasibility study
indicated that there would be minimal influence on the environment,
environmental and political movements forced the consortium to dissolve in
1993.
The cause of this failure may be attributed to insufficient
measurement of country risk. It is necessary to investigate the
environmental effects of the project and the concerns of local
nongovernment organizations.
4. Case 3: Shanghai Exhibition and Hotel Complex
As a partner of the consortium, Kajima participates in the Shanghai
Exhibition and Hotel Complex project. This complex has operated since the
completion of its construction in September, 1990. It was initially regarded
as a development project rather than a BOT; however, there are many
similar features.
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a. Description
Project:
Contract:
Joint venture:
Construction:
Cost:
A complex facility including hotels,offices, an exhibition hotel
and residences
After twenty-five years of operation, this facility will be
transferred to the Chinese government.
J. Portman Shanghai Associates (JPA), AIG China Real
Estate Investors (AIG), and Kajima. They established a
project company, Shanghai Partners, in the U.S. and
operate through its local subsidiary company.
March, 1986 - September, 1990
Capital $50.5 million, AIG (57.0%), JPA (21.5%), Kajima
(21.5%), Finance by $145 million from syndicate.
b. Organization
In this project, JPA is in charge of designing and total management,
AIG is in charge of insurance and marketing, and Kajima is in charge of
construction and marketing. Kajima expects $38 million as its share of the
profit. Figure 23 shows the organization of this project.
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Figure 23. Organization of the
Shanghai Exhibition and Hotel Complex Project
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Source: Kajima Corporation, The Possibility of BOT Projects, Unpublished Paper.
c. Evaluation
So far, the revenue, income and room-occupancy rate have been
favorable. However, business conditions are uncertain, especially in the
real estate market; therefore, Kajima does not know if it will get the
projected income for the remaining period.
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D. Risk Management in BOT projects
It is difficult to predict the final outcome of BOT projects because of
their long term operation and because of unforeseeable environmental
changes in a developing country. A consortium needs to include as many
risk avoidance measures as possible in the concession agreement with the
host government. The following are possible risks and strategies to
manage risks:
1. Sources of fuel, power, and construction materials
It is necessary to secure the source of fuel, power, and construction
materials in order to avoid suspension of construction and operation. In
addition, well maintained and reasonable transportation facilities are
necessary for stable supplies.
2. Market demand
The collateral for financing a project is generally thought to be the
revenue from the sales contracts itself. In the Bangkok Expressway project,
the toll contract was the collateral. In the Aryia Thermal Power Station
project, revenue from the sales of power was the collateral. In the
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Shanghai Exhibition and Hotel complex project, room charge and rent were
regarded as the collateral. However, even if the contract seems favorable
for a consortium, revenues will be inadequate without a dependable
expectation of market demand. For example, tunnel and highway projects
need a dependable traffic volume over the long term. The Aria Thermal
Power Station project adopted the take-or-pay contract, which stated that
the Power Authority will pay at least 75% of the power supply regardless of
actual power demand.
3. Partners
Financing usually depends on the capability of the sponsoring firm of
a consortium. Therefore, the sponsor should be keenly aware of its
partners' priorities and their attitudes toward their financial condition and
technical expertise in order to avoid disappointing its investors. In a joint
venture agreement the sponsor should prescribe detailed measures such
as the withdrawal of a member, the admission of a new member, rights and
responsibilities in case of a member's default, and the settlement of
disputes.
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4. Performance Guarantee
This is not peculiar to BOT. A sponsor has to guarantee the project
completion because it is considered able to handle the construction risk. In
its completion guarantee the sponsor assures the principal and interest of
loans until project completion.
5. Operational Risk
Although a consortium is established with the intention of
constructing and operating the project, it does not necessarily have
technical and managerial expertise in all its aspects; therefore it is
sometimes necessary to invite an expert in that specific field when the
project enters the operational phase.
6. Local Regulation
A consortium needs to follow local regulations and incentives. It
needs to ensure that the concession agreement includes provisions in case
of changes in regulations and incentives. It should also include a definite
promise that the project will not be confiscated.
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7. Legal System
Since there are many possible risks which a consortium may face
during construction and operation, the legal system in the host country
should have a well-established tradition of contract law, otherwise the
settlement of disputes is almost impossible. In addition, although many
developing countries offer inducements for foreign investors, many
communist and ex-communist countries have no such incentives.
8. Infrastructure
It is important to investigate the degree of infrastructure already
established, such as housing and facilities for labor, port facilities, roads,
railroads as well as transportation systems. The consortium and the local
government have to decide who will bear the cost of new facilities if they are
needed. Failure to make these cost estimates can result in losses.
9. Other risks
Other important risks an investors should consider are country risk
and foreign exchange rate risk. It is difficult to predict situations such as
internal political disturbances and wars. Similarly, it is also difficult to
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exchange local currency for hard currency, especially in developing
countries.
E. Evaluation
1. BOT risks last too long
Because it takes decades before initial investments in BOT projects
can be collected, it is impossible to forecast the future business
environment and the profitability of the project. Kajima should not enter this
business simply because other projects seem to be successful today.
There is no such thing as a royal road to success because each BOT
project is made to order and requires careful measures to be taken which
are specific to each project. In addition, the issue arising from corporate
management's point of view is who should take responsibility for future
profitability and past decisions.
2. High risk and possible low return
BOT is generally thought to be a high risk and high return business,
however, many examples in the private sector in Japan show that BOT is
very likely to be high risk and low return. In addition, there seem to be no
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incentives to promote BOT methods using private funds during
worldwide recession. Kajima's participation should be
construction, while operation should be entrusted to partners
hedge as many risks as possible.
the present
limited to
in order to
3. Further considerations
The World Bank (1990) pointed out that the effective use of private
investment is necessary to establish infrastructures in developing countries
which face crises. Although adopting BOT without careful consideration
cannot be recommended, it may be necessary to study further opportunities
for the effective use of private funds, and opportunities for project making by
combining public and private funds. BOT projects are expected to increase
especially in Asian countries, such as China and Vietnam. Although Kajima
is not interested in BOT projects at the present time, it will continue to
monitor existing projects and watch for change in the business environment
of host countries.
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4.2.8 U.S. Operations
A. Introduction
The U.S. construction industry was surprised in 1979 when the City
of San Francisco awarded the contract for a 3,359-ft, 9-ft-dia sewer tunnel to
a Japanese joint venture, Obayashi, one of the largest Japanese
contractors, and its overseas subsidiary, the Obayashi America
Corporation. The joint venture based its bid, which was nearly $5 million
below the engineer's estimate of $17.6 million, on the use of the earth
pressure balanced shield tunneling method. This method had never been
used in the United States. The ENR (June 21, 1979) reported " The long-
precicted entry of a major Japanese contractor into the American
construction scene is at hand". For the U.S. E&C industry, an invasion by
Japanese E&C firms into the U.S. private market had not been seen as a
real threat because in most cases, Japanese industries had been their
clients. In the 1980's U.S. E&C firms began to feel threatened by the
Japanese entry into its public market. In 1989, when Japanese contracts
accounted for $3.3 billion in the U.S. market, some industry executives were
concerned that the Japanese might overwhelm the U.S. construction market
as they had the automobile and electronics markets.
Today, two Japanese genecons are making remarkable efforts to
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penetrate the U.S. public construction market; these are the above
mentioned Obayashi, and the Kajima Corporation. Interestingly enough,
these two firms have had tremendous control over public project
arrangements or dango in Japan. Obayashi is very strong in western
Japanese public works and Kajima is strong in eastern Japanese public
works. For example, all of the major genecon's sales promotion managers
get together in the Obayashi Hiroshima branch every Monday morning to
discuss the distribution of public works in the Chugoku district. Although
this practice, known as dango, has been criticized widely and is destined to
be abandoned, it is still in effect in eastern Japan where, thanks to the
larger market which includes Tokyo, Kajima has held a favored position in
public works.
Although Obayashi and Kajima often compete for the ame projects,
their stances in the U.S. are a little different. Obayashi has its U.S.
subsidiary, Obayashi America, which engages mostly in E&C services for
Japanese industries, although it contracts public works as Obayashi
Corporation, Japan. On the other hand, Kajima operates in the U.S. only
through U.S. subsidiaries which include Kajima International Inc. (KII), East
West Development Corp., Kajima Development Corp., and Kajima
Engineering and Construction (KEC). The subsidiary which conducts
public works is KEC. This chapter will examine KEC's strategies in public
works. This organization indicates Kajima's intense desire to compete with
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U.S. firms in the most competitive construction market in the world, the U.S.
market.
Obayashi generally contracts large public projects as a member of a
joint venture with a U.S. contractor. Nearly all foreign firms have eased into
the complexities of construction in the United States in this way. Obayashi
does not mind taking sponsorship of the joint venture because it does not
need to show U.S. sales separately. It is not necessary for Obayashi to put
its name on the annual contract value ranking list of U.S. contractors. What
Obayashi needs is real revenue without risks. It understands the difficulties
of U.S. operations, thus its strategy in the U.S. market is to work as a
nominal partner in the joint venture, backing it with its large financial
capabilities. Takeshi Yamada, assistant project manager of
Modern/Obayashi joint venture for the CA/T project in Boston, explained
that Obayashi's secrets of success in the U.S. market are, first, making a
joint venture with a reliable partner without taking a sponsorship, and
second, adapting Obayashi to the partner's way of business. He
understands that Obayashi's competitive advantages in the U.S. are its
financing capability and its experience in the Japanese market. He
believes that Obayashi can compete in the U.S. because it is a large
Japanese contractor, not an Obayashi U.S. subsidiary.
On the other hand, KEC is always teaming up with one or several
U.S. firms, and insists on taking sponsorship in the team because it needs
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to obtain as many contracts as possible to put KEC's name on the ranking
list of top contractors in the ENR. Shigeru Yasu, assistant general manager
of KEC's mid-western regional office says that KEC would develop its
competitive advantages by executing all possible projects, from small ones
including local contracts to large tunnel projects using TBM, which is the
KEC's strength. He believes that this is the only way to put down deep roots
in the United States. Yasu's confidence in KEC's advantage in the
tunneling field is the result of a great deal of experience and little
competition in this field.
Both Obayashi and Kajima were recently awarded subway projects
by the Los Angeles city government. Contracts were $65 million for
Obayashi and $48 million for KEC. It is difficult to conclude which practice
is best: competing as a Japanese giant or competing as a U.S. firm.
B. Case Study: Kajima Engineering and Construction (KEC)
1. Background
KEC, headquartered in Pasadena, California, was established in
1984 as the fourth U.S. subsidiary of Kajima Corporation. The total value of
new contracts in 1992 came to $75.2 million, ranking KEC 284th on the
ENR survey of the top 400 contractors. The original purpose of establishing
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KEC was to respond to the heavy civil engineering related needs of the
Japanese industries, which included golf course and resort developments,
and automobile test track constructions. Traditionally, Japanese
construction firms are divided into two operational divisions, building and
heavy civil engineering, which are completely incompatible. Employees in
the building division never work for the civil engineering division because
the systems of employment are entirely different. Clients also have in-
house building engineers and civil engineers who communicate only with
their counterparts (building engineers with each other and civil engineers
with each other). Thus, although Kajima had KII engaged in building
engineering and construction, it needed to have a civil engineering
subsidiary in the U.S. to serve its Japanese clients.
There are several reasons why Japanese industries prefer to award
contracts to KEC and to other Kajima U.S. subsidiaries. First, because
Kajima enjoys an excellent reputation in the Japanese construction market,
Japanese industries believe that the headquarters of Kajima should take
responsibility for U.S. operations including the quality, cost, and completion
periods. Second, Japanese industries are not accustomed to the U.S.
contractual system, and have been reluctant to get involved in legal and
pecuniary problems. The best way to hedge risks in the U.S. has been to
use a Japanese E&C firm as the design and build contractor. However, this
situation has not necessarily been good for Kajima's subsidiaries.
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Japanese clients have often considered them to be a division of Kajima
Corporation and have expected them to operate in the "Japanese way of
business". In summary, Kajima's subsidiaries have to take all the risks in
their projects both against Japan based clients and against U.S. based sub-
contractors. Atsushi Takeuchi, the plant manager of Obayashi America
explained this situation:
"They rarely accept claims caused by a change of order or design.
We are always torn between a client and a sub-contractor. Sub-contractors
make claims according to U.S. construction practice and Japanese clients
want to complete projects without claims and litigations. They have told us
over and over again that the reason why they had chosen Obayashi was
that they wanted to do business in the Japanese way and in the Japanese
language. Today, because many of the local managers of Japanese
industries have been replaced by Americans who know U.S. business
methods, our competitive advantages which were based on the Japanese
style of business have been running out."
In addition to the gap created by contractual practices, Japanese
foreign direct investments (FDI) have been decreasing recently. Although
KEC set the target of its share of public works in the U.S. at 25% of the total
at the beginning of 1993, decreasing Japanese FDI brought this number to
more than 50%. KEC's strategies in public works are shown in the later part
of this chapter.
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2. Kajima and its U.S. subsidiary network
KII was the first subsidiary established in 1964 to proceed with the
Little Tokyo project in Los Angeles, California. The total of its contracts in
1992 came to $245 million, ranking it 95th in the ENR top U.S. 400
contractors ranking survey. In its early days KII was exclusively engaged in
the design and engineering business; this was what Shoichi Kajima, the
president of KII and the Co-chairman of Kajima, believed that the Kajima
Corporation itself should do in the future. It was a great experiment and had
to take place in the U.S. because, first, the status of service including design
and engineering are relatively low in Japan, second, success in the U.S.
market would prove that not only KII but also Kajima were competitive, and
third, Kajima needed to learn many things from the U.S. market and from
U.S. firms about the process of globalization. However, by the mid 1970's,
with the expansion of its target clients, KII was not only designing and
engineering projects but was also constructing buildings to satisfy their
needs. Nine years later, the East West Development Corp. was
established. Its purpose was to execute the Little Tokyo project, taking it
over from KII, so that KII could explore business opportunities more widely.
Kajima Development Corp. was established in 1979. As a property owner,
it was intended to deal with development projects at its own risk, thus
following the trend of Kajima's expanding development business. Five
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years later, in 1984, KEC was established. One of KEC's purposes was to
catch up with and overtake Kll's performance. Finally, Kajima U.S.A.
(KUSA) was established in 1987 to oversee all its U.S. subsidiaries by
holding their stock. KUSA works as a buffer for legal matters in the U.S.
and with the home office in getting financing and information from Kajima. It
rarely interferes in the subsidiaries' businesses; on the contrary, it raises
funds for them. It can enjoy tax deductions by commingling the
subsidiaries' profits and deficits in one account. By establishing KUSA,
Kajima completed its U.S. network, consisting of its headquarters, buildings,
heavy civil engineering, and development subsidiaries. This was the model
of Kajima's organizational restructuring in 1991, called Kajima Evolution 21
(KE21). Kajima created its four independent profit centers - construction,
architecture and engineering, development, and new business - under this
evolutionary strategy, which was conducted by Kenichi Ohmae, the
managing director of MacKinsey & Company.
3. KEC's organization
KEC was established as a part of Kajima's horizontal configuration
strategy. Because it is a new and growing subsidiary, KEC's organization
cannot be considered vertically configured. However, KEC can use
Kajima's vertically organized functions such as R&D, design, and
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technological and managerial knowledge. For example, most of the
overseas projects funded by multilateral development banks and
governments as well as some large projects in the U.S. require
prequalification documents, which must include contractors' work
experience, financial statements, personnel, holding machinery, brief
descriptions of construction work plans, and technical proposals. KEC can
use all of Kajima's advantages in order to be qualified even though the goal
of KEC and Kajima's other subsidiaries is to be self-supporting and to
maintain their independence.
By following trends of growing shares in the U.S. public market, KEC
recently changed its organization and functions. The purpose was, of
course, to strengthen its marketing and construction capabilities in the
public sector. Today's major revenue sources are golf course and resort
development, and tunnel construction. The former relies largely on
Japanese private investment and the latter relies on public investment in
the United States. The issues which came up recently in KEC were the
differences in the contractual system, and in the nature of competition
between Japanese and U.S. investments, neither of which were
compatible. The KEC staff, which has worked from the beginning with
Japanese clients, is reluctant to be involved in public works or in the U.S.
contractual system. On the other hand, almost all of the Japanese staff
members in KEC's public division have graduated from U.S. universities
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where they studied construction management and are relatively optimistic
about business in the United States.
4. KEC, the public division's new business policy
KEC has gradually increased its public work contracts since it was
awarded its first public contract in the U.S. in 1988. It has always
established a joint venture company in order to bid for public works. This is
in order to ease differences in the ways of doing business between Japan
and the U.S., such as labor management, legal procedure, contractual
system, language and culture. As the sponsor of a joint venture company,
KEC dispatches a civil engineer transferred from Kajima to KEC for every
construction site. Because these civil engineers have no experience in the
U.S. construction business they work like trainees and learn the U.S.
business style from joint venture partners rather than take responsibilities
as staff members of the sponsor firm. After the completion of several public
works, KEC has learned that it is difficult to find good partners, win contracts
in large projects, and make profits. In addition, KEC's internal issues have
been coming to a head. The following section will discuss the role and
status of KEC's public division and consider its restructuring as a whole.
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a. Business environments
In addition to the recent recession in the U.S. economy, the
decreasing Japanese FDI has raised difficulties for KEC. It needs to pay
more attention to public investments in the U.S. to survive and to look for
more opportunities in the public market. Today it has seven regional
offices: Hawaii, Pacific, Western, South Central, Mid Western, Northeast,
and Southeast; it has four market segment divisions, including Golf Course,
Tunnel, Building, and Other Construction. Only the Mid Western regional
office and Tunnel division participate actively in public bidding. This is due
mostly to a lack of personnel interested in public works. The staff of the
public division (Tunnel Div. and Mid Western regional office) is composed
of live Japanese employees transferred from Kajima and nine Americans
working under KEC's payroll. These employees are dispersed through
several construction sites and offices which are operated independently;
therefore each site and office is small and inefficient. The tunnel division
manager, Noboru Deura, believes that a Japanese employee is necessary
for U.S. public works; he believes that at this time the role of Japanese
employees should be to establish a stable base for Kajima in the U.S. and
then to delegate all responsibilities to American employees as soon as
possible.
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b. Capability
So far, most public works awarded to KEC have been tunnel related
projects. When Kajima decided to enter the U.S. public market, Deura
judged that because Kajima's tunnel technology and experience in soft
ground were superior to those of the U.S. contractors, these could be
competitive advantages even if many handicaps existed. Only a few U.S.
contractors specialize in soft ground tunnel works. Deura decided to enter
the U.S. public market for tunnel projects using TBM (Tunnel Boring
Machine) and intended to expand gradually in to other fields.
KEC tendered 63 public work bids between January 12th,1993 and
October 20th, 1993, and won 10 out of the 63; thus the total hit ratio was
15.9% during this period (see Table 38). The average hit ratio was 13.6%
in these 63 bids. (63 awards out of 464 bidders) KEC's challenges have
been concentrated mostly in the Mid-west, where it has Mid-western
regional office, and the West, where its headquarters is located. KEC
tendered 17 bids in Michigan with no contract awarded. Yasu explained
the reason for this, noting, "Michigan has clearly too many contractors in a
limited market. The discount race here is fierce." Indeed, the average
number of bidders in Michigan was 9.5 firms, while in Indiana, where KEC
enjoys a higher hit ratio (40%), it was 6.6 firms. The reason for successful
bids in Indiana is due largely to the fact that KEC can neglect mobilization
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costs by having several project offices there, and can cut machinery costs
by limiting itself to the same types of works. So far, it seems that KEC needs
a U.S. partner to make a joint venture because the total hit ratio of joint
venture was 31.3%, while that of KEC alone was 10.6%. It can be said that
KEC is learning competitive estimating through checking its estimations
with those of the joint venture partners, which have almost always been
lower than KEC's estimations.
Table 38. Bid Results by State (Jan. 12 - Oct. 20, 1993)
State Number
MIl 17
CA 15
IN 10
AZ 6
OH 5
IL 2
NV 2
GA 2
MA 1
SC 1
UT 1
WA 1
Total 63
Source: KEC, Unpublished Paper.
Lowest by KEC
0
3
4
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
10
The size of contracts KEC should focus on became important in
determining its future operation and goals, since KEC intends to put down
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Hit Ratio
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.17
0.00
0.00
0.50
0.00
1.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.16
-
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roots in the U.S. market as a U.S. contractor. However, the $48 million
contract recently awarded in LA will inevitably push KEC to give a new
direction to its strategies in the U.S. public market. Obayashi has taken the
course of contracting as large projects as possible either by establishing a
joint venture company with large U.S. contractors, or by itself. Yamada
explained the reason why U.S. contractors want to establish a joint venture
with Obayashi as "the expectation of Obayashi financial capability". This
strategy has made Obayashi a reputable contractor in the U.S. construction
market, and its policy of contracting large projects has made it possible for
Obayashi to attract good U.S. contractors as partners.
Table 39. Bit Results by Amount (Jan. 12 - Oct. 20, 1993)
Amount Number KEC Hit Ratio
Less than $300,000 3 0 0.00
$300,000 - $1,000,000 16 2 0.13
$1,000,000 - $10,000,000 29 4 0.14
$10,000,000 - $50,000,000 13 3 0.23
More than $50,000,000 2 1 0.50
Total 63 10 0.16
Source: KEC, Unpublished Paper.
Although the number of examples is limited, and most are heavy civil
projects, Table 39 shows that KEC is better at large projects than at small
ones, where it may meet more competition. Large projects usually require
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technological expertise, financial capability and experience, and U.S.
general contractors rarely meet all three of these conditions. Large U.S.
E&C firms, which are often all-around players, seem to be reluctant to bid
on tunnel projects due largely to high risks and low returns.
Table 40. Bid Results by the Types of Work
Type Number Hit Ratio
Concrete Structure 18 0.11
Open Cut Sewer 12 0.33
Tunnel 11 0.18
Building 6 0.00
Road & Infrastructure 6 0.33
Golf Course 2 0.00
Remediation 2 0.00
Other 6 0.00
Source: KEC, Unpublished Paper.
Table 40 shows that KEC's contracts are limited to four fields:
concrete structures, open cut sewers, tunnels, and roads. However, it is
making steady progress by using technologies which have been developed
in the Kajima Corporation.
c. Coordination
Deura recognized that the future growth of the public division as well
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as KEC as a whole depended largely on coordination between its
headquarters, divisions, regional offices, and job site offices. Although the
KEC public division is operated independently with a small headquarters, it
needs to use Kajima's competitive advantages effectively in order to win
contracts. Each manager should recognize his own role and make an effort
to establish a well-coordinated communication system.
d. Future Policy
As the above section mentioned, KEC has two major functions: one
as a subsidiary of the Kajima Corporation, where it is in charge of Japanese
investments; the other as a U.S. contractor, where it is in charge of U.S.
public works. The two organizations, with their business styles and their
contractual practices, are incompatible; thus it is difficult to establish a
corporate policy and strategy. This "existing internal two business style" is
almost the same situation that the Kajima Corporation is facing today. If
KEC can solve its internal inefficiency and become competitive in both
markets, it can be a good example for the Kajima Corporation's
organizational shift.
The public division's goal in 1993 was to secure 25% of KEC's new
contracts. However, the shrinking Japanese foreign direct investment made
possible the public contract share more than 50% of the total. Under these
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unstable conditions, where miscalculations can occur, it is difficult to
forecast the future business environment and establish KEC's policy and
strategy.
Still, KEC is making steady progress. It is gradually shifting its status
from Japanese contractor in the U.S. to U.S. contractor. KEC's future
opportunities may depend on whether it can apply Kajima's competitive
advantages effectively to the U.S. public market and whether it can develop
its own competitive advantages by learning from the U.S. public market. In
addition, KEC should have a clear goal and policy as soon as possible in
order to make maximum use of its resources.
4.2.9 The Iron Triangle
While the Japanese construction industry holds many characteristics
in common with other members of the "big business" community, its
contractors play a unique role in Japanese society. It employs the largest
work force including many unskilled workers, relies largely on public works,
and is influenced by the economic policy of the country and the economic
conditions of other domestic industries. The government not only regulates
its activities but serves as one of its best clients. The contractual system has
been established and maintained by the industry, the LDP (Liberal
Democratic Party), and the government. This close interdependence has
239
made them pacesetters in developing government relations practices that
safeguard their interests. However, it has become clear that this cozy
relationship between interest groups has deteriorated the competitiveness
of the industry. Compared to foreign competitors, the Japanese
construction industry has few comparative and competitive advantages in
the international market, lower productivity and higher construction costs.
Previous sections described how Kajima developed its domestic strategies
in order to be competitive in the domestic contractual system. This section
investigates the U.S. defense industry which has contractual practices
similar to those of the Japanese construction industry, and explores
defense contractors' strategies for maintaining their position and market
share in the industry.
A. The Japanese Iron Triangle: The Construction Industry
The series of construction bribery scandals and unique contractual
practices, which were made known to the public by U.S. government
pressure, revealed the strong connections between the three parties
concerned, the "Construction Tribe" Diet members, bureaucrats, and big
business executives. This triangle does not only function in the construction
industry; however, since the share of public works is relatively high in the
construction industry, the system is well organized there. This section
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analyzes the relationships between the three groups.
The practice of dango originated among contractors as a means of
avoiding excessive competition which might lead to a price war. Over the
years dango has come to involve the public sector clients in conspiracy as
well as the contractors. From the clients' point of view it has the advantage
of ensuring that all contracts will be taken up and the work will be done,
regardless of how easy or difficult each project may be or how profitable it
may be.
It is also advantageous for the public sector or bureaucrats to keep a
close relationship with contractors because in so doing they can secure a
new position in the private sector after they retire as officials. If a contractor
refuses to accept either the unprofitable work or the retired officials, it may
be excluded from bidding on contracts or may be starved for information.
The designated bid system has made it easier for bureaucrats to maintain
these tyrannical practices and to control the industry.
The designated bid system itself is not a unique practice. Most
countries adopt some kind of prequalification process in the pre-bid phase
in order to secure the quality of the work. However, the dango system,
together with the lack of openness of the government has twisted the
Japanese designated system. Since the system puts so much power in the
hands of the bureaucrats who hand out the contracts, it is hardly surprising
that politicians, the only people who can exercise any real influence on the
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bureaucrats, have also joined in the game.
The rewards enjoyed by politicians who do favors for the construction
industry are money and electoral support. Table 41 shows the major
genecons' annual political contribution to the LDP. The National Tax
Administration Agency showed that in fiscal 1991 V38.2 billion of spending
was unaccounted for in the construction industry, amounting to 68% of the
total of unaccounted spending for all industries. It is generally thought that
about 10% of unspecified expenditures were being given to politicians and
about 1% of the value of the construction was given as gifts in connection
with winning contracts, including those in the private sector. At election time
the construction industry mobilizes people, materials and money in support
of its favored politicians.
Meanwhile, the politicians help out the bureaucrats by campaigning
for budget allocations and defending their interests in other ways, expecting
in turn to be accommodated when they put in a word for a favored
contractor, thus contractors enjoy the benefits of a stable flow of public
works contracts, thanks to the bureaucrats and politicians. In this way, the
three interest groups are bound together in a tight community of interest
which is known as the "iron triangle", shown in Figure 24.
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Table 41.
The Genecons' "Official" Political Contribution to
the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)
Source: The Yomiuri Shimbun, "Jimin Kenkin wo Kvohi," Nov. 14, 1993
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v million
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Kajima 43.2 49.5 55.5 52.0 28.1
Taisei 26.1 40.9 65.7 36.9 24.5
Shimizu 25.9 41.8 55.7 30.1 25.0
Ohbayashi 26.1 51.0 59.0 46.9 25.0
Takenaka 26.0 58.4 47.3 33.6 24.4
Kumagai 33.9 45.7 65.2 29.7 24.3
Toda 17.7 21.8 40.4 27.6 15.6
Hazama 14.7 40.0 39.4 25.1 14.1
Fujita 16.2 15.0 33.7 34.2 25.3
Nishimatsu 14.9 25.2 24.1 16.8 14.3
J=-CC 59
firms total 607.8 920.7 995.6 771.8 807.2
-
Figure 24. The Japanese Iron Triangle
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Source: Jun Mamiya, 'The Iron Trianale and Corruption in the Construction Industry," Nov.,
1993.
1: Helping award contracts.
2: Political contributions and electioneering supports.
3: Fair distribution.
4: Accepting unprofitable deals and guaranteeing jobs to officials.
5: Securing budgets and protecting vested rights.
6: Accepting "tribe" diet members' arbitrary decision and electioneering
supports.
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B. The U.S. iron triangle: The Defense Industry
This study originated from the questions: How have U.S. defense
contractors secured their positions and maintained their market shares in
this monopsony situation of the industry? And, what strategies have
developed under the unique contractual system based on the government's
procurement policy within a strong triangle (Congress - the Pentagon -
contractors)? According to the report of the Center for Strategic and
International Studies (1989), " The U.S. defense industrial base faces
significant challenges, and little is being done to address them. Inefficiency,
a decline in capability, steady erosion of global competitiveness, and
increasing vulnerability to a disruption of supplies present serious
challenges to the national security of the United States." This section first
describes the U.S. defense industry and the U.S. and international markets;
second, it studies the uniqueness of the procurement process of the
government and its contractual system; third, it investigates the structure of
the iron triangle; and fourth, it explores U.S. defense contractors' strategies
for securing their positions and maintaining their market shares.
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1. The Industry and the Market
a. The U.S. Defense Industry and the Market
The Center for Strategic and International Studies defines the U.S.
defense industry as "the aggregate ability to provide the manufacturing,
production, technology, research, development, and resources necessary
to produce the material for the common defense of the United States." The
defense industry encompasses myriad industrial activities, from
shipbuilding to semiconductor manufacture. Over 38,000 firms provided
goods and services to the U.S. Department of Defense in 1987.
According to Kapstein (1992), the U.S. defense industry and the
market show the following characteristics through the study of major
defense contractors.
1) Concentration
The industry is relatively concentrated; the top 100 contractors do
about 75% of the business. Although this is no more concentrated than
most segments of the commercial sector, the industry is quite concentrated
when it comes to particular military platforms (ships, aircraft, vehicles), and
systems (avionics, computers, fire control systems).
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2) Cyclical Business
The defense budget has been subject to sharp cyclical increases
and declines. This complicates the industrial planning process since
commercial firms generally plan on the basis of relatively constant growth or
predicted seasonality.
3) Monopsony
The defense market is characterized by one client, the Department of
Defense; it establishes the determination of military specifications for all
hardware. From the perspective of economic theory, this may suggest that
the buyer exercises considerable leverage in the market place.
4) Annual Budget Process
Firms make investment decisions using a long planning horizon and
make assumptions about the cost of capital and other input, and about the
prices they can expect to receive for the final output. The U.S. government,
however, provides funds for defense procurement on the basis of an annual
budget process. At any point in time, funds for a given program can be
increased, decreased, or cut.
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5) R&D-intensive
Concern over U.S. defense technology places pressure on firms to
produce "high technology", but at the same time the costs of advanced R&D
are rapidly rising. Firms must be prepared to invest a substantial portion of
risk capital "up front" if they hope to win defense contracts.
6) Political
The defense industry is intensely political. Firms are heavily
monitored not only by their program managers at the DOD, but by various
congressional bodies as well, including congressional committees, the
General Accounting Office, and the Congressional Budget Office. Since
defense contracts are a high-stakes business, members of Congress are
active in ensuring that a piece of the pie goes to their local constituents.
This means that economically optimal decisions are often set aside for
politically expedient ones.
The characteristics listed above suggest that the U.S. defense
industry is different from competitive industries in a free market sense.
There is no free market in defense, and the industrial structure reflects that
fact.
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Contractors vary in their dependence on government. Some giants,
like Grumman, Lockheed, and Northrop depend almost entirely on
government sales. The percentages of contractor sales that come from the
government sales for the ten largest contractors are listed in table 42.
Obviously, most of these contractors would be in serious trouble without
their defense work.
Table 42. Government Sales as Percentage of Total Sales
Northrop 92.2%
Lockheed 92.0
Grumman 90.4
Martin Marietta 85.4
General Dynamics 85.0
McDonnel Douglas 64.5
Paytheon 55.3
Rockwell 47.3
United Technologies 32.0
Boeing 28.3
General Electrics 11.4
Source: Kenneth Mayer, The Political Economy of Defense Contractingq 1991.
b. The International Market
According to the World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers
1990, total world arms transfers (import and export) accounted for $45
billion in 1989, a new ten-year low, which represented an 18% drop from
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1988 and a nearly 28% drop from the 1987 peak level of nearly $63 billion.
The former Soviet Union continued to be the export leader of the world.
The U.S. exported $11.2 billion in 1989, which accounted for nearly 25% of
the world's arms export (see Table 43).
Table 43. Share of World Arms Export (in percent)
U.S.S.R. U.S. Other Developed Developing
1979 52.2% 18.6% 25.0% 4.2%
1980 47.4 18.1 30.0 4.4
1981 40.2 19.3 33.2 7.3
1982 38.5 19.0 29.6 12.9
1983 38.8 23.2 29.2 8.9
1984 35.6 19.4 31.0 13.9
1985 35.1 22.8 32.9 9.1
1986 42.0 18.1 32.0 7.9
1987 38.8 24.5 26.8 9.9
1988 40.6 27.8 20.5 11.1
1989 43.1 24.7 22.5 9.7
Source: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 'World Military Expenditures and Arms
Transfers," 1990.
Table 43 does not indicate any evidence of deterioration of U.S.
competitiveness in the international market. However, Kapstein points out
that U.S. defense contractors are nervous about the future of export
markets. The reasons are, first, many countries are defecting from U.S.
arms, as competitors in Europe and the former U.S.S.R. offer their arms at
lower prices; second, the U.S. has lost some important sales because
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buyers do not want to become embroiled in heated congressional debates
over approval; and third, the number of arms producers has increased
dramatically in recent years, causing an overall decline in the size of the
"off-the-shelf" market. The largest military export item, aircraft for example,
has steadily dropped from a 1987 foreign sales peak of $3.6 billion to a
1990 level of $1.4 billion.
2. Procurement Process
The process by which the U.S. government selects and purchases
military weapons and supporting goods and services for the armed forces
has been subject to public criticism and controversy. Recurring charges of
inefficiency, incompetence, and corruption have brought periodic efforts at
reform, and each instance has conferred on the process an ever-increasing
level of regulation. The acquisition process has, however, remained
remarkably resistant to significant or lasting improvement. There are many
reasons for this resistance which are long-standing and built into the
structure of the U.S. sociopolitical system. The inherent tension between a
free enterprise economy and a government-regulated procurement system
subject to public scrutiny automatically produces inefficiency.
The arms purchased by the DOD can be placed in two categories:
major weapons systems and commercial-type "standard" items. An
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overwhelming majority of the contract actions involve standard items, but
the largest share of the defense dollars goes to a few major weapons
systems. In 1985, for example, the Air Force spent 78% of its budget on just
3% of its contracts. Kenneth Mayer (1991) wrote that "every major weapon
that one of the armed service buys passes through four stages as it moves
from conception to deployment: concept formulation, concept validation,
full-scale development, and production." Kapstein explained this process in
his book, The Political Economy of National Security, as follows:
a. Concept Formulation
The first stage of the procurement process, concept definition, is
extracted from either threat assessment, military doctrine, or technological
change. Once a military requirement is defined, concept definition can
move into the laboratory. Research teams in government laboratories and
in the industry work or "paper designs" of a system. Although these teams
are operating in a competitive environment in principle, this environment
does not encourage realistic estimates of costs and schedules since each
team often develops highly overstated requirements and understated costs
in order to win the approval from of Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) in the
Office of the Secretary of Defense.
Once development funding has been approved by the DAB, funds
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must be allocated to the program in the defense budget. The program will
be listed as a new line item, and congressional approval for the weapon will
be required as Congress considers the annual defense budget request.
While the budget is being prepared, the new item must be specified in
detail.
b. Concept Validation
A program office is established and a program manager is appointed
for the execution of the development and testing stages. Potential
contractors are, of necessity, involved in the specification process, and they
try to influence the design characteristics. This is a critical step in the
process because it will affect all future elements in the program, from
contracting to final production. The next step was once competition among
firms; however, the high pre-bid costs associated with R&D have made this
no longer possible, and the most significant competition takes place earlier
in the procurement process, often when preliminary research is still
ongoing. The competition at this stage is based on specification
documents. In order to win a contract, a firm must demonstrate that it will
meet the project specifications at the lowest possible cost. Competitions
generally end at this stage.
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c. Full-scale Development
This is the stage in which the item is completed: it is put through
military tests and adapted to meet specification changes and
accommodated to new requirements. Design shortcomings are overcome.
The item is then prepared for mass production.
d. Production
When a contractor is selected to build an item Congress authorizes
and appropriates a certain amount of funds for the program.
Congress is intimately involved in every step of the procurement
process. In the yearly budget, the program manager must sell the program
to the relevant committees and subcommittees in the House and Senate.
This helps to explain why there is an effort by the Pentagon to spread the
subcontracts through as many congressional districts as possible.
Since early participation is the most important factor for a contractor
to win a contract, it is critical to identify the main actors at in each stage of
the procurement process. Activities in early stages of the process are
summarized below in the order in which they generally occur.
1) DOD identifies a security threat, military doctrine, or technology change.
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2) DOD, usually with assistance from contractors, designs an engineering
development program to meet the mission need and draws up a
procurement strategy and budget.
3) Congress authorizes and appropriates funds for the program.
4) The administration releases funds for the planned program.
5) DOD and interested contractors develop detailed technical approaches
to the program.
6) DOD prepares a contract statement with assistance from contractors.
7) DOD issues a request for proposals (RFPs) to interested contractors and
arranges preproposal conferences for bidders.
8) Contractors submit proposals to DOD, where they are evaluated.
9) DOD selects one contractor (or more), and the party (or parties) sign a
contract for the development of the weapon sysiem.
10) The contractor begins work under the contract.
11) The contractor delivers items to DOD for testing and evaluation.
The winning contractor is focused on through this process. The
Source Selection Authority (SSA) takes the responsibility for selecting a
contractor, who is designated by the secretary of military service. The
secretary also assigns the members of the Source Selection Advisory
Council (SSAC), which convenes the Source Selection Evaluation Board
(SSEB) for actual evaluation. After SSEB evaluates contractor proposals, it
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submits an evaluation report to the SSAC. Then the SSAC prepares a
report to the SSA after weighing the information in the evaluation report.
The SSA selects the winning contractor(s) based on 1) comparative
evaluations of proposals; 2) costs; 3) risk assessment; 4) past performance;
5) contractual considerations; and 6) surveys of contractor capabilities.
3. Competition
As the above sub-section, "Procurement Process," described, a
winning contractor is selected early in the project development. Jacques
Gansler writes in his book, Affording Defense (1989), "The acquisition of a
major new weapon system usually begins with competition for a research
and development contract," and "there is usually fierce rivalry for the initial
award for the development of a weapon system." Once a contractor is
awarded a contract, it usually wins successive development and production
contracts. This R&D contract award is based primarily on the projected
technical capability of the weapon. However, because of the government's
"all or nothing" policy, an R&D competition is a slow and expensive process:
as a result, only a few firms have the resources to compete. Since the
DOD's goal is to obtain the most effective weapons at the lowest cost, a
limited number of bidders is still enough to secure quality and minimal cost,
while fair opportunity may cause unnecessary administrative costs and the
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deterioration of possible contractors' R&D efforts. A contractor may put
more effort into its R&D if the probability of winning appears to be very good
and make a significantly smaller effort if the number of bidders is large.
Unlike the Japanese construction industry, the U.S. defense industry
has never yielded any data to show that there is any form of conspiracy
among contractors. Gansler explains the reason for the lack of collusion as
follows:
a. The DOD can play contractors against one another.
b. The DOD can bring in other contractors.
c. If no other contractors are available, the DOD itself may enter the market.
d. Public visibility is high.
e. "Custom-designed" products are not substitutable; therefore, there is no
market to share.
f. The demand is unpredictable; therefore, it is hard to divide up the market.
g. The "all or nothing" award makes it hard to divide up the business.
h. Awards are very infrequent; 10 or 15 years is too long to wait for one's
turn.
i. Competition is on technology rather than on price, and rapid
technological change makes it hard to collude.
j. A new leader can emerge at any time; all it takes is a technological
breakthrough and a large investment.
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4. The Iron Triangle
An iron triangle is a political relationship that brings together three
key participants in a clearly delineated area of policy making: the Federal
bureaucracy, the key committees and members of Congress, and the
private interest. In defense, the participants are the DOD, the House and
Senate Armed Services Committees and Defense Appropriations
Subcommittee, Congressional members from defense-related districts and
states, and the firms, labs, research institutes, trade associations and trade
unions in the industry itself.
The structure and the interests among the parties concerned in the
defense triangle closely resemble those of the construction triangle in
Japan. Defense contractors want to secure more defense work, Congress
wants to preserve the jobs produced by defense contracts, and the military
wants to protect its pet weapons at all cost; as a result, procurement
decisions are based more on political expediency than on national interest.
Similar characteristics of the triangle include the cost factor, which is
important but not critical, the inefficient procurement process, and the
determination of the winning contractor by negotiation rather than by
competition. As the largest government organization in the U.S. and part of
the iron triangle, DOD officials, like government officials in Japan, have to
pursue multiple economic and security objectives. These include the
258
support of domestic industries and firms, the employment of scientists and
engineers, funding for research and development, and, of course, the
fielding of equipment that meets perceived national security requirements.
5. Strategy
The contractual process in the U.S. defense business implies several
strategies a contractor needs to win a contract. The incompatibility of the
process with that of commercial business make the nature of competition
totally different. The following are the possible business strategies used by
U.S. defense contractors for winning contracts:
1) Mastering the procurement process
2) Early participation
3) Technical capability
4) Optimistic proposal
5) Specialization
On the other hand, defense contractors have several options for their
corporate strategy, which each contractor has to consider in order to survive
in changing environments.
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1) Its share of the defense business
2) International sources
3) High entry and exit barriers
4) Vertical and horizontal integration
a. Business Strategy
1) Mastering the Procurement Process
The first step in winning a contract is to become acquainted with the
procurement process. In order to maintain the technical and political
knowledge that smooths the procurement process, defense contractors
regularly hire DOD civilian employees and retiring military officers who
bring a wealth of professional experience and useful contacts to the
contractor.
2) Early Participation
After funding for a new program is approved, the weapons system
must be developed for its specific application. Potential contractors are
usually involved in this stage, and they try to influence the specifications of
particular design characteristics. After the program is specified, the DOD
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makes a major decision to build a prototype of the weapon. The single
contractor who is selected to build the prototype, almost always takes the
program through its subsequent phase. This preliminary stage accounts for
a relatively small portion of the program; however, the time and monetary
commitment to the program itself begins to become clear. Contractors
make an effort to get information on contract competitions.
3) Technical Capability
The initial award for the development of a weapons system is based
on the technical capability of the weapon. Since this initial award includes
the contract for subsequent development and production, this is a critical
factor for winning contracts.
4) Optimistic Proposal
The goal of the DOD is to get the best possible value for the dollar;
thus contractors tend to propose overly optimistic and sometimes unrealistic
technical goals in order to win contracts. On the other hand, contractors
recognize that there are almost no financial penalties for competitive
optimism. These are a major cause of the perennial cost overruns and
performance shortfalls of weapon procurement.
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5) Specialization
The present defense contractors are a "specialized" set of suppliers,
working in a regulated environment. This unique environment, which has
created high entry barriers, includes government regulations, special
bookkeeping, security requirements, and special production procedures.
As a result, contractors with long duration government contracts and with
associated high overheads, have great difficulty diversifying into the
commercial marketplace. Thus there is a mutual dependence between the
defense contractors and the DOD.
Since there is no cost competition in major weapon contracts, pre-bid
activities are very important.
b. Corporate Strategy
1) The Share of the Defense Business
Although some giants depend almost entirely on government sales,
others, like Boeing, United Technologies, and General Motors, are mostly
commercial firms with substantial cores of defense work (Table 42).
Boeing, for example, has enough orders for its commercial planes to
sustain it throughout this century. Because of the changing political and
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economical environment and the structure of the U.S. defense industry,
defense contractors are facing the need for alternative strategies for future
growth. Declining profitability rates, increasing risk, and program
uncertainty, combined with the above-mentioned environmental change,
have caused most firms in the defense business to pursue profits
elsewhere. The strategic choice for a contractor includes shifting its
business from defense to other industries either totally or partially.
2) International Sources
To meet the government's goal of reducing costs, many prime
contractors for the assembly of major weapon systems are forcing their
suppliers to cut their costs. One possible alternative is to increase the use
of international sources as far as the policy of national security permits. The
issue arising from international procurement is that once manufacturing has
gone offshore, engineering capability is also lost.
3) High Entry and Exit Barriers
A distinguishing characteristic of the defense business is the
presence of extremely high barriers to entry and exit, as mentioned above.
The members of the iron triangle have collaborated to create high barriers
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to secure their own interests. The barriers to entry include a unique
environment, high capital investment, brand loyalty, the need for high levels
of engineering and scientific capability, the need for large cash availability,
specialized reporting requirements (the required knowledge of detailed
federal regulations), security clearances, and political considerations. The
barriers to exit and/or diversification, unlike the barriers against commercial
business, include: government sponsorship of R&D, the large overhead
required for defense work; the specialized nature of the capital equipment;
the government's tendency to accept low bids rather than quality; the
specialization of scientific and engineering labor; the specialized nature of
the marketing force, which is incompatible with the commercial market; the
"comfort" with military specifications; and patriotism. These barriers have
made defense contractors specialize for contracting; they have also
prevented them from operating effectively, from moving freely within the
major segments of the defense market, and from diversifying to more
attractive business. In order to regain or at least keep competitiveness, a
contractor should maintain an alternative market at all times by refusing the
monopsony situation and reducing barriers.
4) Vertical and Horizontal Integration
Like major Japanese construction firms, competition between big
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businesses in the U.S. defense industry is based largely on total capability.
The standard advantage is technical capability, which makes it possible for
a contractor to participate at an early stage of development. Political and
managerial capabilities also serve to support the interrelationship between
the parties concerned and the smooth procurement process. On the other
hand, because of the "specialized" market, the contractors that remain in the
defense business will have to work on many different types of defense
equipment and/or diversify in order to absorb the high cost of their overhead
and still be competitive.
C. Lessons Learnt
Although the entry and exit barriers in the U.S. construction market
are relatively low, those of the Japanese construction market are extremely
high. This is because Japanese contractors need to accommodate the
industry's unique contractual system, which includes a huge capital
investment, strong relationships with the government and political world,
and the necessity of possessing outstanding technical expertise, while U.S.
contractors compete for contracts by cost without any industrial, political or
economical constraint. In order to maintain their huge overhead, major
Japanese contractors need collusion for securing stable market shares.
The U.S. defense contractors are in the same situation. Because of the
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firmly established contractual system, which excludes outsiders from the
iron triangle, defense contractors, which rely largely on defense contracts,
cannot compete in other markets, where work is based on other rules.
Many political scientists have described the U.S. defense industry as
sick. However, for the past fifty years since World War II, defense
contractors, the DOD, and politicians have not changed their nature
because they do not want to leave their established concessions. They are
criticized because their productivity is lower and their costs are higher than
commercial-based manufacturers, because of their complex and
bureaucratic procurement procedure, because of their declining
international competitiveness, and because of their relationship to the
outside world. However, they have no incentive to change their business
style as long as they can make money operating as they are. Japanese
construction contractors, the public sector, and politicians are criticized for
the same reasons, and they too have no incentive to change their business
style as long as they do not have to concern themselves with international
issues. However, today, as the changing political environment and
international power relationships begin to influence the business style of
defense contractors, the open market and fair opportunity policies
introduced by the Japanese government have begun to force construction
contractors to change their business style.
Despite different types of business, (manufacturing and engineering
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and construction service) U.S. defense strategies and Japanese
construction strategies are about the same. They both concentrate on pre-
bid activities because early participation is the key factor for winning
contracts. The differences are, however, that the Japanese system has
collusion or "dango" practice, and Japanese politicians intervene directly.
In Japan, an outstanding performance is not allowed for a contractor
because the benefit of all parties concerned has priority over the individual
interest. These differences may explain the differences in culture and
business traditions.
4.2.10 Summary of the case study: General Contractor
A. Summary
The construction industry is closely related to regional interests,
community, the economy, and social life. These factors vary from region to
region, and from country to country; thus the nature of the contractual
system, competition, and the business of construction as well as its purpose
differ among countries. In terms of public construction, government policy
determines the characteristics of the contractual system. The public
contractual system controls the nature of competition, and competition
shapes the business policy, organization, and strategy of contractors. For
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example, in the United States, cost is the most important factor for
contracting because the U.S. government believes that minimum cost will
promote maximum welfare. In the pursuit of lower costs, then the U.S.
government adopts a fair opportunity policy. On the other hand, the
Japanese government adopts a fair distribution policy because the
government believes that the economic influences exercised by public
construction investment have priority over cost. The Japanese government
also believes that public investment must be returned to the tax payers.
Although in Japan, contracts are not awarded according to a fair
opportunity, public works are distributed to contractors on a fair basis. A
government should probably not complain about the national policy of
another government because there is no such thing as a perfect policy. It is
true, however, that most developing countries regard cost as the most
important factor because low construction costs affect their industrialization
process. In addition, these countries often have to borrow construction
funds from foreign investment institutions, such as foreign government
agencies and multilateral development banks. To obtain funds from these
institutions, the host country has to clear a construction process which
includes a contractor selection procedure. Competition based on cost is the
easiest criterion to use.
This case study makes clear that Japanese contractors have no cost
competitiveness in the international market because their competition in the
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domestic market is not based on cost but on the total capability of the firm.
Kajima's policy, organization, strategy and management practices are
based on competing in the domestic market. The Japanese domestic
market has unique characteristics in its contractual system, competition, and
in the structure of its industry, which are incompatible with other markets.
'Therefore Kajima cannot apply its domestic competitive advantages directly
to other markets, and this is why it has created a second organization and
separate strategies for the international market. If the international market
were to adopt the Japanese contractual system, Japanese contractors
could dominate it. There are still some ways to help Japanese contractors
to be competitive in the international market, such as by using Japanese
financing and specific technology to reduce construction costs, and by
applying technical expertise to change construction methods.
At the present time, globalization is the objective of most Japanese
general contractors. However, their share of overseas business is relatively
small because the domestic market is so attractive that they are not tempted
to shift their business to the overseas market. The absence of open
competition in the domestic market leaves Japanese contractors without
any know-how to compete in the international market. This is why they
rarely take measures for globalization. However, they should watch for
changes in government policy and take appropriate measures to avoid
lagging behind as pressures from the U.S. government increase.
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B. Opportunities and issues
The genecon, Kajima, has concentrated too much on the domestic
contractual system; as a result, in terms of globalization, it seems to be
behind its Japanese competitors. Kajima should explore opportunities in
the international market. At present the international situation is unstable,
therefore, despite opportunities, the international market holds many risks.
Section 4.2.6 discusses three strategies for globalization based on the idea
that Kajima can advance into the international market by expanding its
competitive advantages already developed under the domestic contractual
system. Accepting unnecessary and useless risks may force Kajima to
withdraw from the overseas market; therefore Kajima should make a strong
effoit to establish its status as a global contractor.
The Japanese construction industry is facing other issues as well.
One is the issue of opening the domestic market, another is the contractual
system and dango issue, and another is the construction bribery scandals.
These issues should be considered separately. First, bribery practices
should be abandoned. Second, dango practice is indispensable for
present contractual practices since it has been a part of government
contractual policy. Therefore, it is absurd to believe that only dango is
illegal. The industry and the government should consider the real problems
in the contractual system. Finally, If the Japanese government wishes to
270
introduce cost competition and abolish the merits of the present contractual
system, the government should listen to the opinion of the U.S. government.
Otherwise, the Japanese government should request the U.S. government
to follow Japanese practices in Japan, just as Japanese contractors follow
the U.S. contractual system in the United States. Both governments have to
realize that cost competition is not a perfect contractual practice.
4.3 Engineering Contractor
Many firms are categorized as engineering contractors: plant
engineering contractors in the fields of petroleum, chemical, refinery, power,
iron, and cement; information and communication engineering firms; and
general contractors which sell not only construction services but also
engineering services. This section focuses on the three major Japanese
process plant engineering contractors, JGC (former Japan Gasoline
Corporation), Chiyoda and Toyo Engineering Corporation (TEC). In
comparison with the general contractors, they are relatively new, small, and
oriented toward advanced-technology in specialized overseas businesses.
Although the industrial policy of the government is very important for
process plant engineering contractors, they have been relatively
independent of the contractual system peculiar to Japan and the Japanese
construction industry. Since most of their clients are private companies and
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foreign government agencies, they do not accept the contractual practices
used by the domestic construction industry. Technological advantages and
business relationships have been the key factors for success in this
industry, especially in the domestic market. Although JGC has remained
independent from keiretsu, a hierarchically arranged group of firms,
Chiyoda and TEC are members of Mitsubishi and Mitsui respectively.
JGC, Chiyoda and TEC were originally established in order to
introduce foreign process technologies and engineering methods to the
Japanese market. This has caused them structural problems because they
applied and sold technologies which their U.S. partners developed; as a
result, they have always been behind the United States. The cost
advantage of these Japanese contractors has also deteriorated because of
the U.S. licensing fee. In the domestic market, their business expanded
along with other Japanese industries during the high economic growth
period. However, after they completed their major projects, they were
forced to expand to overseas markets because R&D needs substantial
investment; it is the concept of scale in this technology-oriented business,
the key which differentiates competitors. On the other hand, factors other
than those of technological advantage and the seeking of business
relationships for success are also important in the international engineering
market. These are cost competitiveness, financial capabilities and
overseas procurement Table 44 shows the factors of success and failure in
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Table 44.
Factors of Success and Failure
in the International Plant Construction Market
1. Success factors
(%)
Cost Technology/ Finance Other
experience
1970 10 30 50 10
1971 10 30 40 20
1972 5 40 40 15
1973 80 10 10 0
1974 2 80 2 16
1975 7 90 2 2
1976 10 78 0 11
1977 18 68 0 14
1978 13 75 2 10
1979 22 71 1 6
1980 20 73 3 4
1981 22 70 2 6
2. Failure factors
(%)
Cost Technology/ Finance Other
experience
1970 23 30 27 20
1971 37 31 20 11
1972 50 7 32 10
1973 13 0 63 26
1974 78 0 63 26
1975 100 0 0 0
1976 33 0 33 33
1977 38 19 13 31
1978 64 18 0 18
1979 63 6 7 24
1980 34 14 20 32
1981 82 0 9 9
Source: Takaaki Wakasugi & Hideo Takanaka, "Engineerina Sanavo," Tokyo University
Press, 1986.
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international bids. The factors for success were based largely on a firm's
technologies, experience, and its financial capability before the first oil
crisis; after the crisis, the financial factor was no longer important. It follows
that failure was the result of a lack of technology and experience before the
crisis, while, cost competitiveness became the critical factor after the crisis.
In summary, in order to be competitive internationally, a firm must have
technological advantages, be experienced in its field, and be cost
competitive. Unfortunately, although Japanese process plant contractors
are technologically advanced and have overseas experience, their cost
advantage has deteriorated in recent years due mostly to increasing labor
costs and the high appreciation of Japanese currency. They have
competed in open markets both domestically and internationally and while
their way of business, cost structure and strategies may be similar to those
of their U.S. counterparts, they still have to deal with Japanese business
traditions, such as keeping a close relationship with Japanese industries
including keiretsu, respecting the government's regulations and policies,
conforming to the Japanese lifetime employment system and the seniority
system, and accepting the relatively lower status of the service
(engineering) industry. In the present business environment, which is
gradually changing, general contractors should absorb the experience and
strategies of process plant engineering contractors in order to have
international competitiveness. This section of the chapter will investigate
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the competitiveness and the future perspectives of process plant
engineering contractors.
4.3.1 Description
A. Historical Background
This section of this chapter gives a brief history of the Japanese
engineering industry in order to reveal the process of its evolution and
structure.
1. Before 1980
a. Prewar period
Although engineering businesses increased during the rapid
industrialization of Japan, there were no plant engineering firms in the
prewar period because most industrialists, especially those in the chemical
industry and the petroleum industry, had in-house engineers to design their
systems of facilities and manage construction. These industrialists relied on
technologies transferred from the U.S. and European countries for
everything from basic design to detailed design during this period. Until the
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end of World War II, the refinery industry was considered a military industry,
so the process of refining was confidential and there was no chance to
establish a refinery plant engineering firm. Although, the Japan Gasoline
Corporation (today's JGC) was established in 1928, it was then limited to
refining and selling petrochemicals; engineering was not included.
b. Postwar period
The Japanese industry was severely damaged by World War II and
many plants and factories collapsed. However, this catastrophic situation
provided an opportunity to establish plant engineering firms. After the
General Headquarters (GHQ) permitted the construction of a refinery plant
in 1949 construction boomed. Responding to the postwar reconstruction
boom and the rapid growth of the Japanese economy, Chiyoda broke away
from the Mitsubishi Oil Corporation and was incorporated in 1948, while the
Japan Gasoline Corporation changed its business from manufacturing and
retailing to engineering in 1952.
c. High Economic Growth Period
Japanese refinery, petrochemical, synthetic fiber, chemical fertilizing,
chemical, coke and gas industries all actively invested in their plants and
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equipment during this period. The refinery industry spent V620 billion
between 1955 and 1964 in order to construct eighteen refinery plants. The
capacity of the refineries increased from 230,000 barrel/day to 1,870,000
barrel/day during this period. For the first time JGC and Chiyoda used
genuine engineering methods introduced from the U.S. to construct large
complexes. These included the Idemitsu Tokuyama Refinery Complex and
the Mitsubishi Mizushima Refinery Complex, both completed in 1957. The
petrochemical industry also developed rapidly during this period, spending
V400 billion. These investments promoted Japan's industrialization and
trained Japanese engineering firms. Although engineering contractors still
had to rely on licensed process technologies and basic system design, they
were gradually able to assume responsibility for detail system design. The
capacity of the refineries was again increased to 5,660,000 barrel/day just
before the oil crisis, three times the capacity of 1964. The export of
engineering services increased during this high growth period and began
to displace the depressed domestic market after the oil crisis period.
d. The Oil Crisis and the Post-crisis Period
The oil crisis, which occurred in 1973 caused high inflation. Most
domestic projects contracted before the oil crisis turned out to be
unprofitable. On the other hand, OPEC countries rapidly increased their
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engineering contracts, backing the leaping oil prices. As a result of this
situation, overseas contracts in Japanese engineering firms accounted for
$175 billion in 1981, an increase of $136 billion over the contract of $39
billion in 1974. Although this increase in overseas contracts covered the
unprofitable domestic contracts, refinery and petrochemical investment
were gradually reduced due to the worldwide recession which followed the
oil crisis, the governments' energy saving policies, decreased oil
consumption, and the stabilization of oil prices at a lower level. After
enjoying the brief prosperity caused by the oil crisis, the engineering
industry was dragged into a difficult situation both in its domestic and in its
international markets by being rushed into price competition. The decade
of the 1980's was severe for the engineering industry. Engineering
contractors were required to restructure their organizations and develop
survival strategies. The strategies adopted by plant engineering contractors
in the 1980's will be discussed in a later section of this chapter.
2. The 1980's
Japanese plant engineering contractors, JGC, Chiyoda and TEC,
experienced both prosperity and depression during the 1980's. The
decade opened with a rapid expansion of business, especially in the
overseas markets. The mid-80's were difficult years when engineering
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contractors needed patience. The world-wide depression caused a rapid
decrease of new contracts. Japanese contractors had a particularly hard
time because the high appreciation of the yen weakened their international
cost competitiveness. They had to restructure their organizations and
develop new strategies for survival during this period. However, as the
domestic economy recovered in the late 80's, the domestic industries were
able to increase their investment in the engineering fields again. Although
they had been badly shaken, they prevailed by making strategic shifts in
their businesses.
This section examined the environmental changes in the 1980's and
engineering contractors' strategies for survival.
a. Prosperous period (1981-1982)
The overseas contracts of Japanese E&C firms had expanded
rapidly since they had begun to sell their services to overseas markets. The
contracts, which exceeded $100 million in 1960, expanded to $1 billion in
1970, and to 10 billion in 1980. This was the result of efforts to expand
overseas contracts after the oil crisis in 1973 when the Japanese recession
forced engineering contractors to look for alternative markets. 1981 was an
epoch-making year for engineering contractors, when overseas contracts
accounted for $175 billion, up from $118 billion in 1980. The backlog of
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JGC, Chiyoda and TEC amounted to about V600 billion in that year; the
ratio of overseas business accounted for 62% in JGC and Chiyoda, and
95% in TEC. However, the influence of environmental changes in the
world's economy and politics, such as the Iran-Iraq War and the economic
adjustment policy adopted in China, caused the suspension of projects and
forced unprofitable settlements to be made often in 1982. According to
Engineering Business (Oct. 1, 1991), even though these three contractors
had inferred that the trend of business was heading toward a world
recession, they had postponed taking measures devised to deal with these
issues largely due to optimistic perspectives caused by the huge backlog of
hydro-carbon projects, their strongest field.
b. Reaction Period (1983)
In 1983 the OPEC general assembly reached a consensus on the
reduction of the price of crude oil from $34 per barrel to $ 29 per barrel,
which forced the balance of payments into a deficit in most of the OPEC
countries. Many large scale international projects were canceled one after
the other although major oil refining and downstream process plants had
already been completed. Large scale projects were only expected in the
natural gas field. Engineering contractors began to consider their
restructuring seriously from this year.
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c. Depression Period (1984-1986)
The worldwide depression accelerated in 1984. New contracts in the
international market were limited to medium-small size projects.
Engineering contractors began to explore alternative funding sources, such
as counter-trade, barter-trade and project finance. JGC, Chiyoda, and TEC
restructured their organizations in 1985. For example, the strategies for
restructuring taken by Chiyoda were to strengthen its marketing promotion
and to advance to new markets. Chiyoda also reorganized its structure so
that it could deal with small size projects. Strategies adopted by other firms
included establishing smaller business units and delegating to them as
many responsibilities as possible, as well as giving their operation a short-
term orientation. Engineering contractors began to explore new markets,
including factory automation (FA), which received considerable attention
during the depression period. Every engineering contractor tried to be the
first to enter to this field. Today, together with computer integrated
manufacturing (CIM) and intelligent manufacturing systems (IMS), FA has
become one of core businesses of engineering contractors. They have also
entered electric power and nuclear plant markets, which had previously
been confined to heavy manufacturing firms and general contractors.
On the other hand, general contractors began to invade the
engineering field during this period due largely to the recession in the
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construction market. Genecons already had some experience in the above
mentioned FA and CIM related fields because they had become
accustomed to these systems through the construction of manufacturing
factories. Using this advantage, their plan was to enter one engineering
field and to expand throughout the engineering business.
JGC, Chiyoda, and TEC gradually shifted their targeted market from
the international market to the domestic market not only because of the
world wide recession, but because signs of recovery had begun to appear
in some engineering fields, especially in fluid catalytic cracking and in the
production of polypropylene and polyester. On the whole, though, the
recession continued both internationally and domestically and engineering
firms suffered losses during 1985 and 1987.
d. Heisei Prosperity Period (1987-1990)
In an attempt to control the recession, the government began to
promote public investment in 1987. As a result, domestic-oriented
industries, such as the construction industry and the steel industry, rapidly
improved their profitability. On the other hand, overseas-oriented
industries, such as the engineering industry, recovered more slowly. It was
only in 1988 that active investments in domestic industries began to bring
back their profitability. Together with the effects of restructuring and the
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diversification of the business, the strategic shifts that developed during the
recession period began to improve the profitability of engineering
contractors. In 1989 the overseas contract exceeded $100 billion for the
first time since 1982 and the Japanese domestic industry was finally
restored.
The international engineering industry underwent reorganization at
the same time. One of the top engineering contractors, M.W.Kellogg was
purchased by Dresser industries in 1988. ASEC (Sweden) and BBC
(Switzerland) merged into ABB in 1988, which later acquired C.E. Lummus
Crest.
B. A profile of the major players
Unlike its construction industry, which accounts for 520,000 firms and
a considerable work force, the Japanese engineering industry consists of
relatively few firms. Most of them are divisions of large Japanese industries:
ship builders, heavy machine and a electrical manufacturers, and steel
makers. Three engineering contractors, JGC, Chiyoda and TEC, specialize
in the engineering business. This section describes the profiles of these
three engineering contractors and briefly introduces other players related to
the business.
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1. JGC (JGC Corporation)
JGC was established in 1928 to manufacture, retail, and export
gasoline products made from crude oil. This corporation started with a
refinery plant using Dubb's thermal cracking process technology licensed
by the Universal Oil Products Company (UOP). Then during the worldwide
depression period in the 1930's, JGC abandoned the refinery business due
largely to falling oil prices. Instead, it started licensing businesses acquired
from UOP. As the demand for high-octane gasoline for aviation increased
before and during the war, JGC applied new process technology purchased
from UOP to the construction of refinery plants in military bases. This was
generally thought to be the first modification engineering implemented by a
Japanese engireering firm. After World War II, JGC concluded an exclusive
agreement with UOP for various licenses in refinery and petrochemical
technologies. The close relationship with UOP from the beginning helped
JGC to resume its engineering business early in the postwar period.
The completion of Idemitsu Tokuyama Refinery Complex in 1957
was epoch-making for the Japanese petroleum industry and for JGC itself.
JGC had acted as engineering contractor in this project using UOP's
technologies and had established its reputation as a procurement,
engineering and construction contractor. During the high economic growth
period, JGC consistently promoted internationalization and diversification.
284
Regarding internationalization, JGC first advanced overseas business
cooperating with UOP, then expanded its overseas share by cooperating
with Japanese trading companies and manufacturing industries, taking
advantage of their worldwide network. As time went on, since JGC was a
contractor, it had to diversify into many fields in order to respond to clients'
needs. JGC has entered various plant construction fields such as nuclear,
pipeline, medical, food, and gas. It contracted its first overseas refinery
project in Peru in 1965, and followed this with the similar contracts in
Argentina and Venezuela. In the same year it contracted engineering
service for Japan's first radioactive waste processing plant in collaboration
with a French firm.
The dollar crash which occurred in 1971 terminated the Japanese
high economic growth period. The oil crisis of 1973 further damaged he
Japanese economy, which had come to rely heavily on the petrochemical
industry. The strategies developed in this period include: the shift from
lump sum to cost plus fee contracts, which was the system commonly used
in the international market; the adoption of the self supporting accounting
system for independent divisions, which made divisional responsibilities
clear; and exploring new markets. JGC called the domestic investment
trends in this recession period the "4s": self-financing, specialized, save-
what-you-can, and size-down. In order to correspond to these investment
trends, JGC made efforts to promote communication between divisions,
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improve productivity, increase technological capabilities, and find and train
new suppliers and subcontractors.
Today, JGC enjoys huge back orders, many of them in new fields
such as factory automation, telecommunication, and urban development.
However, a shortage in the work force has become an urgent problem and
JGC has had to make the most of subcontracting with U.S. and Korean
engineering firms.
2. Chiyoda (Chiyoda Corporation)
Chiyoda was established in 1948 as a subsidiary of Mitsubishi
Petroleum. It is also a part of joint venture company with Gulf Oil (U.S.) and
Mitsubishi. Engineers were first transferred from the parent so that
Chiyoda's initial strength was in the petrochemical and refinery fields. As
Japan's industrialization expanded in the 1950's and 60's, drawn in the
wake of the chemical and petroleum industry, its business expanded. Then,
when Japan's inter-governmental assistance increased after the first United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) was held in
1964, it increased its overseas contracts as well. When the government
declared that its policy would be to develop Japan's overseas markets
Chiyoda established its reputation as an international engineering
contractor.
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Chiyoda has been highly motivated to establish global coalitions with
host countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Singapore and Nigeria. The Union
Carbide Corporation (UCC) has been its partner, collaborating on heavy
oil-based flame-cracking technology to produce olefin, and an Australian
firm has been in partnership with Chiyoda for the production of fuel oils from
oil shale. However, having built up a high ratio of overseas operations in
the early 1980's, Chiyoda was seriously damaged in the last half of the
decade by the dramatic appreciation of the Japanese yen. Chiyoda
successfully gained a domestic share of up to 50% of its total contracts by
restructuring its organization and operation through diversification into other
fields, such as power, nuclear processing, pollution control, factory
automation, information processing, urban development and general
construction.
Today, three quarters of Chiyoda's new contracts come from hydro-
carbon related fields, although new businesses which Chiyoda invested in
during the recession period have also begun to bear fruit and have become
part of Chiyoda's core businesses. However, like JGC, a shortage in the
work force has become a serious problem and Chiyoda is looking for sub-
contracting opportunities in the international market, though this is causing
internal controversies.
287
3. TEC (Toyo Engineering Corporation )
TEC is the newest of these three Japanese engineering contractors.
It was established in 1961 as a subsidiary of Mitsui Toatsu Chemicals in
order to meet the needs of chemical plant construction both in the domestic
and overseas markets. TEC's initial competitive advantage was the
exclusive chemical fertilizer process technology inherited from Mitsui
Toatsu Chemicals. In addition, TEC concluded a license agreement with
ABB Lummus in 1963, which brought TEC further advantages in ethylene
process technology. TEC learned not only process technology from
Lummus but engineering and project management methods as well. In
addition, TEC has taken charge of the detail design of ethylene heater
revamping and now dominates this market in Japan. Since its first contract
was awarded in 1965, TEC has designed and constructed more than thirty
ethylene complexes in the world. TEC also introduced the ammonia
process technology which it imported from M.W. Kellogg in 1968. The
ammonia process technology, combined with TEC's own urea process
technology, has been delivered to fertilizing plant projects in overseas
markets.
While JGC and Chiyoda have their competitive advantages in the oil
refining technology, TEC has advantages in downstream petrochemical
process technologies. TEC's overseas configuration strategy is unique in
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that it is focused on communist countries, such as the former USSR,
Eastern Europe, China and India. JGC makes a strong appearance in
South-eastern Asia and Chiyoda lead in the Middle-east. It also leads in
factory automation and in the computer application fields.
4. Engineering Related Contracts of Major Firms (1990)
According to the Engineering Advancement Association of Japan
(ENAA), the Japanese engineering industry consists of eight types of
businesses; these include the above mentioned three major engineering
contractors, mid/small-sized engineering contractors, general contractors,
integrated steel makers, shipbuilders, industrial equipment and machinery
manufacturers, heavy electric equipment manufacturers, and
telecommunication and information processing firms. The following table
shows engineering related contracts in selected firms.
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Table 45. Engineering Related Contracts in Selected Firms (1990)
(V billion)
a. Major Engineering Contractors
Chiyoda Corporation 245
Toyo Engineering Corporation 223
JGC Corporation 279
b. Steel Makers
Kawasaki Steel Corporation 202
Kobe Steel, Ltd. 233
Nippon Steel Corporation 301
Sumitomo Metal Industries, Ltd. 145
NKK Corporation 329
c. Shipbuilders
Ishikawajima Harima Heavy Industries Co., Ltd. 920
Kawasaki Heavy Industries Ltd. 433
Sumitomo Heavy Industries, Ltd. 88
Hitachi Zosen Corporation 210
Mitsui Engineering & Shipbuilding Co., Ltd. 214
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. 1,316
d. Heavy Electric Equipment Manufactures
Toshiba Corporation 2,687
Hitachi, Ltd. 1,217
Fuji Electric Co., Ltd. 304
Mitsubishi Electric Corporation 2,044
Toshiba Engineering & Construction Co., Ltd. 128
Hitachi Plant Engineering & Construction Co., Ltd 247
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e. General Contractors
Kajima Corporation 2,201
Obayashi Corporation 1,928
Kumagai Gumi Corporation Co., Ltd. 1,176
Shimizu Corporation 2,362
Taisei Corporation 2,202
Takenaka Corporation 1,919
f. Trading Companies
Engineering Related Plant Export
C. Itoh & Co., Ltd. 3,692 471
Kanematsu Corporation 615 121
Sumitomo Corporation 5,907 646
Tomen Corporation 1,239 405
Nichimen Corporation 869 135
Nissho Iwai Corporation 2,385 662
Marubeni Corporation 4,487 779
Mitsui & Co., Ltd. 4,209 550
Mitsubishi Corporation 4,150 600
Source. Engineering Business, 'liavo-betsu Enaineering Kanren-busho Uriaae Juchyu.
Juchvu-zandaka," August 1 and 15, 1991.
In addition to the above mentioned engineering related firms, many
Japanese enterprises have their own in-house engineering divisions.
Although they are not considered engineering firms, their in-house
engineering division often performs the duties of engineering contractors.
Indeed, their engineering capabilities are regard as equivalent to those of
engineering contractors. For example, the Tokyo Electric Power
Corporation (TEPCO), Nihon Telephone and Telecommunication (NTT) and
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Japan Railways (JR) are typical firms which have a certain number of civil
engineers. Table 46 shows the basic data of the three Japanese
engineering contractors.
Table 46. Basic Data of the Three Engineering Contractors
JGC Chiyoda TEC
Foundation 1928 1948 1961
Capital V7.2 bill. V14.8 bill. 12.2 bill.
Net Sales 400.2 bill. 411.6 bill. V165.0 bill.
Net Income V5.9 bill. V10.8 bill. 3.5 bill.
#of employee 2,514 2,873 1,510
Head office Tokyo Yokohama Tokyo
Source: Annual Reports. 1993.
4.3.2 Overseas Strategy
Unlike the Japanese public contractual policy, where economic
theories rarely work, the private contractual policy should be defined
according to economic rules; that is, clients usually require the most
advanced technology at the lowest possible cost, otherwise they cannot be
competitive in their industry. Competition is clear since contracts are
competed for on technological and monetary grounds. In the engineering
industry clients always look for the latest technology and for capable
engineering contractors who can realize their plans with this technology
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and at lowest cost without deteriorating qualitative criteria. As long as the
contractor meets the requirements, clients do not care about the nationality
of the contractor or of the plant components. Because he himself does not
have to belong to a particular country, an engineering contractor can hire
engineers and managers regardless of their nationality and procure plant
components from worldwide sources. This section explores the overseas
strategy of Japanese engineering contractors by studying the contractual
system, comparative advantages, and the international market
environments.
A. Contractual System
Japanese engineering contractors are more globalized than
Japanese general contractors, although they still have an internal gap
between domestic and global business. This section introduces the
contractual system in both the domestic and international markets.
1. The Domestic Market
The private sector is the only client in the Japanese engineering
market. Therefore, engineering contractors follow the contractual practices
peculiar to Japanese commercial business. A client asks an engineering
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contractor to join the project development, technical assessment, feasibility
study, and basic design without signing a contract. The selection process
depends on the clients; for example, power corporations adopt a fair
distribution policy like that of the public sector. It is generally recognized
that there is collusion among contractors under this policy. On the other
hand, since oil companies regard experience and technical expertise as
important, there is no collusion for refinery and petrochemical plant
construction. In either case, business relations are important. According to
Masatoshi Kano, a chief engineer of JGC, even if a project is suspended
during these project development phases, contractors do not claim
compensation for their efforts because they believe that long-standing
relationships help contractors to be chosen for the next project.
2. The international market
The international contractual process is easier to understand. There
are three information sources for new projects: in-house business
promotion divisions, Japanese trading companies, and invitations to bid
(ITB) received directly from clients. Japanese engineering contractors often
rely on Japanese trading companies' information network, especially for
foreign public projects. Trading companies, sogo shosha in Japanese,
enjoy a strong position with excellent ties to key private as well as
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governmental financial institutions. Their advantages include a global
procurement network, bargaining power with foreign governments,
financing and coordinating capabilities as well as an information gathering
capability.
Contractual processes vary from project to project. The general
procedure for a lump-sum contract begins with a feasibility study and
prequalification. The criteria of prequalification generally include project
records, technical capabilities, financial statuses, key personnel resumes,
company and project organizations, procurement capabilities, and present
work loads. It is necessary for contractors to be qualified to join the bid, and
Japanese contractors rarely fail. Once prequalified, contractors submit
proposals (commercial, technical and alternative) responding to the
inquiries of the client. The next step is cost evaluation. The lowest bidder is
not always the winner. Although cost is an important factor, since each
contractor uses a slightly different technology from the others, it is possible
for contractors who cannot offer the lowest bid price to turn the tables by
using the client's favorable technological applications. The client takes all
aspects into consideration and makes a reasonable judgement. The
contract is finally awarded to the contractor who comes to an agreement
with the client by means of commercial negotiations. At the commercial
negotiations, the clients and the contractor often fail to come to an
agreement on the conditions of the contract, which is usually complex and
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unilaterally for the contractors. Therefore, a contractor should study
carefully not only the conditions offered by the client but also why lower
bidders have declined to accept these conditions.
B. Comparative Advantages
1. The Business Style Suitable for Full-Turn-Key Contract
Recently, clients of large international projects, especially
government agents in developing countries, have tended to prefer the full-
turn-key contract to the cost-plus-fee contract, because in this way clients
can hedge construction risks. As a result, international contractors are
being forced to accept this contract method, giving Japanese E&C
contractors an advantage. It is a common business practice in Japan for
firms to have a certain amount of internal reserve to serve as a buffer for risk
acceptance. The buffer can absorb a short-term loss from a certain project,
thus Japanese E&C firms do not have to add unreasonable contingency
and risk fees. In addition, Japan adopts the lump-sum contract instead of
the cost-plus-fee contract for most construction projects, which makes it
easy for the Japanese contractor to accept the full-turn-key contract, as the
full-turn-key is based on lump-sum contract method. The reason why Japan
has adopted the lump-sum contract is because it does not recognize
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service or engineering is as separate concepts; as a result, contractors
cannot make individual profits in the engineering business, and all
construction risks are accepted by the contractors, while people tend to
consider the U.S. cost-plus-fee contract as a method used to avoid
responsibility. On the other hand, Japanese contractors are weak at cost-
plus-fee contracting largely due to their lifetime employment system; they
have to maintain a certain number of employees regardless of annual
contracts, and the cost-plus-fee contract which is based on man-hours,
limits the number of employment. Therefore, Japanese construction firms
are internally organized to accept the full-turn-key contract. Their financing
capability also helps Japanese contractors to accept this contract method.
U.S. contractors have practiced cost-plus-fee contracting both in the
domestic and in the international market. Therefore, they are internally
organized for risk avoidance. In addition, they regard dividends to
stockholders as very important, so they cannot have internal reserves as a
buffer. These factors make it difficult for U.S. contractors to accept full-turn-
key contracts without a certain amount of contingency and risk fees.
According to Engineering Business (Nov. 15, 1993), Chiyoda was
awarded the full-turn-key contract of the LNG plant construction project from
Qatar in May, 1993. The contract amount was $1.4 billion, which was $100
million less than the second lowest offer, which was made by JGC-Kellogg
joint venture. Since Kellogg did the basic design and has a long-standing
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relationship with the Qatar government, a JGC-Kellogg joint venture was
expected to contract this project. However, Kellogg could not reduce its
contingency fee because it had to hedge as many risks as possible
especially for such a large scale project. As a result, despite the efforts of
JGC, the joint venture lost the contract.
2. Domestic Business Relations
Japanese engineering contractors have an advantage in the full-
turn-key type contract, as mentioned above. However, it requires a wide
variety of activities which include non-engineering businesses, such as
financing, procurement, negotiation with host governments, general
construction works. Engineering contractors can hedge risks associated
with these activities by using Japanese trading companies and general
contractors.
Japanese general trading companies or sogo shosha do much more
than simply buy and sell goods; they are coordinators of product systems.
The specific role played by a sogo shosha varies with the circumstances of
the product system. But in all product systems their activities cover multiple
stages, from raw materials through finished products, and many functions,
such as logistics, finance, marketing, technology scanning, give it the broad
perspective and formidable organizational and bargaining power essential
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to the role of coordinator. In terms of engineering and construction exports,
complex and high-value added projects, such as large-scale turnkey plant
construction, are attractive to sogo shosha because they can participate in
more stages in large complex projects than in small ones. Such projects
can provide them with the additional advantage of enhancing their
presence in host countries. Japanese engineering contractors and other
plant exporters generally team up with trading companies in order to
explore new opportunities and hedge financial and political risks
associated with international full-turn-key type projects, and when host
countries require counter-trade as a condition of contract, cooperation with
trading companies is indispensable. Counter-trade has become popular in
the former USSR and in Eastern Europe where international debt has
increased. Commonly used forms of counter-trade are counter-purchase,
compensation, barter trade, and switch trade.
In civil engineering works engineering contractors can hedge
construction risks by using Japanese general contractors. The construction
of plant foundations is extremely difficult because of unknown site
conditions and environments, and changes in designs and orders
commonly occur. Although Japanese general contractors usually cost
much more than those in host countries, they guarantee completion without
delay and within the budget. This is essential, for any delay or problem
which occurs in this period could affect the completion dates, quality, and
299
labor relationships of following construction activities, which may lead to the
loss of the total project. The percentage of civil engineering works accounts
for about 10% of the total.
3. Advanced Technology Derived from Domestic Requirements
The Japanese economy depends completely on imported natural
resources, and the oil crisis reminded Japanese industries to use these
resources as efficiently as possible. The energy-saving policy of the
government has forced energy-related industries to use the most advanced
technology for their businesses; as a result, engineering contractors
compete fiercely in developing new technologies. These R&D efforts of
Japanese engineering contractors in collaboration with energy-related
industries have pushed up their technologies' competitive edges in the
energy fields.
Japanese engineering contractors have also become competitive in
the environmental field. Japan has adopted the strictest environmental
regulations in the world, as can be seen in its antipollution ordinance and
exhaust emission standard. This competitive environment has encouraged
environment-related industries to have advanced environmental
technologies. Although other countries do not always require the same
level of environmental technologies, Japanese engineering contractors try
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to apply them to environmental projects not only to have technological
superiority over their foreign competitors, but also because they have to
spread these costly technologies over as many projects as possible in order
to recover R&D investments.
C. Environments and Conditions of Globalization
1. Environments
This section investigates conditions of globalization by studying the
various environments which besiege Japanese engineering contractors.
a. Incentives
The globalization of the engineering market stimulated the
globalization of engineering contractors. In 1964, the first United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) brought up the North-
South issue. The conference stressed the need for developed countries to
provide developing countries with economic cooperation and development
aids. Many countries had declared their independence and were making
efforts to achieve economic independence through industrialization.
Developed countries began to support this industrialization by exporting
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industrial plants, which they considered the most influential method of
economic cooperation. In this way Japanese engineering contractors
started their overseas businesses in developing countries with the aid of
official development assistance.
In addition to the government policy of foreign assistance, the
following factors encouraged Japanese engineering contractors to lead the
international market.
1) The limited domestic market
Although the Japanese market is relatively large, market volatility
often forced engineering contractors to diversify into the international
market.
2) Gaining technical expertise
Initially, Japanese engineering contractors introduced engineering
technologies through licensing. However, after they assimilated licensed
technologies, they developed technologies that were more advanced than
the original licensed technologies. As a result, they often have
technological advantages over licensors, and thus achieve the international
market advancement.
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3) Cost competitiveness
The Japanese manufacturing industry has raised its productivity
since the end of the high economic growth period. Since the productivity
improvement rate exceeded the wage increase rate, the industry could
reduce its relative costs and reinforce its competitiveness in the
international market. Although the recent high appreciation of the
Japanese currency has weakened the industry's cost competitiveness,
high-value-added products supported by advanced technologies are still
competitive in the foreign market.
b. Financing
As engineering markets globalize and operations spread over the
world, financing activities globalize. In addition to receipts and payments in
foreign currencies, engineering contractors need to enter into other
financial activities peculiar to the engineering industry, such as preparing
financial resources and hedging foreign exchange risks.
Besides yen credit, there are three commonly used financing forms:
supplier credits, buyer credits and bank loans. In the case of buyer credit,
the Export-Import Bank of Japan grants credit directly to the buyer who then
pays the supplier; in the case of bank loans, Japanese commercial banks
303
provide financing to the banks in the host country. Both these financing
forms are risk free for engineering contractors. Supplier credit, however, is
accompanied by financial risks, especially when the financing is prepared
in foreign currencies. In this case, the exporter has a credit in foreign
currencies, which often influences the final balance of the project.
Foreign exchange risks are commonly hedged by using forward
exchange contracts and exchange risk insurance. The exchange risk
insurance covers the fluctuation in exchange rate between 3% to 20%.
Thus, contractors should carefully determine the reasonable percentage of
the host and hard currency receipts.
c. Global Configuration and Coordination of Activities
Plant exports require global configuration and coordination of
activities based on each exporter's competitive and comparative
advantages. Global operation and procurement, and forming a global
consortium are concrete examples of global configuration and coordination.
1) Global Operation
Engineering contractors rarely employ labor directly; instead, they
subcontract with many second tier contractors. In a large full-turn-key
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project, a prime engineering contractor may contract with more than a
hundred subcontractors, among which are many foreign contractors and
suppliers. Today's circumstances have forced Japanese engineering
contractors to subcontract not only construction but also design and
engineering to international contractors.
2) Global Procurement
Because of relatively declining international cost competitiveness,
Japanese engineering contractors have promoted the overseas
procurement of plant equipment. Today, they source about 30% of the total
procurement in overseas markets. In 1992 the largest suppliers were the
U.S. ($700 mill.), U.K. ($270 mill.), and Holland ($115 mill.). Although at
first Japanese engineering contractors procured equipment from
industrializing countries, non-price problems, such as quality, performance,
delivery date, standard difference, and guarantee made them shift to
industrialized countries.
A serious concern for Japanese engineering contractors is the
mounting personnel expenses of engineers. Figure 25 shows the average
engineering cost per hour in selected countries. In order to have cost
competitiveness, they often have to subcontract engineering to foreign
engineering contractors.
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Figure 25.
Engineering Man-hour Fee in Selected Countries
2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
Van.
12000 14000' I
Source: Engineering Business, Nihon no Plant Yusvutsu no Kyosoryoku
wo Kensho suru, Oct. 15, 1993.
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3) Consortium
It became difficult for engineering contractors to contract large
projects without making a consortium because of huge initial investments,
widely ranging contract conditions, and complex business environments.
Therefore, they established temporarily a complementary relationship with
other engineering contractors and, other, with a trading company. A
consortium can be divided roughly into four categories: parallel contract,
main-sub contract, joint and several contract, and the establishment of a
new corporation.
Consortiums are formed in order to avoid excessive competition, and
complement permits contractors to share costs, risks, political
correspondence and opportunities.
d. Global R&D
In its early days the Japanese engineering industry applied imported
licensed technologies to its domestic market because it could not expect the
limited Japanese market to recover its R&D expenses. Today, because
huge investments make it difficult for any single contractor to develop new
technologies and because Japanese engineering contractors have become
technical experts who are often counted on by foreign firms, international
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joint research and technical cooperation has increased. In this way
technologies and R&D expenses are shared and opportunities are
increased.
e. Global Management
Japanese engineering contractors have adopted the U.S. type of
project management system because they had no example in the Japanese
management system that they could follow in the international market. For
example, a Japanese management practice, based on mutual
understanding, often allows contractors to start a project without a contract;
a verbal promise often has priority over a documented contract in Japan.
The U.S. type of management system, today's international standard, could
not be more different; it forces parties concerned to follow the doctrine of
contract for contract's sake. These differences in contract types between
Japan (lump-sum) and the rest of the world (cost-plus-fee) have made it
difficult for Japanese engineering contractors to maintain the Japanese
management system. (However, a recent trend of shifting contract types
from cost-plus to lump-sum is pushing them back to the competitive edge in
some markets.) In any event, they still have to use the Japanese
management system for their Japanese clients, thus the arrangement of this
managerial gap has become a vital issue for them.
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2. Conditions
a. Strengthen International Competitiveness
Having global competitiveness is a must for globalization. In order to
be globally competitive, engineering contractors have to examine carefully
the comparative and competitive advantages in each overseas market.
These advantages can usually be divided into cost and non-cost factors.
Many contractors compete with combined advantages depending on client
needs, maximizing their advantages by applying themselves to client
environments. Although Japanese engineering contractors are considered
to have non-cost competitiveness, they are still weak at pre-bid activities
such as feasibility studies and consultation. While they can develop
competitive advantages by themselves, they can do little to change their
comparative advantages.
b. Promoting Global Capabilities
In addition to meeting the conditions of globalization for other
industries, such as the manufacturing industry, engineering contractors
need to meet conditions peculiar to the service exporting business. First,
they need a problem settlement capability. Since engineering contractors
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are not just contractors who can wait for directions from the client, they must
team up with a good problem settlement organization. Second, they need
the ability to create good international relationships with the countries
concerned. Third, they need to promote an international interchange of
personnel and to train globally-minded engineers, as engineering export is
based on a reliable corelationship between the countries concerned.
Fourth, they need to establish their own project management methods
applicable to the international market and to train project managers who
can handle them. Fifth, the industry, collaborating with the government,
should establish an export promotion system in order to create a favorable
environment for engineering contractors. Many European countries have
strong export promotion systems supported by their governments which
work very well in the international marketplace.
4.3.3 U.S. Engineering Contractors
The major U.S. engineering contractors are far more diversified than
Japanese engineering contractors both horizontally and vertically.
Horizontally, they conduct not only refinery and petrochemical plant
construction but other constructions as well, including industrial facilities,
infrastructure, power stations, buildings and housing. Vertically, they offer
engineering consulting, trading services, construction, maintenance, related
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technical service, and operation in addition to engineering service. They
have a relatively small number of well-trained project managers who are in
charge of a project from the beginning to the end. On the other hand,
Japanese engineering contractors, such as JGC, Chiyoda, and TEC,
conduct mainly refinery, petrochemical, and chemical related plant
construction (70-80%). Their business is limited to engineering,
procurement, and construction and they rarely do the upstream and
downstream businesses such as consulting, management, and operation.
The horizontally and vertically configurated operations of U.S. contractors,
based on their cost-plus-fee contract method, permits them to minimize their
risks and thus be involved in a variety of fields. As the former section
described, though, the contract method in the international market has
shi.ted from cost-plus-fee to lump-sum fixed price; thus U.S. engineering
firms face restructuring of their organization as well as their business style.
Both the Japanese engineering industry and the U.S. engineering
industry had a hard time during the 1980's, due mostly to the fall in oil
prices. In addition, the depression in which the U.S. market was caught
during this period forced U.S. engineering contractors to restructure their
organizations and businesses. According to Syunichi Hiraki (The
Engineering Business Oct., 15, 1993), this restructuring practice made it
clear that there were three types of U.S. engineering contractors which
should be considered separately.
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The first type includes Fluor Daniel, Foster Wheeler, and Stone &
Webster, which were able to maintain their listing in the N.Y. stock market.
Although their contract values decreased and profitabilities deteriorated
during that period, they survived by diversifying, globalizing, and expanding
their businesses through the acquisition of a consulting firm. Their positive
measures were effective enough to improve their performances today.
The second type includes Bechtel and Parsons, which are not open
to the public. Bechtel decreased its family's share-holding ratio to less than
50%. Its partners now hold more than 50% of its shares and have begun to
influence its mission, strategy and policy.
Parsons bought back all its shares and became a employees'
stockholding firm. This gave incentives both to the firm and to its
employees. Parsons can expect long-term employment while its
employees can see their efforts reflected in their stock price.
These firms can take a long-term view without being interrupted by
outsiders, although they still need to clear their balances. Since they
cannot issue corporate bonds and commercial papers, they need to
maintain a good relationship with financial institutions in order to rise funds.
Both the above mentioned types of engineering contractors have
promoted diversification in order to meet the needs of as many kind of
clients as possible. They have also been positive about entering new
businesses. On the other hand, they usually just buy licensed technologies
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for their clients and are reluctant to spend money for R&D.
The third type of U.S. engineering contractor includes Kellogg and
Lummus, which were targeted by M&A. Since they specialize in the
refinery, petrochemical, and chemical fields, their performance can easily
be influenced by economic fluctuations, making them similar to Japanese
engineering contractors. They are technology-oriented firms and rely
largely on the licensing business. They can remain successful if they make
themselves recession proof by securing new markets and promoting
globalization.
Forced by a severe business environment, U.S. engineering
contractors strengthened their competitiveness through radical
restructuring. The Bechtel group reduced its number of employees from
40,000 in 1985 to 23,000 in 1993. Today they have expanded their sales in
the international market again, leaving behind Japanese engineering
contractors who have made little progress from their restructuring.
One of the greatest risks U.S. engineering contractors took was to
shift their system from cost-plus-fee contract-oriented to lump-sum contract-
oriented; this demanded a complete organizational change. They made
this effort not only because they understood this trend was strong in the
international market, but because they realized, too, that with appropriate
management the lump-sum contract can bring greater profits. Today, they
seem to hedge the risks associated with the lump-sum contract method by
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collaborating with Japanese engineering contractors; however, once they
have learned the keys for success, U.S. engineering contractors will be
able to dominate the international market again.
4.3.4 Summary of the Case Study: Engineering Contractor
Japanese general contractors (e.g. Kajima) and engineering
contractors (e.g. JGC) are often confused with each other and called
Japanese E&C firms, and the primary business of both is engineering and
construction, but their business practices are incompatible in many
respects. General contractors have a huge domestic market, which makes
them reluctant to expand their international market. Engineering
contractors, on the other hand, have to enter the international market in
order to cover the domestic market's fluctuating business conditions. In
other words, engineering contractors are more globalized because they
have to be.
U.S. engineering contractors once dominated the international
engineering market; however, rapid environmental changes and technical
advancements have made it impossible for a specific engineering
contractor to take the leadership in every engineering field. In order to
compete globally, an engineering contractor has to first identify the specific
needs and preferences of the client, and then endeavor to assemble the
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necessary factors to meet them. Today's complex situations require
engineering contractors to form international coalitions with partners in
order to strengthen their total power. The selection of which types of
coalitions and partners depends on the types of projects, the technologies
involved, financing, countries and degree of experience. The alliances may
take place vertically, covering everything from R&D down to field
construction, and horizontally, going beyond the industry to collaborate with
financial institutions and trading companies.
For example, JGC has made a long-term alliance with Stone &
Webster since its introduction of ethylene production technology, and it has
also formed a close relationship with M.W. Kellogg in natural gas
technology. TEC cooperates with Kellogg in ammonia production
technology, with Lummus in ethylene technology, and with Stone &
Webster in nuclear technology. These examples show that a subtle
combination of competition and coalition plays a crucial role in the current
global strategy. In order to make the coalition as perfect as possible, an
engineering contractor should develop and promote its advantages to
attract partners while establishing a global network.
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chapter 5
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
5.1. Summary
This thesis first described the characteristics of the international
market, then investigated overseas strategies by focusing on Japanese
engineering and construction firms. Today, the U.S. seems to dominate the
international market due largely to its large share of petroleum and
industrial plant construction. This is the area where U.S. contractors can
demonstrate their competitive advantages best, and U.S. engineering and
construction firms rely on this international market. As for Japanese firms,
compared to their domestic construction market, the international market is
relatively small, more competitive, and risky. Although most Japanese
engineering and construction firms regard globalization as a core strategy,
their incentives for globalization are few. As long as Japanese general
contractors can share their huge domestic market, they will not have strong
incentives to advance into the international market. The domestic market is
doubly attractive in that, thanks to the government's fair distribution policy,
316
Japanese general contractors can secure their market shares and maintain
their organizations without difficulty and without being involved in a price
war. Thus, it is natural that the Japanese construction industry regard the
domestic market as important and the international market as secondary.
Although it may be strategically important for the Japanese construction
industry to shut out foreign contractors from the Japanese market, Japanese
general contractors are not worried about being invaded; they are
concerned, though, that not only the domestic contractual system but that
the government's fair distribution policy can be forced to change in the
process of the market opening.
According to Nikkei Construction, U.S. contractors are confident that
they can reduce Japanese construction costs by introducing U.S.
construction management methods. This may be true if the government
adopts the U.S. type of contractual system; however, as section 4.2. shows,
by accepting a higher cost of construction, Japanese clients avoid
construction risks and having to hire industrial contractors, such as
designers, consultants, construction managers, construction firms,
surveyors and suppliers separately. In Japan general contractors do
everything and take almost all responsibilities. Therefore, there are
differences between Japan and the U.S. both in the concept of construction
and in the role of contractors. For example, Bechtel Overseas Inc. refused
to accept a loss in public works by making a claim against the government,
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(Nikkei Construction, July 23, 1993) but the Japanese contractual system
does not permit this kind of claim. Japanese engineering contractors, such
as JGC, increased their overseas contracts by using the comparative
advantage in the lump-sum contract method, which is commonly used in
Japan. Differences in business traditions confuse and mislead not only the
international contractors but the two governments as well.
5.2. Conclusion
When one plans to expand one's business into a new field, one
should know the competition in the new market. Michael E. Porter said in
his book, Competitive Advantage (1985), "Competition is at the core of the
success or failure of firms. Competition determines the appropriateness of
a firm's activities that can contribute to its performance, such as innovation,
a cohesive culture, or good implementation." In the construction industry,
due mostly to its "contract" type of business, the nature of competition is
controlled by its contractual system. Japanese contractors cannot
demonstrate their competitiveness in the international market because the
contractual system in Japan is different from that in the international market.
The difference in the nature of competition creates different types of
organizations and business practices. Thanks to similar contractual
practices, U.S. contractors can enter the international market without
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difficulty. This may be the main reason why U.S. contractors dominate the
international market. Understanding this, U.S. contractors push the U.S.
government to convince the Japanese government to change its contractual
system and its fair distribution policy rather than to make a steady effort to
establish competitive advantages which could be applicable to the
Japanese market. Although this pressure seems unacceptably high
handed at first glance, the inconsistencies and inefficiency of the U.S.
defense contractual system has shown both the clients and the contractors
in the Japanese construction market that the present Japanese contractual
system is also full of inconsistence and is inefficient from the point of view of
free competition. Although it is difficult to say which construction policy and
contractual system is best, it is necessary for both parties concerned to find
the best contractual system in the present situation and business
environment.
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